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Abstract
High-speed rail (HSR) becomes a very hot topic recently when all Portugal, the United Stated,
China, Japan, Spain, etc. are ambitious in building their HSR systems. Although HSR is
expected to shrink the temporal distance between cities, reshape the travel patterns of people
toward environment friendly ones, create an image effect for the country building it, promote
regional economics, etc., HSR is more capital intensive than other transportation projects in both
unit cost (the cost per lane km) and total cost. Due to its high costs and public or private budget
constraints, HSR may have significant financial impacts on other transportation investments.
And it is important to lower the costs of HSR building and explore more funding opportunities to
make HSR investments more financially viable.
This research aims to understand the financial impacts of HSR investments and to explore
financing methods for them. Firstly, this research examines the crowding out effect of HSR
investments on other transportation investments-whether financing HSR makes the funds for
other transportation projects less available due to public or private budget constraints. In addition,
this research compares HSR financing with the financing of other transportation projects to
figure out the uniqueness of HSR financing. Finally, this research explores innovative financing
methods and identifies megaregion revenues to make HSR investments more financially viable.
We find that HSR investments crowd out other transportation investments based on the
worldwide experience. In the end, we propose the use of monoline wrapped bonds and the
establishment of Portuguese infrastructure bank to lower the financial costs of Portuguese HSR
investments. And we recommend the use of value capture mechanisms to capture the megaregion
economic benefits of HSR and gain additional revenues for Portuguese HSR investments.
Thesis Supervisor: Joseph M. Sussman
Title: JR East Professor, Civil & Environmental Engineering and Engineering Systems
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1. Introduction
1.1. Overview of High-Speed Rail
There is no authoritative or standard definition for High-Speed Rail (HSR). The European Union (EU)
defines HSR lines as new lines to be "designed for speeds above 250 km/h" and upgraded lines to be
designed "for speeds up to 200 or even 220 km/h". (International Union of Railway, 2011) HSR is best
suited for journeys ranging from 250 to 900 km: if the distance is larger than 900 km, the air
transportation becomes more attractive because of its time saving advantage in long distance, and it
typically dominates the whole market; if the distance is smaller than 250 kin, HSR typically doesn't have
competitive advantages compared with cars. (Naukowy, 2010)
There are four methods to improve the conventional railway systems: the first one is to upgrade existing
railways, and use existing trains to achieve higher speed; the second one is to upgrade existing railways
and use dedicated High-Speed Trains; the third one is to build new dedicated HSR lines and use dedicated
High-Speed Trains; the fourth one is to combine the first and second methods. Although designed speed
is increased and service quality is enhanced from method one to method three, construction costs and
financing pressure also increase from method one to method three. Sometimes the method three is too
expensive that people may have to turn to other cheaper options, for example, the California government
may finally choose to upgrade existing railway lines instead of building dedicated HSR lines between San
Francisco and San Jose due to the budget constraint. More details of this California HSR issue are
illustrated in Appendix A. It should also be noted that the HSR defined by the EU refers to the railway
lines built using method two and three.
Japan, France, and Germany were the pioneers for the deployment of HSR. The first HSR trains of these
three countries, namely the Japanese Shinkansen, the French TGV, and the German Intercity Express,
finished the first trips in 1964, 1981 and 1991. (Sands, 1993) Following Japan, France and Germany,
South Korea and Taiwan were in the second wave of HSR deployment. The first HSR trains of these two
countries, namely Korea Train Express and Taiwan High Speed Rail, finished the first trips in 2004 and
2007. (Loubinoux, 2008; Taiwan High-Speed Rail, 2011) High-Speed Rail has become one of the most
important transportation modes in the world. For example, China has 8,358 km HSR in operation up to
January, 2011 (Bi, 2011); Japan has 2452 km HSR in operation, and 590 km under construction; France
has 1871 km HSR in operation, and 299 km under construction; Spain has 1598 km HSR in operation,
and 2219 km under construction; and Germany has 1285 km HSR in operation, and 378 km under
construction. (Department of Transport (the UK), 2010)
1.2. High-Speed Rail in Europe
High-Speed Rail has been used by the EU to promote the integration of Europe. The EU is "developing
the most efficient and integrated High-Speed Rail network of the world and it is promoting a rail corridor
with preference for freight." The total length of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) is
"30,000 km, out of which 20, 000 km are expected to be in operation by the year 2020." (European
Commission, 2011)
Portugal is also very ambitious in its High-Speed Rail system. It plans to invest in five HSR lines, as parts
of the TEN-T network in Europe in the future: Lisbon-Madrid (2013), Lisbon-Oporto (2015), Oporto-
Vigo (2013), Aveiro-Salamanca, and Evora-Faro-Huelva. (RAVE, 2008) The map of the planned
Portuguese HSR is illustrated in Figure 1-1. Portugal has finished financing the Poceirao-Caia HSR
project, its first HSR project and part of the Lisbon-Madrid HSR line. (RAVE, 2010B) Within these
planned HSR lines, the Lisbon-Madrid and Aveiro-Salamanca lines, or the East-West lines, are supposed
to link Portugal to Spain, while the others are planned to serve the economic development of Portugal
itself.
Figure 1-1 Planned High-Speed Rail Investments in Portugal
Source: RAVE.2008. The Portuguese High-Speed Rail Project: General Overview and Status of the Project. RAVE's
Presentation. Lisbon, Portugal. September, 2008.
1.3. Motivation for High-Speed Rail Investment in Portugal
According to Melibaeva, Sussman, and Dunn (2010), HSR is becoming more important and popular in
the world because "roads and airports become more congested and greenhouse gas levels increase." They
expect HSR to "reshape the travel patterns and activities of people and consequently changing the ways
cities develop." Based on their analyses, capacity increase of transportation infrastructure, provision of an
environment friendly transportation alternative, and promotion of regional economic development are all
important motivations for HSR investments. (Melibaeva, Sussman, and Dunn, 2010)
In addition, the building of HSR may also creates an image effect and help promote the reputation of a
country. According to Sands (1993), the Japanese Shinkansen "has also had an image effect, further
strengthening the image of Japan as a nation of precision and reliability, not just one of cherry blossoms".
(Sands, 1993) In addition, after the earthquake and tsunami crisis on March 11 *, 2011, the reopening of
the Shinkansen service from Tokyo to Sendai on April 25h, 2011 may have a symbolic effect for Japanese
people, increasing their confidence in the railways and the country and the government. More details are
discussed in Appendix A.
The motivations for building Portuguese HSR are stated by RAVE as "enable a modem, sustainable and
efficient transport system; reduce the country's peripheral position, by connecting Portugal to Europe;
contribute to the Atlantic south-west front competitiveness; accelerate the country's economical and
technological development, also at the regional level; contribute to a better modal distribution, both for
passenger and freight, changing the actual hegemony of road solutions; and increase mobility and
competitiveness of the port, airport and logistics systems". (RAVE, 2010a)
Portugal uses cost benefit analysis based on demand forecast to evaluate the economic benefits generated
from its HSR projects. According to RAVE (2010a), the Porto-Vigo Axis, Lisbon-Porto Axis, Lisbon-
Madrid Axis are estimated to generate 1.7 million, 7.4 million, and 6.7 million HSR journeys and
economic IRR of 2.4%, 10.8% and 5.9% respectively.
In addition, according to RAVE (2008), the building of Lisbon-Porto, Lisbon-Madrid and Porto-Vigo
HSR lines can greatly promote regional economic development: 56 thousand new permanent jobs are
expected to be created in the long run; the private investment of the whole society is expected to increase
by 126 billion Euros; GDP is expected to increase by 121 billion Euros, approximately 50% of the
estimated GDP in 2010; tax revenues are expected to achieve cumulative increase of 64 million Euros.
Furthermore, the building of Portuguese HSR network is projected to bring a positive effect in all regions,
promote greater social and economic cohesion between regions, and help Portugal connect more closely
to other countries in Europe by integrating in the TEN-T network. (RAVE, 2008) Therefore, we can
conclude that Portuguese HSR projects are mostly megaregion projects: megaregions are the regions with
large agglomeration of economic activities, and HSR may contribute to the formation and economic
development of megaregions. We will discuss this megaregion concept in more detail in Chapter 5,
Megaregions and HSR Financing.
1.4. Cost characteristics of High-Speed Rail Investment
Although HSR is expected to bring significant benefits, HSR is more capital intensive than other
transportation projects in both unit cost (the cost per lane km) and total cost. As illustrated in Figure 1-2,
the average unit cost of HSR infrastructure is about 13 million Euros, whereas the average unit cost of toll
road infrastructure is only about 7 million Euros. In addition, the unit cost of one HSR project can vary
significantly. For example, the unit cost of the Hokuriku Shinkansen in Japan, is 4 times higher than the
unit cost of the Spanish High-Speed Rail line between Madrid and Lerida. (FitchRating, 2010) In addition
to the infrastructure costs, rolling stock and signal and communication system can also be very expensive.
For example, the budget for dedicated HSR train to operate along several Illinois corridors is as large as
262.8 million USD. (Illinois Government News Network, 2011)
Figure 1-2 Cost Comparison of HSR and Toll Roads
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Source: FitchRating. 2010. High-Speed Rail Projects: Large, Varied and Complex. Retrieved March, 2011 from
www.fitchratings.com
According to FitchRating (2010), the total capital costs of HSR projects usually exceed 1 billion Euros, or
1.5 billion Euros, primarily due to the long distance nature of HSR projects. Therefore, capital costs, or
the costs to construct infrastructures, of HSR investments, account for a larger portion of total costs than
capital costs of other transportation projects do. In Portugal, the total construction investment for the
Poceirao-Caia HSR project is about 1.359 billion Euros and the life cycle costs of this project are 1.814
billion Euros when discounting all the cash flow back to 2008. (RAVE, 2010b) The high capital costs of
HSR investments can sometimes prevent people from building HSR systems. In February 2011, Florida
Governor Rick Scott (R) announced that Florida was giving up the state's High-Speed Rail project linking
Tampa with Orlando because the state government may still have to provide 3 billion USD even though
the federal government provided 2.4 billion USD at the beginning. More details are illustrated in
Appendix A. (William, 2011)
In addition, even the operation costs of HSR account for a smaller portion of total costs than the operation
costs of other transportation projects do, the operating costs can also prevent people from building HSR
projects. For example, both the Ohio's Governor John Kasich and the Wisconsin's Governor Scott
Walker rejected the funding from the federal government of the United States to build their HSR projects
due to their worry about the high operating costs. More details are discussed in Appendix A.
The cost-intensiveness characteristic of HSR investments increases people's concern that HSR
investments may make the funds for other transportation modes less available due to public or private
budget constraints, or in other words, HSR investments crowd out investments of other transportation
modes. For example, as for the building of HSR in Spain, "Critics say the country's massive investment in
High-Speed Rail has come at the expense of other, less-glamorous forms of transportation. Starved of
funds, Spain's antiquated freight-train network has fallen into disuse, forcing businesses to move their
goods around by road." (Catan, 2009)
1.5. Current Economic Condition of Portugal and Assumptions of this
Thesis
Portugal, as a part of the EU, is considered to be a developed country in the world, with the GDP of 232.8
billion USD in 2009. (The World Bank, 201 1a) The 2008 financial Crisis has severely damaged the
Portuguese economy, resulting in "a wide range of domestic problems specifically related to the levels of
public deficit in the economy, as well as the excessive debt levels, soaring up to at least 223% of
Portugal's GDP." (The World Bank, 201 1b) The Portuguese government is struggling between spending
more money to stimulate the weak domestic economy and limiting its public spending to maintain its
public deficit level around the EU average. It has been predicted that "the Portuguese economy will not
significantly recover until 2012." (The World Bank, 201 1b)
The 2010 European sovereign debt crisis, originally started in Greece, has also severely affected the
economy of the EU members including Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, and Belgium. The fear of
this crisis can be reflected by "the widening of bond yield spreads and risk insurance on credit default
swaps 1 between these countries and other EU members, most importantly Germany." (International
Business Times, 2011, Matlock, 2010, and Oakley and Hope, 2010)
Portugal's sovereign debt rating has been downgraded significantly recently. In March, 2011, Portugal's
sovereign debt rating was downgraded by Moody's Investors Service, one of the three biggest rating
agencies, to A3 2, a rating only four steps from so-called junk status. Moody explained the reasons as "a
weaker outlook for economic growth, risks to the government's deficit- reduction plans and a possible
need to recapitalize banks." (Lima and Rastello, 2011) On April 1st, 2011, Portugal's sovereign debt
rating was downgraded by Fitch Rating, another top three rating agency, to BBB-3 , the lowest investment
grade. (Ross-Thomas and Meier, 2011) On April 5t, 2011, Portugal's sovereign debt rating was further
downgraded by Moody's Investors Service to Baal, three steps from junk status. (Ross-Thomas and
Meier, 2011)
On April, 6t, 2011, Portugal informed the EU of its intention to ask for "the activation of financial
support mechanisms", or financial bailout. (Froymovich, 2011) According to Minder and Castle (2011),
"Europe's monetary affairs commissioner said that preliminary estimates indicated that Portugal would
need about 80 billion Euros, or $114 billion, though some analysts have suggested that the amount could
be as much as 110 billion Euros." (Minder and Castle, 2011)
On April 8t, 2011, Eurogroup and ECOFIN Ministers issued a statement clarifying that "EU (European
Financial Stabilization Mechanism) and euro-area (European Financial Stability Facility) financial
support would be provided on the basis of a policy programme supported by strict conditionality and
negotiated with the Portuguese authorities". (The European Commission, the IMF and the ECB, 2011)
On May 3rd, 2011, the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European
Central Bank (ECB) issued the Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy
Conditionality for Portugal. According to this MOU, Portugal will be required to endure years of
1 The definition of credit default swap (CDS) is illustrated in the List of Definitions. Here the reference obligation is
the sovereign bonds of EU members.
2 The definition of Moody's rating is in List of Definition.
3 The definition of Fitch's rating is in List of Definition.
unprecedented austerity, government expenditure cut and taxes rise (or tax deductions decrease) to reduce
the government deficit to "below EUR 10,068 million (equivalent to 5.9/o of GDP based on current
projections) in 2011, EUR 7,645 million (4.5% of GDP) in 2012 and EUR 5,224 million (3.0% of GDP)
in 2013". (The European Commission, the IMF and the ECB, 2011) For example, this MOU requires
Portugal to "reduce costs in the area of education, with the aim of saving EUR 195 million by
rationalizing the school network by creating school clusters; reduce costs in Stated-owned enterprises
(SOEs) with the aim of saving at least EUR 515 million; reduce corporate tax deductions and special
regimes, with a yield of at least EUR 150 million in 2012" and so on. (The European Commission, the
IMF and the ECB, 2011)
As for Public Private Partnerships, the MOU requires Portugal to avoid any new PPP contracts, "perform
an initial assessment of at least the 20 most significant PPP contracts" (probably including the Poceirao-
Caia HSR project), recruit a top international accounting firm to undertake a more detailed study of PPPs,
put legal and institutional structures in place to ensure no frivolous spending in the form of PPPs is
undertaken in the future, and so on. (The European Commission, the IMF and the ECB, 2011) These
restrictions of new PPP contracts make it impossible for Portugal to build HSR when it is accepting
bailout assistance from the EU and IMF.
In summary, in this MOU, requirements for government expenditure cuts and restrictions for new PPP
contracts together significantly lower the possibility of deploying new HSR investments in Portugal when
Portugal still receives financial support from the EU and IMF in the near future.
Therefore, we can conclude that the current economy of Portugal is weak and instable, and it is open to
considerable question for Portugal to build a new HSR line in the near future. Our analyses in this thesis
are done for the future HSR financing in Portugal when the economy of Portugal has become much better.
In other words, the most important assumption of this thesis is that Portugal will build other HSR lines
only when the economy of Portugal has significantly recovered.
Although this thesis tries to incorporate all the up-to-date information into the analysis (e.g. we discuss
Current Events of Relevance in Appendix A), this thesis cannot avoid having many limitations and
uncertainties because this thesis will be finished before May, 2011 and the current economy of Portugal is
instable.
1.6. Thesis Outline
Therefore, based on the assumption that Portugal will build other HSR lines only when the economy of
Portugal has significantly recovered, this thesis aims to understand 1) the crowding out effect of HSR
investments on other transportation projects, 2) the use of innovative financing methods to lower the
financial costs and 3) the identification of megaregion revenues to make HSR investments more
financially viable. If the crowding out effect exists, the use of innovative financing methods and the
identification of megaregion revenues can also help counter the crowding out effect.
The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 is this introduction; Chapter 2 examines the crowding
out effect of HSR investment on other transportation investments using comparative analysis of China,
Germany, Taiwan and Japan; Chapter 3 compares HSR financing with the financing of other
transportation projects in China, Germany, Taiwan, Portugal, and Japan, and in the end identifies the pros
and cons of financing Portuguese HSR in various ways; Chapter 4 identifies innovative financing
methods that can be used to lower the financial costs of HSR investments, and provides institutional
suggestions for the use of these innovative financing methods in Portugal; Chapter 5 examines the
economic influence of HSR on megaregions, and captures part of these economic benefits to finance the
building of Portuguese HSR projects using value capture mechanisms; Chapter 6 concludes all the
findings in this thesis, and provides recommendations for building Portuguese HSR projects in the future.
2. Crowding Out Effect of HSR Investment
2.1. Overview
In this chapter, we focus on four different countries: China, Germany, Taiwan and Japan. Our purpose is
to find out whether HSR investments crowd out other transportation projects.
To be clear, we define crowding out effect of financing HSR on other transportation projects as financing
HSR makes the funds for other transportation projects less available due to public or private budget
constraints. To accurately measure the crowding out effect, we have to compare the scenario with HSR
and the imaginary scenario without HSR, but we are unlikely to get the data of the imaginary scenario
here. Therefore we define the crowding out effect using three less accurate but more measurable sub-
definitions: the effect that investments in other transportation modes decrease when HSR is being built,
the effect that investments in other transportation modes decrease as a percentage of the total fixed asset
investment of the society when HSR is being built, and the effect that investments in other transportation
modes decrease as a percentage of the total fixed asset investment in transportation when HSR is being
built.
If the crowding out effect exists, we need to further analyze the scale of HSR investments, the scale
change of HSR investments, and the scale change of other transportation investments, to identify whether
the crowding out effect is significant. This is because if the scale and the scale change of HSR
investments are not large, HSR investments are not able to crowd out other transportation investments in
a large extent; if the scale change of other transportation investments is not large, the influence of HSR
investments on these projects is limited.
In addition, here we are most interested in the crowding out effect of HSR investments on urban
transportation because without connecting HSR to urban transportation, HSR cannot bring real time
saving benefits to most people, and cannot promote the regional economic development to the largest
extent.
2.2. China
2.2.1. Overview of China's Transportation Investment
In China, a very high percentage of tax revenue goes to the central government. 75% of the three most
important types of tax revenue: VAT, consumer tax and Enterprise income tax goes to the central
government, while only 25% are left to provincial and local governments. On the other hand, the central
government is responsible for building most of infrastructures across the country. In the case of
transportation infrastructures, most of the funds for building the national railway system (including HSR),
national road system, and national inland waterway system come from the central government. Airports
construction seems to be the only exception with only about one quarter of the funds coming from the
central government. For example, 22.3 billion out of 82 billion RMB (or 3.28 billion out of 12.06 billion
USD 4), which is the total aviation infrastructure investment from 2001 to 2005, comes from the central
government of China (Civil Aviation Administration of China, 2008).
Within the central government, the National Development and Reform Commission has broad
administrative and planning control over the Chinese economy. It is responsible for making the important
decisions on how much money should be spent on each transportation mode, which projects should be
built and so on. The Ministry of Transport of the People's Republic is the executing agency which is in
charge of building the national road system, national inland waterway system and national sea ports. The
Ministry of Railway is responsible for the building of the national railway system, including High-Speed
Rail. The Civil Aviation Administration of China is responsible for the building and coordinating of
national airports.
2.2.2. Investments of Different Transportation Modes in China
The statistics of National Bureau of Statistics of China below can provide us an overview of investments
of different transportation modes:
4 The exchange rate used here is: 1 USD=6.8 RMB
Table 2-1 Fixed Asset Investment in Different Transportation Modes (US$ billions)5
Mode/Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Railway6  12.10 18.14 29.99 34.78 59.11 100.34
Road 64.90 79.88 92.32 101.50 107.87 152.69
Urban Transport 5.82 7.73 12.58 15.91 19.23 29.94
Waterway 7.82 11.52 14.63 16.36 17.41 24.40
Aviation 3.99 4.43 6.81 8.72 8.59 8.97
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2010, Retrieved Dec 2n, 2010 from http://www.stats.gov.cn/tisi/
Figure 2-1 Fixed Asset Investment in Different Transportation Modes (US$ billions)
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Table 2-2 Increase of Fixed Asset Investment of Different Transportation Modes Based on Their 2004 Value
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Railway 100% 150% 248% 287% 489% 829%
Road 100% 123% 142% 156% 166% 235%
Urban Transport 100% 133% 216% 273% 331% 515%
Waterway 100% 147% 187% 209% 223% 312%
Aviation 100% 111% 171% 219% 216% 225%
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2010, Retrieved Dec 2 ', 2010 from http://www.stats.gov.cn/tisi/
5 The exchange rate used here is: I USD=6.8 RMB
6 China began its HSR building in 2005 and massively increased its HSR investment in 2008
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From Table 2-1, Table 2-2, Figure 2-1, and Figure 2-2 above, we can see investments in all five
transportation modes increased from 2003 to 2009. Investments in railway increased at the fastest pace,
especially after 2007. Investments in urban transportation also increased at a very fast pace, ranking 2 "d
among all these five modes.
Table 2-3 Fixed Asset Investment In Different Transportation Modes / The Total Fixed Asset Investment of the Society7
Mode/Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Railway 1.4% 1.6% 2.2% 2.0% 2.7% 3.5%
Road 7.5% 7.2% 6.7% 5.9% 5.0% 5.3%
Urban Transport 0.7% 0.7% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 1.0%
Waterway 0.9% 1.0% 1.1% 0.9% 0.8% 0.9%
Aviation 0.5% 0.4% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3%
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2010, Retrieved Dec 2', 2010 from http://www.stats.gov.cn/tisi/
7 The total fixed asset investment of the society includes both the public and private investments
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Table 2-4 Increase of Ratio of Fixed Asset Investment of Different Transportation Modes / The Total Fixed Asset
Investment of the Society Based on Their 2004 Value
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Railway 100.0% 114.3% 157.1% 142.9% 192.9% 250.0%
Road 100.0% 96.0% 89.3% 78.7% 66.7% 70.7%
Urban Transport 100.0% 100.0% 128.6% 128.6% 128.6% 142.9%
Waterway 100.0% 111.1% 122.2% 100.0% 88.9% 100.0%
Aviation 100.0% 80.0% 100.0% 100.0% 80.0% 60.0%
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2010, Retrieved Dec 22, 2010 from http://www.stats.gov.cn/tisi/
Figure 2-4 Increase of Ratio of Fixed Asset Investment of Different Transportation Modes / The Total Fixed Asset
Investment of the Society Based on Their 2004 Value
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From Table 2-3, Table 2-4, Figure 2-3, and Figure 2-4 above, we can conclude the fixed asset investments
in railway and urban transportation increased as a percentage of the total fixed asset investment of the
society from 2003 to 2009. At the same time the fixed asset investments in road decreased as a percentage
of the total fixed asset investment of the society from 2003 to 2009. The fixed asset investments in
waterway stayed almost flat as a percentage of the total fixed asset investment of the society from 2003 to
2009.
Table 2-5 Fixed Asset Investment of Different Transportation Modes
Transportation
/ The Total Fixed Asset Investment in
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Railway 12.79% 14.90% 19.18% 19.62% 27.85% 31.72%
Road 68.59% 65.63% 59.05% 57.26% 50.83% 48.27%
Urban Transport 6.15% 6.35% 8.05% 8.97% 9.06% 9.47%
Waterway 8.26% 9.47% 9.36% 9.23% 8.20% 7.71%
Aviation 4.21% 3.64% 4.36% 4.92% 4.05% 2.84%
Total 1 1 1 1 1 1
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2010, Retrieved Dec 2d, 2010 from http://www.stats.gov.cn/tisi/
Figure 2-5 Fixed Asset Investment of Different Transportation Modes / The Total Fixed Asset Investment in
Transportation
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Table 2-6 Increase of Ratio of Fixed Asset Investment of Different Transportation Model
Investment in Transportation Based on Their 2004 Value
The Total Fixed Asset
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Railway 100% 117% 150% 153% 218% 248%
Road 100% 96% 86% 83% 74% 70%
Urban Transport 100% 103% 131% 146% 147% 154%
Waterway 100% 115% 113% 112% 99% 93%
Aviation 100% 86% 103% 117% 96% 67%
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2010, Retrieved Dec 2n, 2010 from http://www.stats.gov.cntisi/
Figure 2-6 Increase of Ratio of Fixed Asset Investment of Different Transportation Modes / The Total Fixed Asset
Investment in Transportation Based on Their 2004 Value
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From Table 2-5, Table 2-6, Figure 2-5, and Figure 2-6 above, we can conclude the fixed asset investments
in railway and urban transportation increased as a percentage of the total fixed asset investment in
transportation from 2003 to 2009. At the same time the fixed asset investments in road and aviation
decreased as a percentage of the total fixed asset investment in transportation increased from 2003 to
2009. The fixed asset investments in waterway stayed almost flat as a percentage of the total fixed asset
investment in transportation increased from 2003 to 2009.
Table 2-7 Annual Fixed Asset Investment of the Transportation Industry and the Whole Society
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Annual fixed asset investment of the
transportation industry 94.62 121.70 156.33 177.26 212.21 316.35
Annual fixed asset investment of the whole
society 862.06 1104.36 1374.59 1726.68 2178.93 2854.98
The percentage of transportation fixed
asset investment in the total fixed asset
investment (annually) 10.98% 11.02% 11.37% 10.27% 9.74% 11.08%
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2010, Retrieved [ec 2', 2010 from http://www.stats.nov.cn/tisi/
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Figure 2-8 The Percentage of The Annual Transportation Fixed Asset Investment in the Annual Total Fixed Asset
Investment of the Whole Society
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Table 2-8 Accumulated Fixed Asset Investment of the Transportation Industry and the Whole Society
2004- 2004- 2004- 2004- 2004-
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Accumulated fixed asset investment of
the transportation industry from 2004 94.62 216.32 372.65 549.91 762.12 1078.46
Accumulated fixed asset investment of
the whole society from 2004 862.06 1966.42 3341.02 5067.69 7246.62 10101.60
The percentage of transportation fixed
asset investment in the total fixed asset
investment (accumulated from 2004) 10.98% 11.00% 11.15% 10.85% 10.52% 10.68%
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2010, Retrieved Dec 2', 2010 from http://www.stats.gov.cn/tisi/
Figure 2-9 Accumulated Fixed Asset Investment of the Transportation Industry and the Whole Society
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Figure 2-10 The Percentage of Accumulated Transportation Fixed Asset Investment in the Accumulated Total Fixed
Asset Investment of the Whole Society (Starting From 2004)
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From Table 2-7, Table 2-8, Figure 2-7, Figure 2-8, Figure 2-9, and Figure 2-10, we can see from 2004 to
2009, the percentage of the annual transportation fixed asset investment in the annual total fixed asset
investment fluctuated in narrow range from 9.5% to 11.5%. From Table 1-8 and Figure 1-10, we can see
from 2004 to 2009, the percentage of accumulated transportation fixed asset investment in the
accumulated total fixed asset investment starting from 2004 fluctuated in narrower range from 10.5% to
11.2%. All these indicate that the transportation fixed asset investment is pretty stable in the percentage of
the total fixed asset investment, even after the start of massive HSR building in 2008.
2.2.3. Crowding Out Effect of HSR Investments in China
Figure 2-2 shows the change of fixed asset investments of different transportation modes from 2005 to
2009. From this figure, we can conclude that if we define crowding out effect as the effect that
investments in other transportation modes decrease when HSR is being built, no crowding out effect
exists here since investments in all transportation modes increase.
Figure 2-4 shows the change of the ratios of fixed asset investment of different transportation modes
divided by the total fixed asset investment of the society from 2005 to 2009. From this figure we can
conclude that if we define crowding out effect as the effect that investments in other transportation modes
decrease as a percentage of the total fixed asset investment of the society when HSR is being built,
crowding out effect exists here: building of HSR crowds out investments in roads and aviation, but not
crowds out investments urban transportation and waterway.
In addition, according to Table 2-3, railway investments increase from 1.4% of the total fixed asset
investment of the society in 2004 to 3.5% in 2009; road investments drop from 7.5% of the total fixed
asset investment of the society in 2004 to 5.3% in 2009; aviation investments drop from 0.5% of the total
fixed asset investment in 2004 to 0.3% in 2009: the scale of railway investments is large, the scale
changes of railway and road investments are significant in both absolute value and relative value
compared to their original ones, the scale change of aviation industry is not significant in absolute value
but significant in relative value. Therefore, we can further conclude that the crowding out effect is
significant on both road and aviation projects in the sub-definition 2.
Figure 2-6 shows the change of the ratios of fixed asset investment of different transportation modes
divided by the total fixed asset investment of the transportation industry from 2005 to 2009. From this
figure, we can conclude that if we define crowding out effect as the effect that investments in other
transportation modes decrease as a percentage of the total fixed asset investment in transportation when
HSR is being built, crowding out effect exists here: building of HSR crowds out investments in roads,
waterway, and aviation, but does not crowd out investments urban transportation.
In addition, according to Table 2-5, railway investments increase from 12.8% of total fixed asset
investment of the transportation industry in 2004 to 31.8% in 2009; road investments drop from 68.6% of
total fixed asset investment of the transportation industry in 2004 to 48.3% in 2009; waterway
investments drop from 8.2% of the transportation industry in 2004 to 7.7% in 2009; aviation investments
drop from 4.2% of the transportation industry in 2004 to 2.8% in 2009: the scale of railway investments is
large, the scale changes of railway and road are also significant in both the absolute and relative value, the
scale change of aviation industry is not significant in absolute value but significant in relative value, and
the scale change of waterway is neither significant in absolute nor relative value. Therefore, we can
further conclude that the crowding out effect is significant on both road and aviation projects, but not
significant on waterway projects.
Therefore, as illustrated in Table 2-9, we will reach different conclusions for crowding out effect
depending on how we define crowding out effect.
Table 2-9 Crowding Out Effect--China
Urban
Road transport Waterway Aviation
Sub-definition 1: the effect that
investments in other transportation
modes decrease when HSR is
being built No No No No
Sub-definition 2: the effect that
investments in other transportation
modes decrease as a percentage of
the total fixed asset investment of
the society when HSR is being Yes, Yes,
built significant No No significant
Sub-definition 3: the effect that
investments in other transportation
modes decrease as a percentage of
the total fixed asset investment in
transportation when HSR is being Yes, Yes, not Yes,
built significant No significant significant
Source: summarized by the author
2.3. Germany
2.3.1. Overview of Germany's Transportation Investment
Germany is a federally organized nation and it has a cooperative federal system, which consists of the
federal government (Bund), the federal states (Bundeslander), and communities (Gemeinden). In this
cooperative system, most of the infrastructure investment decisions are made by the federal government,
while the states are only responsible for implementation. In the case of transportation, the federal
government shoulders the responsibility for planning, financing, constructing, maintaining and operating
federal roads and trunk roads, federal railways (including HSR), and inland waterways, while the states
are responsible for the building of airports and sea ports. The general public budget is the main source for
funds for transportation infrastructure investments in Germany, which means that on one hand most
infrastructure investments are funded through the general public budget; on the other hand user charges
such as vehicle taxes and mineral oil taxes are not dedicated funding sources for the transportation sector.
(Astrid Guhneman, 2005)
2.3.2. The Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan 2003
One of the most important transportation infrastructure investment planning tools is The Federal
Transport Infrastructure Plan (2003), which provides a view for the transportation infrastructure
investments towards 2015. This FTIP 2003 considers all types of transportation projects together, e.g.
truck roads, railways, and etc. and set priorities based on certain criteria, such as benefit-cost ratios,
network design considerations, the status of planning and the level of investments that is likely to be
available over the lifetime of the plan, environmental and nature conservation influences, and ecological
risks they pose (BMVBS, 2010a).
The total investment budget for projects in the FTIP 2003 is 149 billion Euros from 2001 to 2015 in total:
83 billion Euros are for maintenance, and 66 billion Euros are for building new projects (BMVBS, 2010a).
Two kinds of projects, the first and second priority projects are listed in FTIP 2003. The investment
budget is just used to build the first priority projects. The government may not be able to build the second
priority projects although these projects have been proven to be able to bring social benefits. (BMVBS,
2010b)
2.3.3. Planning of HSR Investment in Germany
In the end of 2003, the total length of the HSR network in Germany was close to 1900km. HSR projects
are treated the same as other projects and are prioritized using the same criteria in FTIP 2003. HSR
projects in the FTIP 2003 are listed below (BMVBS, 2010b):
In the category of "ongoing and definitely planned first priority rail projects" (first priority category),
1.8298 billion Euros out of 17.9324 billion Euros are invested in HSR projects till 2015, including:
e Upgrade the Hamburg-Buchen-Berlin lines (Vmax=230 km/h, 563.8 million Euros)
e Construct new line between Stuttgart and Uhn for 250 km/h, incl. integration in Stuttgart hub;
upgrade between Ulm and Augsburg for speeds up to 200 km/h (1266.0 million Euros)
In the category of "new first priority rail projects" (first priority category), less than 9.694 billion Euros
out of 15.9933 billion Euros are invested in HSR projects:
" Construct new double-track lines from Lauenbruck to Isernhagen (Vmax=300km/h, part of
1.2839 billion Euros)
e Upgrade the Seelze-Wunstorf-Minden lines/construct new lines (Vmax=230km/h, 901.3 million
Euros)
e Upgrade the Hanau-Wurzburg/Fulda-Erfurt lines/construct new lines (construct new double-
track lines between Gelnhausen and Mottgers with grade-separated connecting curves towards
Fulda and Burgsinn linking the new line to the existing Fulda-Wurzburg High-Speed Rail line,
Vmax=300km/h, part of 2.250 billion Euros)
* Construct new Rhine/Main-Rhine/Neckar lines (Vmax=300km/h, 1.7714 billion Euros)
e Upgrade the Augsburg-Munich lines (Vmax=230km/h, 328.4 million Euros)
e Upgrade the Karlsruhe-Offenburg-Freiburg-Basle lines/construct new lines (Vmax=250kn/h,
part of 2.8231 billion Euros)
e Upgrade the Munster-Lunen line (Vmax=200 km/h, 177.0 million Euros)
e Upgrade the Neu-Ulm-Augsburg lines (Vmax=200km/h, 158.9 million Euros)
2.3.4. Crowding Out Effect of HSR Investments in Germany
In Germany, The Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan (2003) is the most important planning tool for all
types of transportation projects together, e.g. HSR, truck roads, conventional railways, and etc. In the
FTIP 2003, the HSR investments are only about 7.7% of the total transportation infrastructure
investments from 2001 to 2015. If these potential HSR projects didn't exist, the federal government may
use this extra money to move on the second priority transportation projects. Therefore, if we consider the
third sub-definition of crowding out effect, the effect that investments in other transportation modes
decrease as a percentage of the total fixed asset investment in transportation when HSR is being built, the
crowding out effect of HSR does exist in Germany. But since the HSR only account for a small portion,
the crowding out effect may not be significant.
Noticing that all transportation infrastructure projects, including HSR projects are prioritized based on
certain scientific criteria, such as benefit-cost ratios, network design considerations, and so on, we can
also see the building of HSR are very well justified in the FTIP 2003 even though the crowding out effect
exists. The crowding out effect of HSR investments on other transportation projects in Germany is
illustrated in Table 2-10.
Table 2-10 Crowding Oat Effect--Germany
Germany Road Urban Waterway Aviation
transport
Sub-definition 1: the effect that
investments in other transportation NA NA NA NA
modes decrease when HSR is being
built
Sub-definition 2: the effect that
investments in other transportation
modes decrease as a percentage of NA NA NA NA
the total fixed asset investment of
the society when HSR is being built
Sub-definition 3: the effect that
investments in other transportation Probably Probably Probably Probably
modes decrease as a percentage of yes, and yes, and yes, and yes, and
the total fixed asset investment in not not not not
transportation when HSR is being significant significant significant significant
built
Source: summarized by the author
2.4. Taiwan
2.4.1. HSR Investment in Taiwan
Taiwan High-Speed Rail (THSR) is a High-Speed Rail network that runs along the west coast of Taiwan.
It is approximately 345 km long and it runs from Taipei to Kaohsiung. The THSR plan began in 1997.
The infrastructure construction began in 2000. The service starting date was estimated to be in Oct.2005,
but was delayed to January 5, 2007. The construction phrase lasted for 10 years, from 1997 to 2006. The
project had a total cost of 18 billion USD. (Taiwan High-Speed Rail, 2011) This HSR project is one of the
largest privately managed and funded transportation projects up to 2007. (Shima, 2007)
In November 1994, Taiwan passed a law about the involvement of private capital in infrastructure
projects, which also applied to the THSR project. Consequently, in 1995, the Provisional Engineering
Office of High Speed Rail (POHSR) was transformed into the Bureau of High-Speed Rail (BOHSR),
which started to tender THSR as a build-operate-transfer (BOT) scheme in October 1996 (Taiwan High-
Speed Rail, 2011).
In a prolonged bidding process, the Taiwan High-Speed Rail Consortium (THSRC) ran against the
Chunghwa High-Speed Rail Consortium (CHSRC). THSRC, founded by five domestic companies,
submitted the cheaper bid by promising to pay 3.1 billion USD and to build the line with zero net cost for
the government, was chosen as the preferred bidder in September 1997 (I-Tsung Tsai, 2007). The group
was renamed and formally established as the Taiwan High-Speed Rail Corporation (THSRC) in May
1998. THSRC and the government finally signed the BOT agreement on July 23, 1998 (Taiwan High-
Speed Rail, 2011). More details of financing will be illustrated in Chapter 3, Difference between
Financing HSR and Other Transportation Projects.
2.4.2. The New Ten Major Construction Projects
When THSR was still in its construction phrase, or in November 2003, the premier Yu Shyi-kun
introduced The New Ten Major Construction Projects, a construction plan in Taiwan. The total
investment for this plan within five years was estimated to be NT$500 billion, or 16.5 billion USD.
Within these ten projects, four were transportation projects: TRA MRTizion, The Third Wave of Freeway
Construction, Kaohsiung Harbor Intercontinental Container Port Center, and northern, central, and
southern metro system (Council for Economic Planning and Development (Taiwan), 2011).
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TRA MRTizion was a plan of improving short-distance and middle-distance transportation quality of
railway lines in the west part of Taiwan (Council for Economic Planning and Development (Taiwan),
2011). The total estimated costs for these 12 TRA MRTizion projects were more than NT$130 billion, or
4.3 billion USD (Council for Economic Planning and Development (Taiwan), 2011). The Third Wave of
Freeway Construction was a plan of building 8 road projects in Taiwan, for example, Zhitou Freeway
(Council for Economic Planning and Development (Taiwan), 2011). Kaohsiung Harbor Intercontinental
Container Port Center was built to enhance the competitiveness of Kaohsiung. The first phrase of this
project was built using BOT and the total costs of the first phrase were estimated to be NT$ 15 billion, or
about 500 million USD (Council for Economic Planning and Development (Taiwan), 2011).
2.4.3. Crowding Out Effect of HSR Investments in Taiwan
In November 2003, when Taiwan HSR project was still in its construction and financing process, Taiwan
government established The New Ten Major Construction Projects and started the building of other
transportation projects, such as local railways, roads, sea ports and so on.
It is hard to find direct evidence to prove whether HSR in Taiwan crowds out the investments in other
transportation modes. If we consider the first sub-definition the effect that investments in other
transportation modes decrease when HSR is being built, the THSR building in Taiwan may not crowd out
the building of other transportation infrastructures because the Taiwan government planned to invest
significantly in other transportation modes when HSR was still in its financing and construction phrase.
The crowding out effect of HSR investments on other transportation projects is illustrated in Table 2-11.
Table 2-11 Crowding Out Effect---Taiwan
Taiwan Road Urban Waterway Aviation
transport
Sub-definition 1: the effect that
investments in other transportation Probably Probably Probably Probably
modes decrease when HSR is being no no no no
built
Sub-definition 2: the effect that
investments in other transportation
modes decrease as a percentage of the NA NA NA NA
total fixed asset investment of the
society when HSR is being built
Sub-definition 3: the effect that
investments in other transportation
modes decrease as a percentage of the NA NA NA NA
total fixed asset investment in
transportation when HSR is being
built
Source: summarized by the author
2.5. Japan
2.5.1. Overview of Japan's Transportation Investment
Japan has a very modem transportation system, including all road, railway, airport and urban
transportation projects. Japan has an approximately 1.2 million kilometer road network. Major cities are
typically connected by high-speed toll roads operated by toll-collecting enterprises. Japan has a 23,670.7
km length railway network including 2,893.1 km of the entirely electrified standard gauge one and 89.8
km of narrow gauge. There are a lot of Japanese railway companies competing in both regional and local
passenger transportation markets, such as the six JR companies (JR East, JR Central, JR West, JR
Hokkaid6, JR Shikoku and JR Kyilshil), Kintetsu Corporation, etc. These companies often build real
estate or department stores next to stations to get a significant amount of non-transportation revenues.
Shinkansen are the High-Speed Trains in Japan operating in a frequency of about 250 Shinkansen trains
daily. The fastest shinkansen trains are the N700 series Nozomi, which operate at a maximum speed of
300 km/h. There are 173 airports in Japan. The largest international gateways are Narita International
Airport (Tokyo area), Kansai International Airport (Osaka/Kobe/Kyoto area), and Chiibu Centrair
International Airport (Nagoya area). (Wikipedia, 201 1f)
The fixed asset investment of different transportation modes is illustrated in Table 2-12:
Table 2-12 Fixed Asset Investment in Different Transportation Modes (Japan), Billion USD
2008 2009
Road investment 14.573 12.22
Seaport 2.279 2.195
Airport 1.536 1.429
Urban railway 0.39 0.36
HSR 0.706 0.706
Aid to navigation for Airplane and Ships 0.052 0.052
Total 19.536 16.962
Source: Sakamoto, Personal communication, Jan 17, 2011
Table 2-13 The Increase of Fixed Asset Investment of Different Transportation Modes Based on Their 2008 Value (Japan)
2008 2009
Road investment 100% 83.85%
Seaport 100% 96.31%
Airport 100% 93.03%
Urban railway 100% 92.31%
HSR 100% 100.00%
Aid to navigation for Airplane and Ships 100% 100.00%
Source: Sakamoto, Personal communication, Jan 17, 2011
Figure 2-11 The Increase of Fixed Asset Investment of Different Transportation Modes Based on Their 2008 Value
(Japan)
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From Table 2-12, Table 2-13, and Figure 2-11 above, we can see in Japan, the investments in roads,
seaports, airports and urban railways decreased from 2008 to 2009, and only the investments in HSR
maintained the same level.
Table 2-14 Fixed Asset Investment of Different Transportation Mode Total Fixed Asset Investment in Transportation
(Japan)
2008 2009
Road investment 74.60% 72.04%
Seaport 11.67% 12.94%
Airport 7.86% 8.42%
Urban railway 2.00% 2.12%
HSR 3.61% 4.16%
Aid to navigation for Airplane and Ships 0.27% 0.31%
Total 100% 100%
Source: Sakamoto, Personal communication, Jan 17,2011
Table 2-15 The Increase of Ratio of Fixed Asset Investment of Different Transportation Modes / The Total Fixed Asset
Investment of the Society Based on Their 2008 Value (Japan)
2008 2009
Road investment 100% 96.58%
Seaport 100% 110.93%
Airport 100% 107.15%
Urban railway 100% 106.32%
HSR 100% 115.18%
Aid to navigation for Airplane and Ships 100% 115.18%
Source: Sakamoto, Personal communication, Jan 17, 2011
Figure 2-12 The Increase of Ratio of Fixed Asset Investment of Different Transportation Mode / The Total Fixed Asset
Investment of The Society Based on Their 2008 Value (Japan)
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From Table 2-14, Table 2-15, Figure 2-12 above, we can conclude the fixed asset investments in HSR and
urban railways, seaports and airports increased as a percentage of the total fixed asset investments in
transportation from 2008 to 2009, with the investments in HSR increasing by the largest percentage. At
the same time the fixed asset investments in roads decreased as a percentage of the total fixed asset
investments in transportation increased from 2008 to 2009.
2.5.2. Crowding Out Effect of HSR Investments in Japan
We can see the crowding out effect of HSR investments by analyzing Figure 2-11 and Figure 2-12. We
will reach different conclusions for the crowding out effect if we define crowding out effect differently.
Figure 2-11 shows the change of fixed asset investments of different transportation modes from 2008 to
2009. From this figure, we can conclude if we define crowding out effect as the effect that investments in
other transportation modes decrease when HSR is being built, the crowding out effect exists here since
investments in all other transportation modes decreased. However, according to Table 2-12, since the
scale of HSR investments is very small compared to the investments of roads, the crowding out effect on
roads cannot be significant. On the other hand, the scale change of seaports, urban rails and airport
investments is small in both absolute and relative value, so the crowding out effect on these projects are
also limited.
Figure 2-12 shows the change of the ratio of fixed asset investments divided by the total fixed asset
investments of the society from 2008 to 2009. From this figure, we can conclude that if we define
crowding out effect as the effect that investments in other transportation modes decrease as a percentage
of the total fixed asset investments of the society when HSR is being built, the crowding out effect only
exists on road projects. According to Table 2-14, since the scale of HSR investments is very small
compared to the investments of roads, the crowding out effect on roads cannot be significant.
The crowding out effect of HSR investments on other transportation projects is illustrated in Table 2-16.
Table 2-16 Crowding Out Effect---Japan
Road Urban Rail Seaport Aviation
Sub-definition 1: the effect that
investments in other transportation
modes decrease when HSR is Yes, not Yes, not Yes, not Yes, not
being built significant significant significant significant
Sub-definition 2: the effect that
investments in other transportation
modes decrease as a percentage of
the total fixed asset investment of
the society when HSR is being
built NA NA NA NA
Sub-definition 3: the effect that
investments in other transportation
modes decrease as a percentage of
the total fixed asset investment in
transportation when HSR is being Yes, not
built significant No No No
Source: summarized by the author
2.6. Conclusion
The crowding out effect of China, Germany, Taiwan and Japan can be summarized in Table 2-17:
Table 2-17 Crowding Out Effect Sununary
China Germany Taiwan Japan
Sub-definition 1: the effect that
investments in other transportation
modes decrease when HSR is Probably Yes, not
being built No NA no significant
Sub-definition 2: the effect that
investments in other transportation
modes decrease as a percentage of
the total fixed asset investment of
the society when HSR is being Yes,
built significant NA NA NA
Sub-definition 3: the effect that
investments in other transportation
modes decrease as a percentage of
the total fixed asset investment in
transportation when HSR is being Yes, Yes, not Yes, not
built significant significant NA significant
Source: summarized by the author
After analyzing Table 2-9, Table 2-10, Table 2-11, Table 2-16, and Table 2-17, we can draw the
following conclusions:
" If we define the crowding out effect as the effect that investments in other transportation modes
decrease when HSR is being built, crowding out effect of HSR projects generally not exists. The
only exception is Japan, although the crowding out effect is also not significant.
* If we define the crowding out effect as the effect that investments in other transportation modes
decrease as a percentage of the total fixed asset investments of the society when HSR is being
built or the effect that investments in other transportation modes decrease as a percentage of the
total fixed asset investments in transportation when HSR is being built, crowding out effect of
HSR projects generally exists. This crowding out effect is significant in China, but not significant
in Germany and Japan.
" In China, if we consider the second and third sub-definitions of the crowding out effect, we can
see HSR investments significantly crowd out road and aviation investments, but don't crowd out
urban transport and waterway investments. In Japan, if we consider the third sub-definition of the
crowding out effect, we can see HSR investments crowd out road investments, but don't crowd
out investments of other transportation modes; and this crowding out effect in Japan is also
insignificant.
" Although crowding out effect exists in the world, we cannot find evidences of the crowding out
effect of HSR investments on urban transportation investments. This may mean that governments
around the world have all realized that HSR cannot bring real time saving benefits without the
corresponding support from urban transportation.
" Crowding out effect exists in the world: this effect is generally significant in the countries in the
initial stage of the formation of their HSR system, e.g. China; this effect is generally insignificant
in the countries with mature HSR system, e.g. Germany and Japan. We believe Portugal is also in
the initial stage of the HSR system formation just as China does, and Portugal needs to pay
attention to this crowding out effect when building new HSR projects in the future. In the
following chapters, we will use innovative financing methods and identify megaregion revenues
to make HSR investments more financially viable. And this will also help counter the negative
crowding out effect of HSR investments.
3. Difference between Financing HSR and Other Transportation
Projects
3.1 Overview
In this chapter, we compare HSR financing with the financing of other transportation projects in five
different countries: China, Germany, Taiwan, Portugal and Japan. We try to identify the characteristics of
HSR financing in general, identify potential problems of the current HSR financing mechanism in
Portugal, and figure out potential ways to improve the HSR financing mechanism in Portugal.
3.2 China
3.2.1. Overview of China's Funding Sources for Transportation Projects
In China, the central government is responsible for building most of the infrastructure across the country.
In the case of transportation infrastructure, most of the funds for building national railway (including
HSR), national road system, and national inland waterway system come from the central government.
Airports construction seems to be the only exception with only about one quarter of the funds coming
from the central government.
3.2.2. Railway System of China
Railways are the most commonly used mode of long-distance transportation in the People's Republic of
China. Almost all railways are operated by the Ministry of Railway (MOR), which is a part of the State
Council of the People's Republic of China. In October 2008, the Chinese State Council approved a new 2
trillion RMB (292 billion USD) railway investment plan to take it up to 2020. The scheme extended
China's previously announced railway building program, which was allocated 1.25 trillion RMB (182
billion USD) in the 11th five-year plan from 2006 to 2010. (The Economic Observer Online, 2008) As a
result of the increased investments, the country's railway network grew to 91,000km by the end of 2010.
Growth in freight transportation is thought to be one of the drivers behind the increased focus on rail, and
the need to increase railway capacity to meet rising demand (Liang, 2011).
Total investments in new rail lines grew from 14 billion USD in 2004 to 22.7 billion USD in 2006 and to
25.6 billion USD in 2007. In response to the 2008 global economic recession, the government accelerated
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the pace of HSR expansion to stimulate domestic economic growth. Total investments in new rail lines
including HSR lines reached 49.4 billion USD in 2008 and 88 billion USD in 2009. In all, the state plans
to spend US$300 billion to build a 25,000 km HSR network by 2020 (Ministry of Railway, 2008, 2009,
2010).
Within the 88 billion USD in 2009, about 68.8 billion USD was spent building new lines (mostly High-
Speed Rail lines), about 18.7 billion USD was spent upgrading the existing conventional lines, and about
0.5 billion USD was spent on local railway projects (Ministry of Railway, 2010). Within the 49.4 billion
USD in 2008, about 38.4 billion USD was spent building new lines (mostly High-Speed Rail lines), about
10.6 billion USD was spent upgrading the existing conventional lines, and about 0.4 billion USD was
spent on local railway projects (Ministry of Railway, 2009). Within the 25.6 billion USD in 2007, about
18.9 billion USD was spent building new lines, about 4.3 billion USD was spent upgrading existing
conventional lines, and about 2.2 billion USD was spent building new railway stations and about 0.2
billion USD was spent on local railway projects (Ministry of Railway, 2008).
High-Speed Rail in China
After committing to the conventional-track High-Speed Rail in 2006, the government has embarked on an
ambitious campaign to build passenger-dedicated HSR line network, which accounts for a large part of
the government's growing budget for railway construction. As illustrated in Figure 3-1, this planned
passenger-dedicated HSR network consists of four north-south HSR corridors and four east-west HSR
corridors, with a total of 16,000 km in 2020. This planned HSR network is connected within China but
isolated from other countries. The designed speed for these new passenger-dedicated HSR lines is
350km/h, but China planned to decrease this speed due to safety concern and energy consideration. More
details of this are illustrated in Appendix A. And the designed speed for other mixed used HSR lines is
250km/h. (Ministry of Railway (China), 2008)
Figure 3-1 The Planned Passenger-Dedicated HSR Line Network in China
Source: Wikipedia. 201 1i.
The length of the Chinese HSR network was close to 8385 km in the end of 2010. (Liang, 2011) 12 HSR
lines with the designed speed of 250km/h, and 5 HSR lines with the designed speed of 350km/h have
opened to service. These HSR lines are illustrated in Table 3-1 and Table 3-2:
Table 3-1 Chinese Open-Service HSR Lines with the Designed Speed of 250km/h
Line Length Construction cost Construction cost (per(Total) km)
Qinshen PDL 404 km 15.7 billion RMB 38.9 million RMB (5.9(2.4 billon USD) millon USD)
Hening PDL 166 km 25 billion RMB (3.8 150.6 million RMB (22.7billon USD) millon USD)
Jiaoji PDL 364 km 11 billion RMB (1.7 30.21 million RMB (4.6billion USD) millon USD)
Shitai PDL 190 km 17.075 billion RMB 89.87 million RMB (13.5(2.57 billon USD) millon USD)
16.8 billion RMB 47.86 million RMB (7.21Hewu PDL 351 km (2.53 billon USD) millon USD)
Yongtaiwen PFL 268 km 16.28 billion RMB 60.75 million RMB (9.16(2.45 billon USD) millon USD)
Wenfu PFL 298 km 18 billion RMB (2.71 60.4 million RMB (9.1Wef Pbillon USD) millon USD)
15.259 billion RMB 55.49 million RMB (8.36Fuxia PFL 275 km (2.3 billon USD) millon USD)
Chengguan PDL 65 km 13.3 billion RMB (2 204.62 million RMB
billon USD) (30.8 millon USD)
Changjiu ICL 131 km 5.832 billion RMB 44.52 million RMB (6.7(0.88 billon USD) millon USD)
ICL 111 km 9.6 billion RMB (1.5 86.49 million RMBChangji billon USD) (13.15 millon USD)
Hainan ER ICL 308 km 20.2 billion RMB 65.58 million RMB (9.97(3.1 billon USD) millon USD)
Source: Wikipedia. 2011 i.
Table 3-2 Chinese Open-Service HSR Lines with the Designed Speed of 350kn/h
Line Length Construction cost Construction cost (per(Total) km)
21.5 billion RMB 186.96 million RMBJingjin ICL 115 km (3.24 billon USD) (28.17 millon USD)
116.6 billion RMB 120 million RMB (18.08
Wuguang PDL 968 km (17.57 billon USD) millon USD)
Zhengxi PDL 455 km 35.31 billion RMB 77.6 million RMB (11.7(5.32 billon USD) millon USD)
Huning HSR 301 km 50 billion RMB (7.5 166.11 million RMB (25billon USD) millon USD)
29.29 billion RMB 195.27 million RMBHuhang PDL 150 km (4.4 billon USD) (29.4 millon USD)
Source: Wikipedia. 201 1i.
The Construction of Chinese High-Speed Rail projects are primarily funded by state owned banks and
financial institutions, which lend money to the MOR and local governments. The MOR, through its
financing arm, the China Rail Investment Corp (CRIC), issued an estimated Y1 trillion (150 billion USD
in 2010 dollars) in debt to finance the HSR construction from 2006 to 2010, including Y310 billion in the
first 10 months of 2010. The CRIC also raised some capital through equity offerings; in the spring of
2010, the CRIC sold a 4.5 percent stake of the Beijing-Shanghai High-Speed Rail to the Bank of China
for Y6.6 billion and a 4.537 percent stake to the public for Y6 billion. The CRIC retained 56.2 percent
equity on the Beijing-Shanghai HSR project. The CRIC bonds are considered to be relatively safe
investments because they are backed by assets (the railways) and implicitly by the central government of
China (Niu, 2010).
Up to now, only two public railway companies, the Guangzhou-Shenzhen Railway Company and the
Daqing Railway Company, are listed in the Stock Exchanges in China. They are both profitable
companies: the Guangzhou-Shenzhen Railway Company has strong passenger transport demand with
very high load factor, and the Daqing Railway has strong coal freight transport demand. Up to now, no
pure High-Speed Rail company has gone public in China.
From the analysis above, we can conclude that HSR and other national railway projects are both primarily
financed by the MOR, and local and provincial governments. No obvious distinction exists between HSR
financing and other railway project financing. Connecting the two biggest cities Beijing and Shanghai, the
Beijing-Shanghai HSR project is one of the most important HSR projects in China. We will discuss the
financing of this Beijing-Shanghai HSR in more detail below.
The Beijing-Shanghai HSR project
The Beijing-Shanghai High-Speed Rail is a 1318 kilometers (819 miles) long HSR line that connects two
major economic zones in the People's Republic of China: the Bohai Sea Rim and the Yangtze River Delta.
Construction of this HSR line began on April 18, 2008; it is expected to be put into commercial service in
June, 2011. (NetEase Website, 2011)
On Dec. 27th, 2007, the Beijing-Shanghai HSR Company was established to be formally in charge of this
HSR project. It has been fully responsible for raising funds for the construction, managing construction
and operation process, paying back debt and interest, and managing the HSR asset. The eleven sponsors
of this Beijing-Shanghai HSR Company include the Chinese Railway Investment Company, Ping An
Insurance (Group) Company, the Social Insurance Funds of China, Shanghai Shentie Investment Limit,
Jiangsu Transportation Company, Beijing Infrastructure Investment Company, Tianjin Infrastructure
Investment Company, Nanjing Railway Investment Company, Shangdong Road Group, Hebei
Transportation Investment, and Anhui Investment Group. All these eleven sponsors are the equity owners
of the Beijing-Shanghai HSR Company (Gao, 2008).
The total construction costs of the Beijing-Shanghai HSR are about 32.48 billion USD. Within all these
32.48 billion USD, about 16.91 billion USD, or 52 % are financed in the form of equity. The MOR
provides 9.51 billion USD equity, or 51.7% of the total equity. Related provincial government provides
3.44 billion USD, or 20.3% of the total equity. Seven state owned companies, such as Ping An Insurance
(Group) Company, provides 2.35 billion USD in total, or 13.9% of the total equity. The Social Insurance
Funds of China provides 1.47 billion USD, or 8.7% of the total equity (Gao, 2008). Bank of China,
provides 0.88 billion, or 4.5% of the total equity (Zhang, 2010). And the left 15.57 billion USD, or 48%
of the total construction costs, is borrowed from several local banks (Gao, 2008). The funding structure of
the Beijing-Shanghai HSR is illustrated in Figure 3-2.
Figure 3-2 Funding Structure of Beiing-Shanghai HSR
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3.2.3. Road and Inland Waterway System in China
The Ministry of Transport of the People's Republic is the executing agency in charge of building the
national road system, national inland waterway system and national sea ports. According to its annual
statistic report in Table 3-3, we have:
Table 3-3 Investment in Roads, Waterways and Sea Ports (China)
Total National Roads Inland Sea Ports and Other Related Others
(US$ billi (US$ billions) Waterway Facilities (US$ billions) (US$ billio
2007 100.29 85.64 2.16 8.74 3.76
2008 104.80 88.17 2.41 9.66 4.57
2009 144.33 127.32 3.59 9.70 3.73
Jan.2010 to 128.09 114.95 2.92 7.49 2.72Sep.2010 I______ I_____________I_____
Source: Ministry of Transport (2010). Annual statistical Report of Roads, Waterways, Seaports Development in 2009 (2009 4
f7 AETW h kii- ). Retrieved Nov. 2010 from
http://www.moc.gov.cn/zhuzhan/tongiiongbao/fenxigongbao/hangyegongbao/201009/t2100916 811433.html
In the end of 2009, the total length of the national road system was 3.86 million km, increased by 0.13
million km compared to 2008. In more detail, the length of the Chinese national roads, provincial roads,
country-level roads and township-level roads was 158.5 thousand km, 266.0 thousand km, 519.5 thousand
km, and 1.0196 million km respectively, increased by 3.2 thousand km, 2.8 thousand km, 7.2 thousand
km, and 8.4 thousand km respectively. We can also classify the Chinese road system into expressways,
first-class roads, second-class roads, third-class roads, fourth-class roads, and substandard roads. In the
end of 2009, the total length of expressways, first-class roads, second-class roads, third-class roads,
fourth-class roads, and substandard roads was 65.1 thousand km, 59.5 thousand km, 300.7 thousand km,
379.0 thousand km, 2.252 million km, and 804.6 thousand km respectively, increased by 4.8 thousand km,
5.2 thousand km, 15.5 thousand km, 4.8 thousand km, 247.5 thousand km, and 147.1 thousand km
respectively (Ministry of Transport, 2010).
Road
The total costs of the Chinese road network are estimated to be 2 trillion RMB (240 billion USD). The
annual investment was estimated to run from 140 billion RMB (17 billion USD) to 150 billion RMB (18
60
billion USD) from 2005 to 2010, and the annual investment will be around 100 billion RMB from 2010 to
2020 (12 billion USD). The construction fund will come from vehicle purchase tax, fees and taxes
collected by local governments, state bonds, domestic investment and foreign investment (Wikipedia,
2010a).
Unlike other road projects, almost all of roads on the NTHS/"7918 Network" are toll roads largely
financed using PPP, by which we mean they are financed by private companies under contract with
provincial governments. The private companies raise money through bank loans, or bond and stock
offerings and recover money through tolls. The new 7918 Network is composed of:
* 7 radial expressways leaving Beijing (G1-G7)
* 9 north-south expressways(double digit G roads with numbers ending in an odd numeral)
* 18 west-east expressways(double digit G roads with numbers ending in an even numeral)
In addition, asset based securities 8are also used to finance the road construction in China. One example is
Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Zhuhai expressway, which will be discussed in more detail below.
The Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Zhuhai Expressway
In China, the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Zhuhai expressway is the pioneer in using asset based securities
(ABS) 9 to gather money for its construction.
The Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Zhuhai expressway runs across Pearl River Delta, starting from Shenzhen in
the east and ending in Zhuhai in the west. It also links Dongguan, Guangzhou, Foshan, Jiangmen, Xinhui
and Zhongshan. The total length of it is about 302 km. The construction of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-
Zhuhai expressway started in March, 1985. The total construction costs were estimated to be 3.8 billion
RMB, or 559 million USD (Baidu Baike, 2010).
The Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Zhuhai expressway project is a 30-year build-operate-transfer (BOT) project.
The Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Zhuhai Expressway Company is the special vehicle established to be in charge
8 The definition of asset based security is in the List of Definition.
9 The definition of asset based security is in the List of Definition.
of the building, operating and transfering of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Zhuhai expressway. And this
company has the right to collect tolls during the operation phase and it should return the expressway
assets back to Guangdong provincial government in 2027. The two largest sponsors are Hopewell
Holding Limited (Hong Kong), and Guangdong Ministry of Transport. Hopewell Holding Limited owns
50% equity of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Zhuhai Expressway Company. In order to gather the funds for
construction, the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Zhuhai Expressway Company issued 600 million USD bonds
using the underlying expressway assets or the tolling right from 1997 to 2027 as a guarantee (Mei and Li,
2004).
Finally, there are 17 public expressway companies in China now. Yue Expressway A (sz000429 10), Yue
Expressway B (sz200429), Hainan Expressway (sz000886), and HuaBei Expressway (szOO0916) are
listed in Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Wantong Expressway (sh600012), Zhongyuan Expressway
(sh600020), Fujian Expressway (sh600033), Chutian Expressway (sh600035), Ganyue Expressway
(sh600269), Shandong Expressway (sh600350), Ninghu Expressway (sh600377), and Shen Expressway
(sh600548) are listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange. Chenyu Expressway (00107), Huning Expressway
(00177), Shen Expressway (00548), Chinese Expressway Transmission (00658) and Wantong
Expressway (00995) are listed in Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Sina Finance, 2011). These public
companies gather money from people in stock IPO 1 , further stock shares offering, asset based
12
securitization , corporate bond issuance, and so on. The Ganyue Expressway Company is a good
example of companies using almost all these financing methods, and we will discuss more details of it
below.
The Ganyue Expressway Company
The Ganyue Expressway Company was established in March, 1998. Its principal sponsor is the Jiangxi
Expressway Investment Company, which holds 51.98% of its total equity now. (Sina Finance, 2010) The
financing activities of the Ganyue Expressway Company are illustrated in Error! Reference source not
found..
10 sz000429 is the symbol for the stock Yue Expressway A. sz stands for stocks listed in the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange. sh stands for stocks listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange.
" The definition of stock IPO is listed in List ofDefinition.
12 The definition of asset based securitization is in List of Definition.
Table 3-4 Financing Activity of Ganyue Expressway Company
Time Financing methods Scale of Financing Purpose of Financing
April, 2000 stock IPO, 120 million new 194.1 million Construction investment for
shares Changzhang Expressway
October,2002 10:3 stock placement 52.4 million Construction investment for
Changtai Expressway
April, 2005 Internal fund and bank loan 57.1 million Purchased 30% equity of
Changzhang Expressway
April, 2005 Internal fund and bank loan 23.2 million Purchased 30% equity of
Changfu Expressway
November, 2005 Internal fund and bank loan 107 million Purchased 36.67% equity ofChangtai Expressway
October,2005 Short term bonds 147.1 million Increased liquidity and
____________________ ____________ ___________________ change capital structure
,2006 Equity reform 570.6 million Purchased Jiujin and
June, 2Wenhou Expressway
September, 2006 Short term bonds 139.7 million cange capital ucty ce
Source: Jiangxi Ganyue Expressway Company ( 2007). Exploring the capital market in
expressway building (ttlJf i f l) Retrieved Nov. 2010 from
www.ixexpressway.com
3.2.4. Aviation Industry in China
The Civil Aviation Administration of China, formerly the General Administration of Civil Aviation of
China, is the aviation authority under the Ministry of Transport of the People's Republic of China. It
oversees civil aviation and investigates aviation accidents and incidents (The Civil Aviation
Administration of China, 2011). According to the statistics within the Civil Aviation Administration of
China, the total infrastructure investments within the aviation industry was about 12 billion USD from
2001 to 2005, within which 3.28 billion came from the central government (The Civil Aviation
Administration of China, 2006). The total infrastructure investment within the aviation industry was about
3.82 billion USD, 5.15 billion USD, 8.82 billion USD in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 respectively (The Civil
Aviation Administration of China, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010). This investment is estimated to reach 13.24
billion USD in 2010 (Chinese Foreign Investment Website, 2010).
In the case of the airports construction and operation financing, Airport Location-Based Reform is the
most important reform, which transfers the responsibilities of building and operating airports from the
central government to the provincial and municipal government. Overview Of The State Industrial
Policies In 1990s, Bill Of Civil Aviation System Reform, Reform Implementation Plan of Provincial
(Autonomous Region's and Municipal) Civil Airports Management and Administrative System are the
three most important government laws related to this reform (Guangdong Airport Group, 2010). However,
the central government does still participate in the building of civil airports by using the Civil Aviation
Infrastructure Building Fund, which is collected from domestic airlines companies (10% percent revenue
of the domestic routes and 4-6% revenue of the international routes) (Ministry of Finance, China, 1996).
Before the The Reform And Open Policy in 1978, the civil aviation industry in China was highly
monopolized and was a part of the Chinese government. At that time, there was no distinction between
military and civil airport. No independent civil airports existed at that time. At the end of 1980s, the
aviation industry started its market-based reform and tried to separate airline companies, airports and
aviation administration, which provided important prerequisite for the independence of airport industry.
In October 1988, the responsibility of investing and operating Xiamen airport was transferred to Xiamen
municipal government, which was an important milestone since it was the formal start of Airport
Location-based Reform. In 1994, the responsibility of investing and operating Shanghai Hongqiao airport
was transferred to Shanghai Government, which meant the Airport Location-based Reform had gained
further support. The policy Overview Of The State Industrial Policies In 1990s issued in the late 1990s
provided policy and legal foundation for local government capitals and other capitals to join the
construction and operation of airports. In January 2002, the State Council passed the Bill Of Civil
Aviation System Reform, and decided to implement the location- based reform in 129 civil airports
expect for the Beijing Capital Airports and Airports in Tibet. In September 2003, the State Council
published Reform Implementation Plan of Provincial (Autonomous Region's and Municipal) Civil
Airports Management and Administrative System, which led to the national wide location-based reform.
In July, 2004, after transferring the administration power of Lanzhou, Qingyang, Jiayuguan, and
Dunhuang Airports to Ganshu Provincial Government, Airport Location-based Reform officially finished
(Guangdong Airport Group, 2010).
After this Airport Location-based Reform, most provinces and autonomous regions in China established
their provincial airport groups which were in charge of the building and operating of civil airports within
the provinces. These provincial airport groups are almost 100% owned by the provincial governments. If
one needs to build an airport or enlarge a former airport, these provincial airport groups will establish a
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new airport company as a special vehicle. And these provincial airport groups may provide money (or we
can say the provinces will provide money) in the form of equity, help the new airport company borrow
money from local banks and foreign banks, and issue bonds and stocks in the market.
If airports have good prospects of profitability, stock IPO is usually a good choice for financing the
construction. Up to 2010, Shanghai Airport Company, Shenzhen Airport Company, Guangzhou Baiyun
Airport Company and Xiamen Airport Company are all public companies listed in the Stock Exchange in
China.
For example, Shanghai International Airport Company was established on May 1 6 *, 1997 with Shanghai
Airport Group being the only sponsor. The Shanghai International Airport Company is in charge of all the
operating, building, and refinancing issue of the Pudong International Airport and the Hongqiao
International Airport (QQ Finance, 2010). The funds for the first construction phase of the Pudong
International Airport come from funds of the Shanghai government, loans from foreign governments,
loans from the China Development Bank, stock IPO and convertible bonds (CITIC Securities, 2003).
3.2.5. Difference between Financing HSR and Other Transportation Projects in China
In this chapter, we can conclude that the financing of HSR and the financing of conventional railway
projects are almost the same. The financing of HSR and the financing of expressway projects differ in the
case that HSR projects are funded primarily by the bond issued by the MOR, while expressway projects
have some dedicated fund source, such as vehicle purchase tax and fees. On the other hand, PPP, ABS
and stock IPO are widely used for financing other expressway projects, and are seldom used for financing
HSR and other conventional projects. The financing HSR and the financing of airport projects differ in
the case that HSR projects are financed primarily by the central government and airport projects are
financed primarily by provincial governments. Stock IPO is a feasible financing method for airport
construction but is rarely used in HSR financing. The difference between financing HSR and other
transportation projects in China is illustrated in Table 3-5.
Table 3-5 Difference In Financing---China
Other% Of PrincipalOte
. Procurement Principal in Stock InnovativeChaPrivate Prnia FundingIPFiacnMethod Capital" Funding Source AgencyIPO Fancing
Method
Bond Issued by
Traditional MOR, The central
HSR projects procurement Low provincial government & Never NA
method14  government provincial usedfunds, local governments
bank loan
Bond Issued by
Traditional MOR, The centralOther railway provincial government & Seldom NAprojects method government provincial used
funds, local governments
bank loan
Dedicated
revenue, state The central
Traditional bonds, stock Thceta
procurement Medium o, stc government & WidelyRoad projects mehd& o ih IPO, domestic prvt sd ABS
method & or high inetetad private usedPPP ~investment and aeceforignagenciesforeign
investment
Provincial
Traditional budget, local Provincial Widely
procurement Medium bank loan, NAprojects method special vehicle governments used
bond, stock IPO
Urban
transportation NA' 5  NA NA NA NA NA
projects I I I I III
Source: summarized by the author
13 Here we define private capital as funds raised independently by private companies without the help or guarantee
from governments. This may include equity fund from private parent companies, loan or bond capital without
government guarantees, and stock IPO capital without government guarantees and so on in PPP. This may only
include equity fund from private companies if the project is built using the traditional procurement method.
1 Traditional procurement method is opposite to PPPs, which means government is responsible for building,
financing, operating, and maintaining the infrastructure by itself. This definition is also in List of Definition.
i Not available
3.3 Germany
3.3.1. Overview of Germany's Funding Sources for Transportation Projects
Germany relies mostly on the general public budgets to finance its transportation infrastructure projects,
with private capital seldom taking part in this field. In Germany, Public Private Partnership (PPP) has
only been used in building two tunnels (the Warnow Tunnel and the Herren Tunnel), and some ports in
the past, although a multi-modal transportation infrastructure financing agency, VFIG
(Verkehrsinfrastrukturfinanzierungsgesellschaft) was established in 2003 based on the
Verkehrsinfrastrukturfinanzierungsgesellschaftsgesetzes (VIFGG) (transportation infrastructure financing
agency law) to facilitate the use of PPPs (Astrid Gifhneman, 2005).
3.3.2. Road System in Germany
The federal government has the financial sovereignty in the investment decisions of federal roads and
truck roads, and theoretically, the federal government should also be responsible for the project planning,
construction and operation. The reality is the federal states are the direct performers who carry out the
project planning, construction and operation on behalf of the federal government through their
administrative bodies, while the federal government is responsible for controlling and giving instructions
to the federal states.
3.3.3. Railway System in Germany
As to national railway infrastructure projects, investments decision are made jointly by the federal
government and the infrastructure company of the German railways, the DB Netz AG, although the DB
Netz AG is still 100% state owned. Funding of rail infrastructures in Germany, with no exception for
High-Speed Rail, comes from four parts: the federal government, the federal states, EU funds, and private
capital of the DB Netz AG, which is shown in Figure 3-3. (Astrid GUhneman, 2005) One reason that
Germany gets EU funds, especially EU TEN-T funds, is that the German railway system, including its
HSR system, is connected with other countries in the TEN-T network.
Fund provided by the federal government and the federal states is in the form of either subsidies or
interest-rate free loan, while fund provided by the DB Netz AG is in the form of equity. The DB Netz AG
is primarily responsible for ensuring the provision and operation of HSR infrastructure to a suitable level
of quality. Interestingly, the fund provided by the federal states actually comes from the federal
government in the form of specific program subsidies, which will be illustrated in more detail in the
following case study of HSR Stuttgart 21.
Figure 3-3 Funding Structure of German Railway System
BSchwAG: Federal Railway Infrastructure Development Act
V1FGG: Transport Infrastructure Financing Company Act
GVFG: Local Transport Financing Act
RegG: Regionalisation Act
EFRD: European Fund for Regional Development
TEN: Trans-European Networks
Source: DB Netz AG (2006). Case Study: Germany. Workshop: Multi-Annual Contracts governing the Financing of Rail
Infrastructure Maintenance. Retrieved Nov, 2010 from http://ec.europa.eu/transport/rail/ws/doc/case-study-germany.pdf
A major point of criticism for this system is that the track and train operating companies are under the
auspices of the DB AG. This may tend to favor investment decisions which would primarily benefit DB
AG transportation services (Astrid GUhneman, 2005).
3.3.4. Inland Waterways and Airports in Germany
Inland waterways are invested and administrated by the federal government. Airports are owned and
planned, regulated, funded by the federal states and local communities. Refunding of investments in
inland waterways is partly through tolls and fees (e.g. for using locks), and refunding of airport
investments is primarily through user costs (landing charges etc.) and airport services (rents from retail
etc.) (Astrid Gifhneman, 2005).
3.3.5. Stuttgart Ulm Rail Project (HSR Project)
The Stuttgart-Ulm rail project is one of the most innovative and comprehensive railway projects in
Europe. This project includes two project segments: Stuttgart 21 and Wendlingen-Ulm High-Speed
Railline. 4.088 billion Euros are required for the construction of Stuttgart 21 project segment and 2 billion
Euros are required to build the ICE line between Wendlingen and Ulm (Bahnprojekt Stuttgart-Ulm,
2010a).
The Stuttgart 21 project, a project of building a 57 km new railway line, includes a 29.9 km High-Speed
Railline, and three new stations in the new Rosenstein district - Stuttgart Hauptbahnhof (Stuttgart Main
Station), Bahnhof Flughafen/Messe (station at the airport/trade fair centre) and Mittnachtstrasse S-Bahn
(rapid transit) stations. The maximum speed for this line is 250 km/h (Bahnprojekt Stuttgart-Ulm, 2010a).
The map of this Stuttgart 21 project is illustrated in Figure 3-4.
The Wendlingen-Ulm High-Speed Railline is a proposed HSR line crossing the Swabian Alb with speeds
up to 250 km/h and will run in many sections parallel to the A8. The line will connect the Neu-Ulm
station in the east, with the Stuttgart 21 project in the west (Bahnprojekt Stuttgart-Ulm, 2010a). Moreover,
it will link Baden-W lrttemberg to the European High-Speed Rail network (Bahnprojekt Stuttgart-Ulm,
2010a).
Figure 34 Stuttgart 21 Project
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Source: Wikipedia. 2010. Stuttgart 21. Retrieved Nov, 2010 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuttgart 21
Funding of project segment Stuttgart 21
The 4.088 billion Euro construction costs of the Stuttgart 21 project are provided by (Bahnprojekt
Stuttgart-Ulm, 2010b):
* 1.469 billion Euros come from the DB Nets AG;
o 1.237 billion Euros the DB AG own fund
o 232 million Euros risk fund
* 1.229 billion Euros come from the federal government;
* 824 million Euros come from the federal state of Baden-WUrttemberg;
e 227 million Euros come from Stuttgart airport;
* 239 million Euros come from City of Stuttgart;
* 100 million Euros come from Verband Region Stuttgart.
The funding structure of the Stuttgart 21 project is illustrated in Figure 3-5.
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Figure 3-5 Funding Structure of Stuttgart 21
Source: Bahnprojekt Stuttgart-Ulm (2010b). FACTS & FIGURES. Retrieved Nov, 2010 from http://www.das-neue-herz-
europas.de/en-gb/facts--figures/default.aspx
To make sure that the construction of the project progress well, an extra risk contingency fund of 1.45
billion Euros are provided as follows:
e First level, 220 million Euros provided by DB;
* Second level, 780 million Euros provided by the state, city and airport; (state (453.6 million
Euros), city (206.9 million Euros) and airport (119.4 million Euros))
* Third level, 290 million Euros provided by DB;
* Fourth level, 160 million Euros provided by the state and city;
Funding of the Wendlingen-Ulm HSR Line (proposed)
The construction costs of the ICE line between Wendlingen and Ulm amount to 2 billion Euros. The
federal government will assume a share of 1.05 billion Euros, including the funds provided by the EU.
The federal state of Baden-Wirttemberg will provide the remaining 950 million Euros (Bahnprojekt
Stuttgart-Ulm, 2010b). The funding structure of Wendlingen-Ulm HSR line is illustrated in Figure 3-6.
VerbandFunding structure of Stuttgart 21 Region
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Figure 3-6 Funding Structure of Wendlingen-Ulm HSR Line
Source: Bahnprojekt Stuttgart-Ulm (2010b). FACTS & FIGURES. Retrieved Nov, 2010 from http://www.das-neue-herz-
europas.de/en-gb/facts--figures/default.aspx
3.3.6. Difference between Financing HSR and Other Transportation Projects in Germany
In Germany, the federal government is responsible for financing federal roads and trunk roads, federal
railways (including HSR), and inland waterways, while the states are responsible for the building of
airports and sea ports. The general public budget is the main source of funding for transportation
infrastructure investment.
High-Speed Rail projects, as one sub-category of federal railways, are financed in exactly the same way
as other conventional railway projects do: they are financed by the federal government funds, the federal
states funds, EU funds, and capital of the DB Netz AG together. Most of the federal roads and truck roads
are financed directly by the federal government, while only two tunnels, Warnow Tunnel and Herren
Tunnel, were financed by private capital using Public Private Partnerships. Inland waterways are solely
financed by the federal government and airports are funded by the federal states and local communities
(Astrid Ginhneman, 2005).
Therefore, we can conclude that in Germany, the HSR financing is the same as the financing other federal
railway projects. The HSR project financing is similar to the federal road, inland waterway, and airport
financing in the sense that public fund is the primary funding source for all these projects. However, HSR
Funding Structure of Wendlingen-Ulm HSR Line
The federal state of
Baden-Wrttemberg
projects are funded by the federal government and the federal states jointly, while federal roads are
funded solely by the federal government and airports are funded solely by the federal states. In addition
to these, private capital is provided by the DB Nets AG to finance all railway projects, which doesn't exist
in other transportation modes. Difference between financing HSR and other transportation projects is
illustrated in Table 3-6.
Table 3-6 Difference in Financing---Germany
OtherPrincipal Ote
Germany Procurement % Of Private Principal Funding Stock InnovativeMethod Capital Funding Source Agency IPO Financing
AgencyMethod
The federal
government The federal
Traditional fund, the federal government, Never
HSR projects procurement Low states fund, EU the federal Nev NA
method funds, and state & the
capital of the DB DB Netz AG
Netz AG
The federal
government The federal
Other railway Traditional fund, the federal government, Neverpoctr rprocurement Low states fund, EU the federal Nev NA
projects method funds, and state & the used
capital of the DB DB Netz AG
Netz AG
The federal
TraditionalThfera
procurement government The federal NeverRoad projects method & Low fund, private government used NA
Rod pcapital, probably
EU funds
Airport and Traditional The federal state The federal Never
seaport procurement Low fund state used NA
projects method
Urban
transportation NA NA NA NA NA NA
projects I I I II 
_ II
Source: summarized by the author
3.4 Taiwan
3.4.1. Taiwan HSR Financing
As illustrated in Chapter 2, Crowding Out Effect of HSR Investment, built using BOT (one type of PPP),
Taiwan High-Speed Rail (THSR) is a High-Speed Rail network that runs along the west coast of Taiwan
with a total cost of 18 billion USD. (Taiwan High-Speed Rail, 2011) This THSR is isolated from other
countries. The Taiwan High-Speed Rail Consortium (THSRC) was chosen as preferred bidder in
September 1997 (I-Tsung Tsai, 2007), and the group was renamed and formally established as the Taiwan
High-Speed Rail Corporation (THSRC) in May 1998. (Taiwan High-Speed Rail, 2011)
Financing THSR
The original capital investment for this THSR project was estimated to be 15 billion USD. 21% of the
construction costs (3.1 billion USD) would be financed by the government, while the remaining 79%
would be financed by private capital. Within the private capital, 69% was estimated to be debt, and 31%
was estimated to be equity. Within the private equity, the 5 parent firms of THSRC were estimated to
provide more than 51%, institutional investors were estimated to provide 29-34%, and the remaining
12%-20% was estimated to be raised from stock IPO in the local stock market (I-Tsung Tsai, 2007). The
projected funding structure of THSR is illustrated in Figure 3-7.
However, the real funding structure turned out to be very different from the projected one. Until the end
of 2006, the total construction cost became 16.5 billion USD. The real financing process of private capital
could be divided into four stages:
The first stage ended in 1997. In this stage, sponsor companies provided 1.23 billion USD in the form of
equity, Taiwan government provided 253 million USD in the form of equity, and 25 local banks provided
a syndicated loan of 6.18 billion USD, which was guaranteed by a deposit of 6.18 billion USD postal
bond from the Council for Economic Planning and Development in Taiwan government (I-Tsung Tsai,
2007).
The second stage ended in 1999. In this stage, a syndicated loan of about 2.05 billion USD was provided
by 25 local banks, which was guaranteed by a deposit of 882 million USD of postal bond from the
Council for Economic Planning and Development in Taiwan government (I-Tsung Tsai, 2007).
The third stage was from Dec 2002 to May 2005. In this stage, 2.3 billion USD was collected from stock
IPO for convertible and preferred stocks with tax incentives. The tax incentives were stated as: "For those
entities/people who hold the stocks of domestic major transportation projects or significant infrastructures
for more than two years, these entities/people can claim 20% of their investments as deductibles from
taxable income, starting from year 2." (I-Tsung Tsai, 2007)
The fourth stage was May 2005. In May 2005, THSRC reported a forecasted cost overrun of 1.5 billion
USD. To cover these costs, 0.2 billion USD was provided by the Taiwan government in the form of
equity and 1.3 billion USD was provided by local commercial banks in the form of loan without
government fund back up (I-Tsung Tsai, 2007).
To sum up, up to the end of 2006, 16.5 billion USD was collected for the THSR construction. 7.083
billion USD was in the form of equity; within this equity financing, 3.553 billion USD was provided by
the Taiwan Government, 2.3 billion USD came from stock IPO in the local stock market, and 1.23 billion
USD was provided by the five patent companies. 9.53 billion USD was collected in the form of debt,
within which, 2.468 billion USD came from syndicated loans from 25 local banks without the
government guarantees, and the remaining 7.062 billion USD came from syndicated loans from 25 local
banks guaranteed by a deposit of 7.062 billion USD postal bond from the Council for Economic Planning
and Development in Taiwan government (I-Tsung Tsai, 2007). The actual funding structure of THSR is
illustrated in Figure 3-8.
Figure 3-7 Projected Funding Structure of THSR
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Source: I-Tsung Tsai (2007). Default and Renegotiation: Financial Structure and Incentive in Public Private Partnership
Contracts. PhD Dissertation, MIT, Cambridge, MA.
Figure 3-8 Actual Funding Structure of THSR
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To understand the difference between financing HSR and other transportation projects, we need to take a
look at the financing methods of other transportation projects, for example, public transit projects, seaport
projects, airport projects and so on. The projects in the i-Taiwan Infrastructure Projects provide us good
examples.
3.4.2. The i-Taiwan 12 project
In 2008, Taiwanese government has adapted i-Taiwan Infrastructure Projects as the means of the "new
blueprint of economic development" to facilitate the transition and innovation in Taiwan's economic
fundamentals. The i-Taiwan Infrastructure Projects include: a fast and convenient island-wide
transportation network, Taoyuan International Air City, "Intelligent Taiwan", "Industrial Innovation
Corridors", urban and industrial zone renewal, green forestation, and so on. A total investment of
NT$3.99 trillion, or 132 billion USD is estimated to be raised for building infrastructure projects within 8
years (2008-2015), including NT$ 2.65 trillion, or 87.7 billion USD via government budget and NT$1.34
trillion, or 44.3 billion USD via private investment (Public Construction Commission, 2010). The funding
structure of transportation projects in i-Taiwan Infrastructure Projects is illustrated in Table 3-7.
Table 3-7 Funding Structure of Transportation Projects in i-Taiwan 12 Projects
Item Total Investment Private Investment Percentage Of(NT$ billions) (NT$ billions) Private Investment
A Fast and Convenient Transportation 1,215.70 76.3 6.28%Network(mostly public transit)
Kaohsiung Port-City Reconstruction 38.8 16.1 41.49%
Taoyuan International Airport City 293.7 64.4 21.93%
Source: Public Construction Commission (2010). I-Taiwan 12 projects. Retrieved Dec.2d from
http://pp2.pcc.gov.tw/pcc/enIntroduction2.aspx
3.4.3. Difference between Financing HSR and financing other transportation projects in
Taiwan
It is surprising to see that in Taiwan: the government only provides 21% fund for HSR construction,
while the government has to provide 94%, 78%, 58% fund for "A Fast and Convenient Transportation
Network", "Taoyuan International Airport City" and "Kaohsiung Port-City Reconstruction" respectively.
However, we should also notice that, in HSR financing, 43% of the fund comes from a guaranteed loan
guaranteed by a full amount deposit provided by Taiwan government. And 14% of the fund comes from
stock IPO mostly due to the tax incentives. If we add both the full amount deposit and tax incentives as
fund provided by the Taiwan government, 78% of fund comes from the government, which is almost the
same as the airport project "Taoyuan International Airport City". Difference between financing HSR and
other transportation projects in Taiwan is illustrated in Table 3-8.
Table 3-8 Difference in Financing---Taiwan
% Of Principal Other
. Procurement Principal in Stock InnovativeTaiwan Method Funding Source un g IPFnacgMehd Capital Fudn ore Agency IPO Financing
Method
The government Taiwan
Low or fund, stock IPO, goverment Yes, but
HSR projects PPP medi private capital with tax No
and local bank & private incentive
loan companies
Other railway NA NA NA NA NA NA
projects
Road projects NA NA NA NA NA NA
Taiwan
Airport and The government government
seaport PPP Medium fund, private &NA NA
& privateprojects capital companies
Urban The govermnent Taiwan
transportation PPP Low fund, private government NA NA
& privateprojects capital companies
Source: Summarized by the author
3.5 Portugal
3.5.1. Overview of Portugal's Funding Sources for Transportation Projects
"Portugal has not established an explicit surface transportation policy and finance system. No overarching
policy coordinates transportation activity and, apart from the revenue dedicated to road infrastructure,
there is no explicitly defined transportation finance system." (Nelson, 2008)
The funding of transportation investments in Portugal, including conventional rail investments, public
transit investments, and airport and seaport investments come primarily from the central government of
Portugal. And the central government funding comes from general revenues together with extremely
limited streams of dedicated revenues. Municipalities do not utilize any form of dedicated revenue for
transportation-related government expenditures. (Nelson, 2008)
Project planning and financing in Portugal is biased toward road infrastructure. Road planning is guided
by a national road plan and road financing benefits from a dedicated revenue stream. Rail and public
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transportation planning and financing, however, do not have equal plans or dedicated revenues. (Dunn,
2008)
Since 2005, the Portuguese national budget has authorized a stream of dedicated tax revenues, which is
generated by the Circulation and Haulage Tax (Imposto de Circulagio e Camoinagem, ICI, ICA), for the
national road authority, Estradas de Portugal (EP). Beyond this, no additional dedicated revenue sources
exist. Other transportation investments except for road investments have to compete with all other public
investments to draw funds from general tax revenues. The national budgeting cycle therefore features an
extensive process of expenditure authorizations, as the various ministries of the central government
compete with one another for funds. (Dunn, 2008)
Funds for transportation infrastructure investments, including conventional rail investments, public transit
investments, and airport and seaport investments, are offered in three forms: (a) operating subsidies
(indemnizag6es compensatorias) disbursed directly to state-owned SEE enterprises, (b) capital project
grants transferred to SEE enterprises and municipal governments, and (c) EU Structural Funds earmarked
for specific projects but administered by central government. Municipal governments provide operating
and capital funds for municipal transportation departments and in-house public transit systems where they
exist. (Nelson, 2008)
Private capital is allowed to take part in road infrastructure construction and maintenance, but its
involvement in rail and urban transportation has been largely limited. (Nelson, 2008)
3.5.2. Road System in Portugal
In 1972, the first concession for a tolled motorway was granted with the creation of the private company
Brisa. After the 1974 Carnation Revolution, the government took majority equity of Brisa, making it a
state-owned enterprise. Until the 1990s, Brisa was the sole motorway concessionaire in Portugal. During
this decade, the Portuguese government decided to privatize Brisa and increase the number of private
companies participating in road infrastructure concessions to promote competition and industry
development (Dunn, 2008).
Since then, the Portuguese government has used PPPs extensively to develop and manage its National
Motorway System. There are two reasons for Portugal to widely use PPPs mechanism in its intercity road
development: one is in the strong road demand and the other is the public budget constraint due to the
European Union(EU)'s Convergence Criteria (FHWA, 2009).
Up to 2007, the length of the Portuguese intercity road network under PPPs mechanism is approximately
2529 km, which accounts for almost 70% of the total length of Portuguese intercity road network
(approximately 3546 km). Therefore, we can conclude that most Portuguese intercity roads were built
under PPPs (Nelson, 2008). In most of these road projects, a substantial part of the initial funding is
provided by the EU and - as in the case of SCUT - the European Investment Bank (EIB) (Renda and
Schrefler, 2006). The Beiras Litoral / Alta shadow toll road or SCUT project is a good example to
illustrate the financing methods of road projects in Portugal because of the use of PPPs and the substantial
part of EU funding or EIB loans in this project.
The Beiras Litoral / Alta Shadow Toll Road or SCUT project
The Beiras Litoral / Alta Shadow Toll Road or SCUT project entails the widening and upgrading of 167
km of the existing two-lane (2x1) IP5 road between Aveiro, in the Coastal West, and the Spanish border
at Vilar Formoso (East), via the cities of Viseu and Guarda (European Commission, 2004). The project is
a Design-Build- Operate-Transfer (DBOT) project. Revenues for the project company (Lusoscut
consortium) are granted by a shadow toll system (Renda and Schrefler, 2006). The financing structure of
Beiras Litoral / Alta shadow toll road is illustrated in Table 3-9 and Figure 3-9:
Table 3-9 Funding Structure of the Beiras Litoral / Alta Shadow Toll Road
Use of funds EUR Percentage Sources of EUR Percentage
______________(Million) Pecnae funds (Million) Pretg
Construction costs 693.4 60.5 Equity from 102 8.9
Start-up costs 75.5 6.5 EIB loan 470 41
Financing costs 164.9 14.4 Commercial 448.4 39.1bank loan
Other start-up costs Net VAT cash(incl. fees and 51.5 4.5 Net 126.2 11flow
reserves
VAT, working capital
build-up and 161.3 14.1
operating cash flow
Total 1146.6 100 1146.6 100
Source: European Commission (2004).Resource Book On PPP Case Studies. Retrieved Nov 2010 from
http://ec.europa.eu/recional policy/sources/docgener/guides/pppresourcebook.pdf
Figure 3-9 Funding Structure of Beiras Litoral / Alta Shadow Toll Road
Source: European Commission (2004).Resource Book On PPP Case Studies. Retrieved Nov 2010 from
http://ec.europa.eu/regional policy/sources/doceener/guides/pppresourcebook.pdf
The commercial bank loan has a maturity of over 25 years, and it is structured as a non-recourse loan'6 ,
with repayment entirely dependent on the SPV's revenue performance according to the level of motorway
usage and the resulting revenue stream. The loan from the EIB has a slightly longer maturity of 27 years
and is guaranteed by a commercial bank syndicate. The EIB loan has a possibility of guarantee release
during the loan life - 50% after year 8 and 50% after year 16 (European Commission, 2004).
3.5.3. The Poceirao-Caia High-Speed Rail
As the first HSR project in Portugal, the Poceirao-Caia High-Speed Rail project is built using Design,
Build, Finance, and Maintain mechanism, one of the PPP mechanisms. The total length of this HSR line
is 165km. The concession period of this project is 40 years. The PPP project company (concessionaire)
will receive payment from the Portuguese government based on availability (75%), maintenance (25%)
and demand (+-2%). The total construction investment for this HSR project is about 1.359 billion Euros
16 The definition of non-recourse loan is in List of Definition.
Funding Structure of Beiras Litoral / Alta Shadow Toll Road
Net VAT Cash flow Equity from SPV
11% 9%
and the life cycle costs of this project are 1.814 billion Euros when discounting all the cash flow back to
2008 (RAVE, 2010B). The map of the Poceirao-Caia HSR project is shown in Figure 3-10. The financial
structure of the Poceirao-Caia HSR project is illustrated in Figure 3-11.
Figure 3-10 May of the Poceirao-Caia High-Speed Rail
Source: ENR (Official Website). 2011. Retrieved May, 2011 from http://enr.construction.com/images2/2010/06/0602-15a.jpg
Figure 3-11 Funding Structure of the Poceirao-Caia HSR
Fund from Funding Structure of Poceirao-Caia HSRparant
companies EU TEN-T grant
7% Commercial bank lIoan12
6%
Source: 1. RAVE. 2010. The Portuguese High-Speed Rail Project. Application of Life-Cycle Contracts in High-Speed Rail
Projects Conference. Moscow, Portugal. April, 2010.2. Millennium BCP. 2010. Poceirdo-Caia HS Project Financing. Workshop
on PPP and High-Speed Rail. Lisbon, Portugal. January. 2010.
Fund from REFER
4%
Fund from related
Portuguese state
EIB provides a 300 million guaranteed loan and a 300 million unguaranteed loan to this providing, both
with a maturity of 34 years. The 300 million guaranteed loan from EIB is guaranteed by the Portuguese
government. In addition to that, the SPV issues a performance bond valuing 5% of the Contractual Price
(84.559 million Euros) maturing one year after the concession end. Commercial Banks provide a 27 year
long term loan valuing 91 million Euros (Millennium BCP, 2010). One of the reasons that this Poceirao-
Caia HSR project can receive EU funding and EIB loans is that this project is part of the EU TEN-T
railway network and contribute the prosperity of all the EU.
3.5.4. Difference between financing HSR and other transportation projects in Portugal
In Portugal, most transportation modes, including conventional rail, public transportation and airport and
seaport projects are built using the traditional procurement method and funded mostly by the central
government of Portugal. The only two exceptions, HSR and most intercity road projects, are built using
PPPs and are allowed to attract private capital. In addition, the Portuguese HSR projects investments rely
more heavily on EU grants or EIB loans, and are able to attract less private capital than the road projects
do. For example, for the Poceirao-Caia HSR project, 75% fund comes from EU grants and EIB loans,
only 7% fund comes from the private capital (from the private sector); for the Beiras Litoral / Alta
Shadow Toll Road or SCUT project, 41% fund comes from EIB loans, and 48% fund comes from the
private capital (both from commercial bank loan without government guarantees and from the private
sector). Difference between financing HSR and other transportation projects is illustrated in Table 3-10.
Table 3-10 Difference in Financing---Portugal
Other
Procurement % Of Private Principal Principal Stock Innovative
Method Capital Funding Source Funn IPO Financing
Agency Method
The government The central
17 pLow or fund, EU funds,HSR projects PPPmLo EIB loan, government No No
medium commercial bank & private
loans compames
Traditional The governmentOther railway fund, EU funds The central NA NAprojects method and probably government
local bank loan
The central
Road projects PPP Medium or EIB loan and government NA NAhigh local bank loans & private
companies
Traditional The governmentAirport and procurement Low fund, EU funds The central NA NA
seaport projects method and probably government
local bank loan
Urban Traditional The government
transportation procurement Low fund, EU funds The central NA NAo mand probably governmentproj ects I method local bank loan
Source: summarized by the author
3.6 Japan
3.6.1. Overview of Japan's Transportation Investment
As illustrated in Chapter 2, Crowding Out Effect of HSR Investment, Japan has a very modern
transportation system, including all road, railway, airport and urban transportation projects. We will
discuss these different transportation modes in more detail below.
" This data is only based on the Poceirao-Caia High-Speed Rail, the only HSR project in Portugal right now (in
construction or in operation).
3.6.2. Road System in Japan
By the end of 2008, Japan has approximately 1,203,600 km roads consisting of 7,600 km national
expressways, 55,000 km general national roads, 129,000 km prefectural roads, and 1,012,000 km city,
town and village roads. (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (Japan), 2011) In addition,
Japan has a high-speed and limited-access toll road network connecting major cities on Honshil, Shikoku
and Kytsha, and toll is an important funding source for the Japanese road.
At the beginning, Japan typically financed its road building by issuing road bonds and collecting tolls
during operations to pay back bonds. The Japan Road Public Corporation, founded in 1956, was
established to construct and manage the road network in Japan. Considering the fact that some rarely used
roads may not generate enough revenues to cover their operating and financing cost, all tolls were pooled
together to cover the operating costs, and interest and principal payments of the government road debts of
the whole road network. (Sakamoto, Personal communication, Jan 17, 2011)
Now, the government gave up this scheme and it finances its new road building using dedicated tax
revenues, such as car taxes and gas taxes. (Sakamoto, Personal communication, Jan 17, 2011)
3.6.3. Railway System in Japan
In Japan, railways are a major means of passenger transportation, especially for high-speed transportation
between major cities and for commuter transportation in metropolitan areas. Seven Japan Railways Group
companies are the most important participants in both the local and regional railway market. (Wikipedia,
2011 f) The Japan National Railway (JNR) privatization is a milestone event in the history of the
Japanese HSR finances: HSR projects are all financed by public capitals before this privatization and
partly financed by private capitals after this privatization. At the same time, analysis of the financing of
other railway projects should be conducted case by case: some profitable projects are financed by both
private and public capitals, and other unprofitable projects are financed by public capitals only.
(Sakamoto, Personal communication, Jan 17, 2011)
HSR in Japan
The Shinkansen is a HSR network in Japan. Starting with the 210 km/h (130 mph) TMkaid6 Shinkansen in
1964, the now 2,452 km (1,524 mi) network has expanded to link most major cities on the islands of
Honshfi and Kyiishfi at speeds up to 300 km/h (186 mph). (Melibaeva, Sussman, and Dunn. 2010) The
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Japanese Shinkansen network is well connected within Japan, but isolated from other countries by the
Pacific Ocean.
In 1987, Japanese National Railway was privatized, with its business succeeded by seven JR companies
and some corporations. This is one of the most important events in Japanese HSR history and HSR
financing differs before and after JNR privatization.
Three HSR lines were built before JNR privatization: Tokaido-line (1964), Sanyo-line (1975) and
Tohoku-line and Johetu-line (1982).These HSR lines were built by the Japan Railway Construction
Public Corporation (JRCPC) in represent of the government. This JRCPC was created by the government
to be in charge of HSR construction only and the construction fund was provided solely by the Japanese
government (the government gets the money partly from world bank loans and partly from issuing
national bonds to the domestic market). After finishing their construction, these HSR line infrastructures
were bought by JNR from the government. However, JNR didn't have enough money so that it had to
borrow money from the Japanese government. It turned out that JNR bought the HSR line infrastructures
from the government with the money borrowed from the Japanese government. (Sakamoto, Personal
communication, Jan 17, 2011)
In the first three years after JNR privatization, The HSR Retention Organization was created to hold both
HSR infrastructures and debts of JNR. The three main JRs, JR East, JR West and JR Central paid usage
fees for using the infrastructures. Three years after privatization, the three main JRs bought out these HSR
infrastructures from the Japanese government with the prices calculated based on each HSR's profitability,
not on their original construction costs. The price turned out to be 46 billion USD 18 for the Tokaido-line,
8.8 billion USD for the Sanyo-line, and 28 billion USD for the Tohoku and Joetu-line. (Sakamoto,
Personal communication, Jan 17, 2011)
After JNR privatization, three new HSR lines were built: the Takasaki-Karuizawa line, the Hokuriku-line
and the extensional Tohoku-line. The Takasaki-Karuizawa line was built by tax revenue of the central
" Here the exchange rate is 1 USD= 110 JPY in 1991
government of Japan (35%), tax revenue of regional governments (15%) and the private capital of JR East
(50%). The funding structure of the Takasaki-Karuizawa line is illustrated in Figure 3-12.
Figure 3-12 Takasaki-Karuizawa HSR Financing
Source: Sakamoto, Personal communication, Jan 17, 2011
The Hokuriku-line and the extensional Tohoku-line were built by the central government of Japan and
regional governments only. JR East paid usage fee for using these new HSR infrastructures. The
construction funds of these two lines were all public funds and could be divided into four parts: the usage
fees paid by JR East, which was estimated to be 78 million USD; the money gained from selling the
Tokaido-line, the Sanyo-line, and the Tohoku and Joetu-line; taxes from the central government of Japan;
and taxes from regional governments. (Sakamoto, Personal communication, Jan 17, 2011)
It should be noted that the three biggest HSR companies: the JR-East, Central and West, are all public
companies listed in the Tokyo stock exchange. The most important assets of the three JR companies are
the Tokaido-line, the Sanyo-line, and the Tohoku and Joetu-line, which have all demonstrated their
abilities to generate profits. This means if the underlying HSR assets can generate enough profits, the
stock market is a feasible source to gather money for HSR companies. (Sakamoto, Personal
communication, Jan 17, 2011)
Other railway projects in Japan
Takasaki-Karuizawa HSR Financing
*JR East N The central government of Japan M Regional government
Analysis of other railway project (non-HSR) financing should be conducted on a case by case basis. To
separately show how local railways and intercity conventional railways are financed, we will discuss two
cases below: the Tohoku-Jukan line, a JR East's new local railway, and Tukuba New Express, a new line
from Tukuba city to Tokyo megalopolis.
Tohoku-Juhkan Line
The construction cost of Tohoku-Juhkan-line is about 0.4 billion' 9, and it is fully financed by the private
capital from JR East.
Tukuba New Express
Tukuba-new express, a new line running from the Tukuba-city to the Tokyo metropolitan area, is
managed by the Metropolitan Intercity Railway Company, MIR. (Sakamoto, Personal communication,
Jan 17, 2011) The funding source for this project is stated in Table 3-11 and Figure 3-13 below.
Table 3-11 The Tukuba New Express Financing
Funding source Amount(million USD20)
Govermnent interest free loan 4113
Regional government interest free loan 4113
Regional government subsidy 1440
Fiscal investment and loan 617
Investment from the private sector 190
Source: Sakamoto, Personal communication, Jan 17, 2011
19 Here the exchange rate is 1 USD= 100 JPY20 Here the exchange rate is 1 USD= 100 JPY
Figure 3-13 Tukuba New Express Financing
Source: Sakamoto, Personal communication, Jan 17, 2011
3.6.4. Civil Aviation System in Japan
Japan has 97 airports in 2010. (Wikipedia, 2011 f) The Narita International Airport, Kansai International
Airport, and Chibu Centrair International Airport are all important international gateway airports. And
the Tokyo International Airport is an important domestic airport hub. (Wikipedia, 201 1f)
Almost all old and regional airports were invested by the central government and regional government.
However, private capital is becoming more and more interested in this industry after the building of the
Kansai airport. A typical example of this is the Chtbu Centrair International Airport. (Sakamoto, Personal
communication, Jan 17, 2011)
The Chnlbu Centrair International Airport
The Chfibu Centrair International Airport is located in the Tokoname city in Aichi Prefecture. It is
"Japan's third off-shore airport, after Nagasaki Airport and Kansai International Airport, and is also the
second airport built in Japan on a manmade island" (Wikipedia, 2011 g) The funding structure of the
Chiibu Centrair International Airport is illustrated in Table 3-12 and Figure 3-14.
Tukuba-New Express Financing
M Government interest free loan M Regional government interest free loan
* Regional government subsidy 0 Fiscal investment and loan
M Investment from the private sectors
2%
Table 3-12 The Chiibu Centrair International Airport Financing
Funding source Amount (million USD)
Central government subsidy 410
Regional government subsidy 102
Private companies subsidy 512
Central government interest-free loan 1638
Regional government interest-free loan 410
Government-backed bond from Japan 3225.6
Development Bank
Investment from the private sector 1382.4
Source: Sakamoto, Personal communication, Jan 17, 2011
Figure 3-14 Chibu Centrair International Airport Financing
Source: Sakamoto, Personal communication, Jan 17, 2011
3.6.5. Difference between Financing HSR and Other Transportation Projects in Japan
In Japan, some HSR projects are profitable, such as the Tokaido-line the Sanyo-line, and the Tohoku and
Joetu-lin. The owners of these profitable HSR projects, the JR companies, are able to gather money in the
stock market. Considering the fact that these profitable HSR projects were built originally by the Japanese
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Ch0bu Centrair International Airport Financing
" Central government subsidy
" Regional government subsidy
" Private companies subsidy
" Central government interest-free loan
" Regional government interest-free loan
" Government-backed bond from Japan Development Bank
* Investment from the private sector
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government and later bought by the JR companies based on these projects' profitability, we can equally
say that the construction of these HSR projects were partly financed by private capitals. The higher
profitability of the projects, the higher portion of fund the private capitals would contribute. In addition,
the JR companies are willing to contribute private capitals to build some new profitable HSR lines, such
as the Takasaki-Karuizawa line. But these JR companies would prefer not to spend money in less
profitable HSR lines, such as the Hokuriku-line and the Extensional Tohoku-line. In addition, private
capitals are also interested in the building of some profitable conventional railway projects, such as the
Tohoku-Juhkan Line.
In contrast, road projects are still primarily funded by the government funds and no private capitals have
ever taken part in this field. Almost all old and regional airports were invested by the central government
and regional governments. However, private capital is becoming more and more important after the
building of the Kansai airport. Difference between financing HSR and other transportation projects is
illustrated in Table 3-13.
Table 3-13 Difference in Financing----Japan
. OtherPrincipal nOtve
Japan Procurement % Of Private Principal Funding IPO InnovativeMethod Capital Funding Source Agency Financing
AgencyMethod
Tax revenue of Both central
Traditional the central and regional
HSR projects procurement Medium government and governments Yes NA
method & JRgovernments, JR companies
capital wmpanies
Government
Other railway Traditional Medium or subsidy, Both central
projects procurement government and regional No NA
method loan, and private governments
capital
Tax revenue of
Traditional the central Both central
Road projects procurement Low government and and regional No NA
method regional governments
governments
Government
Airport and Traditional subsidy, Both central
seaport procurement Medium government and regional No NA
projects method loan, and private governments
capital
Urban
transportation NA NA NA NA NA NA
projects I
Source: summarized by the author
3.7 Conclusion
Difference between HSR financing in different countries can be summarized in Table 3-14 and Table
3-15.
Table 3-14 Comparison of HSR System in Different Countries
Existence of
Scale conventional Maximum Isolated/connected Motivation
railway speed
system
Isolated from Capacity
China 7431 kn Yes 350km/h other countries, constraint,
connected within economic
the country stimulus
Connected with Economic
other countries, stimulus,
connected within connect to EU
the country railway network
Isolated from Capacity
Taiwan 345 km Yes 30()km/h other countries, constraint,
connected within environmentally
the country friendly
Capacity
Connected with constraint,
other countries, economicPortugal 165 km Yes 350km/h oted itin stimulus
connected withmn stimulus,
the country connect to EU
railway network
Isolated from Capacity
Japan 24591km Yes 300km/h other countries, constraint,
connected within economic
the country stimulus
Source: summarized by the author
Table 3-15 Comparison of HSR Financing in Different Countries
%Of OtherProcurement Private Principal Funding Principal Funding I Innovative
Method Capital Source Agency Financing
Method
Traditional The Central
China procurement Low Bond Issued by MOR government & Never NA
method provincial used
governments
The federal The federal
Traditional government fund, the Th e f deral
Germany procurement Low federal states fund, EU goder ta & the Never NA
method funds, and capital of DB Netz AGthe DB Netz AG
The government fund, Taiwan government Yes, but
Taiwan PPP Low IPO, private capital & private with tax No
and local bank loan companies incentive
The central
Portugal PPP Low EU funds and EIB loan government & No No
private companies
Traditional Tax revenue of the Both central and
Japan procurement Medium central government and regional Yes NA
method or high regional governments, governments & JR
JR capital companies
Source: summarized by the author
According to Table 3-5, Table 3-6, Table 3-8, Table 3-10, Table 3-13, Table 3-14 and Table 3-15,
difference between financing HSR and other transportation projects in China, Germany, Taiwan, Portugal
and Japan can be summarized below:
* The international evidences of the PPP application in HSR development are mixed: some
countries use PPP as their HSR procurement methods, while others don't.
* The ability to attract private capital depends heavily on the project's profitability itself, and does
not depend on which transportation modes the projects are. Generally speaking, compared to road,
airport, and seaport projects, HSR projects are relatively harder to attract private capital and rely
more on the government's funding capabilities because the profitability of HSR projects is lower.
This is not true in Japan, in which HSR projects are more profitable than road projects.
" Whether stock IPO is feasible for HSR projects also depends heavily on the project's profitability.
Generally speaking, stock IPO is infeasible for HSR project financing because HSR projects are
not profitable. This is also not true in Japan, in which some HSR projects are very profitable. On
the other hand, stock IPO can be used to gather money for HSR projects when the government is
willing to give tax incentives, just like the Taiwan case.
" Compared to bank loan, bond is less widely used in the building of all transportation modes,
including HSR building. China uses bond financing more heavily than other countries do: China
issues railway bonds to finance HSR and railway projects, issues state bonds to finance road
projects, and issues project bonds to finance airport projects. This may indicate that bond
financing is less appropriate for infrastructure financing, but may also indicate that more
unexplored opportunities exist in bond capital markets.
" Compared to Germany, Portugal relies more heavily on EU funds and EIB loan to finance its
transportation infrastructure projects, especially its HSR projects. This makes Portugal's
infrastructure building more vulnerable to EU policy change.
" HSR systems connected with other countries are more likely to get financial support from
multilateral agencies (e.g. the World Bank, the European Investment Bank, the Asian
Development Bank, etc.) than HSR systems isolated from other countries do because the HSR
systems connected with other countries may generate positive external effects internationally. For
example, German and Portuguese HSR systems both get financial support from the European
Union and the EIB because of their contribution to the TEN-T HSR network in Europe. At the
same time, one reason that Taiwan, China, and Japan HSR systems don't get any financial
support from multilateral agencies is probably that these HSR systems can not generate external
benefits for other countries.
4. Innovative Methods of Financing HSR
4.1. Overview
In Chapter 2, Crowding Out Effect Of HSR Investments, we conclude that if we define the crowding out
effect as the effect that investments in other transportation modes decrease as a percentage of the total
fixed asset investments of the society when HSR is being built, or the effect that investments in other
transportation modes decrease as a percentage of the total fixed asset investments in transportation when
HSR is being built, the crowding out effect of HSR investments on other transportation projects does exist
worldwide.
In Chapter 3, Difference between Financing HSR and Other Transportation Projects, we conclude that
compared to Germany, Portugal relies more heavily on EU funds and EIB loans to finance its HSR
projects, and this reliance makes the HSR development in Portugal more vulnerable to the EU policy
change. We need to explore more HSR funding opportunities for Portugal in the future. In addition, after
the comparative studies of China, Germany, Taiwan, Japan and Portugal, we find that bank loans are
more widely used to finance the HSR projects than bonds, but China relies a lot on its railway bonds
(although implicitly backed by the Chinese government) to finance its HSR and other railway project
investments. This may indicate that some unexplored opportunities exist in bond capital markets.
The purpose of this chapter is to compare different innovative financing methods and find the most
financially cost-effective one for building Portuguese HSR projects. At the same time, the decrease of
financial costs of HSR investments can also help counter the negative crowding out effect of HSR
investments on other transportation modes, and help Portugal lower its dependence on EU funds and EIB
loans in Portuguese HSR financing. It should be clearly pointed out that the word "innovative" here just
mean that these financing methods are new or innovative for HSR investments, although they have
already been used to finance other kinds of projects.
Financial costs of building Portuguese HSR may include interest payments to bond holders or banks; fees
paid to debt insurance companies like monolines21; debt or stock issuance costs paid to investment banks,
auditors, law firms and so on; and equity return required by stock holders (although this item will not be
shown in the income statement of HSR projects). Generally speaking, equity investors of HSR projects
are willing to provide HSR projects upfront capital funds only when they expect HSR projects can
generate enough net income or cash flow for them in the operation phase. However, too many financial
costs, which are typically incurred in the operating phrase of HSR projects, can turn the net income of
HSR projects negative in the operating phase, not to mention that HSR projects can generate enough net
income for the HSR equity investors to cover their original capital investments. For example, in the case
of Taiwan HSR, the total financial expenses account for more than 100%, 80% and 50% of the operating
revenues in 2007, 2008, and 2009, respectively. The income statement of THSR is illustrated in Table
4-1. Comparison between operating revenue and total financial cost of THSR is illustrated in Figure 4-1
Operating Revenue VS. Total Financial Cost of THSRFigure 4-1, and the percentage of total financial
cost in operating revenue is illustrated in Source: 1. Taiwan High-Speed Rail Company. 2007. 2007 Financial Report.
Retrieved April. 2011 from http://www.thsrc.com.tw/download/tc/file/01/thsrcf_96_full.pdf; 2. Taiwan High-Speed Rail
Company. 2008. 2008 Financial Report. Retrieved April. 2011 from
http://www.thsrc.com.tw/download/tc/file/01/thsrc-f_97_full.pdf; 3. Taiwan High-Speed Rail Company. 2009. 2009 Financial
Report. Retrieved April. 2011 from http://www.thsrc.com.tw/download/tc/file/01/thsrc-f 98_full.pdf
Figure 4-2.
The Portuguese government should pay special attentions to the financial costs of HSR since these high
financial costs will require the government to inject more money even after operation, or they will require
the government to contribute more capital at the beginning no matter which procurement methods are
used, PPP or the traditional government procurement methods.
21 Monoline companies are companies whose sole line of business is to provide bond insurance services to one
industry are called monoline insurers. The term 'monoline' eventually became synonymous in some literature with
terms like 'financial guarantors'. This definition is also in List of Definition. Source: Wikipedia (2011). Bond
insurance. Retrieved Feb 14t from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monoline-insurance#MonolineInsurance
Table 4-1 Income Statement of Taiwan HSR
Item 2007 2008 2009
Operating revenue 13,502,788 23,047,583 23,323,712
Operating costs -28,411,845 -29,286,136 -17,758,866
Operating income -14,909,057 -6,238,553 5,564,846
Financial revenue 315,187 644,500 639,869
Interest -14,423,091 -17,464,896 -10,778,335
Other financial expenses -381,733 -1,950,748 -217,505
Total financial cost -14,489,637 -18,771,144 -10,355,971
Net pre-tax income -29,398,694 -25,009,697 -4,791,125
Tax/tax refund -54 0 1,670
Net income -29,398,748 -25,009,697 -4,789,455
Note: the unit used here is thousands of NT$
Source: 1. Taiwan High-Speed Rail Company. 2007. 2007 Financial Report. Retrieved April. 2011 from
http://www.thsrc.com.tw/download/tc/file/01/thsrc f 96 full.pdf; 2. Taiwan High-Speed Rail Company. 2008. 2008 Financial
Report. Retrieved April. 2011 from http://www.thsrc.com.tw/download/tc/file/01/thsrc f 97 full.pdf; 3. Taiwan High-Speed Rail
Company. 2009. 2009 Financial Report. Retrieved April. 2011 from
http://www.thsrc.com.tw/download/tc/file/01/thsrc f 98 full.pdf
Figure 4-1 Operating Revenue VS. Total Financial Cost of THSR
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Source: 1. Taiwan High-Speed Rail Company. 2007. 2007 Financial Report. Retrieved April. 2011 from
http://www.thsrc.com.tw/download/tc/file/01/thsrc f 96 full.pdf; 2. Taiwan High-Speed Rail Company. 2008. 2008 Financial
Report. Retrieved April. 2011 from http://www.thsrc.com.tw/download/tc/file/01/thsrc f 97 full.pdf; 3. Taiwan High-Speed Rail
Company. 2009. 2009 Financial Report. Retrieved April. 2011 from
http://www.thsrc.com.tw/download/tc/file/01/thsrc f 98 full.pdf
Figure 4-2 % of Financial Cost Relative to Operating Revenue of Taiwan HSR
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http://www.thsrc.com.tw/download/tc/file/01/thsrc f 96 full.pdf; 2. Taiwan High-Speed Rail Company. 2008.2008 Financial
Report. Retrieved April. 2011 from http://www.thsrc.com.tw/download/tc/file/01/thsrc f 97 full.pdf; 3. Taiwan High-Speed Rail
Company. 2009. 2009 Financial Report. Retrieved April. 2011 from
http://www.thsrc.com.tw/download/tc/file/01/thsrc f 98 full.pdf
We believe Portugal is almost certain to use PPPs as procurement methods in building its HSR projects in
the future. The planned HSR projects in Portugal are illustrated in Figure 1-1. There are three reasons: the
European Commission would like to attract more private capital to build the Ten-T priority network
(European Commission, 2005), and this desire may substantially influence Portugal's choice of
procurement methods since the EU Cohesion funds and Ten-T funds account for a large portion of the
total fund of the Portuguese HSR investments. Secondly, the budget constraints of the Portuguese
government in the foreseeable future makes PPPs more attractive in its HSR financing since PPPs can be
used to delay payments for infrastructure building. Lastly, Portugal has gained the experience of using
PPPs to finance its HSR projects, e.g. the Poceirao-Caia HSR project, and most of its road projects: this
experience will definitely help Portugal in the future.
The difference between using traditional government procurement methods and PPP in building
Portuguese HSR is illustrated in Figure 4-3:
Figure 4-3 Difference between Traditional Government Procurement Methods and PPP in Portuguese HSR Projects
Source: sketched by the author
Since the Portuguese government is almost certain to use PPP to build its HSR projects, this chapter will
focus only on exploring innovative financing methods in this PPP case. As illustrated on the right side of
Figure 4-3, the innovative financing methods discussed here are used by the private sector to get money
from banks, bond markets, or stock markets to build the HSR projects. These methods are based on the
financial strength of the HSR projects themselves, instead of the financial strength of the Portuguese
government. The lower the financial costs the private sector can achieve when getting money from banks,
bond markets, or stock markets, the lower the bids the private sector will offer in the bidding process of
the Portuguese HSR PPP, which in return, benefits the Portuguese government. However, because HSR
projects often don't have good financial strength and may have difficulties using these innovative
methods, we need to identify additional revenues for HSR projects and increase their financial strength.
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Actually, we will examine the relationship between megaregions and HSR, and identify megaregion
revenues for HSR financing in Chapter 5, Megaregions and HSR Financing.
In this chapter, we will focus significantly on bank loans and project bonds, including both wrapped and
unwrapped bonds22, because they are the most widely used ways to finance infrastructure projects in the
world now. We will first examine the PPP project rating mechanism since it determines the financial cost
of unwrapped bonds. Then we will compare wrapped bonds with unwrapped bonds, and compare
wrapped bonds with bank loans, to see which financing method is most financially cost-effective and is
most appropriate for building Portuguese HSR. We also take a close look at the wrapped bond financing
after the current financial crisis since this financing method has been changed a lot since the financial
crisis. In addition, we take a close look at the Portuguese pension fund market since pension funds and
life insurance companies are the two most important project bond buyers in the world. At the end of this
chapter, we will provide suggestions for the institutional structure to facilitate the use of the most
financially cost-effective financing methods. And we will also briefly discuss other innovative financing
opportunities includes stock IPOs, co-lending, etc.
4.2. Bond Financing for PPP Projects
4.2.1. Bond Financing History
The use of bond financing in PPP projects differs widely among the European countries. Bond financing
has been most prevalent in the United Kingdom since the launch of the UK's Private Finance Initiative
(PFI, one kind of PPPs) in the 1990s. In the UK, bond financing has been very popular in large PPP
project financing (> Z 200 million in capital value) for the last decade. (European PPP Expertise Centre,
2010)
PPP project bond financing has been less popular in other countries for a variety of reasons: insufficient
demand for PPP project bonds, due to the lack of enough private pension fund assets; illiquidity of PPP
project bonds, due to the lack of a deep capital market; severe competition from bank loan financing,
which is considered an alternative for bond financing all the time-the details of this will be discussed
2 The PPP project bonds fully insured by monolines are called wrapped bonds. The PPP project bonds not insured
by monolines are called unwrapped bonds.
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later in the section Bank Loan & Bond Marketfor PPP Projects; and both the public and the private
sector have insufficient knowledge of PPP project bond financing. (European PPP Expertise Centre, 2010)
Portugal didn't use bonds to finance its Poceirao-Caia HSR project. As illustrated in Chapter 3,
Difference between Financing HSR and Other Transportation Projects, the funds for the Poceirao-Caia
HSR project come mostly from EU cohesion grants, EU TEN-T grants, and EIB loans, with a small
portion of funds come from Portugal commercial banks and no funds come from bond issuance. The map
of the Poceirao-Caia HSR project is illustrated in Figure 3-10. The funding structure of the Poceirao-Caia
HSR project is illustrated again in Figure 3-11.
4.2.2. Key Bond Buyers and Bond Rating
Key bond buyers in PPP project bond market are usually institutions with long-term liabilities, against
which they needed to have assets producing matching long term cash flows. More specifically, these
institutions may include pension funds, life insurance companies, alternative investment funds, sovereign
wealth funds, etc. Within these four, pension funds and life insurance companies are the two most
important ones. (European PPP Expertise Centre, 2010) Therefore, when considering using bonds to
finance Portuguese HSR projects, we should take a close look at the development of the Portuguese
pension fund market, and we will do this in the later section of this chapter Development of the
Portuguese Pension Fund Market.
Bond buyers are concerned mostly about the PPP project bond rating: pension funds and life insurance
companies are generally only interested in bonds with investment grades or grades larger than Baa3.
(European PPP Expertise Centre, 2010)
Without any outside financial support, e.g. monoline guarantees, PPP project bond rating is the same as
PPP project rating. PPP projects are rated differently in both construction and operating phases,
considering the difference between construction risks and operating risks. According to Moody's
experience, PPP projects in the construction phase are usually rated Baa, while availability-payment PPP
projects in the steady state of the operation phase are typically rated A. (Moody, 2010) This PPP project
rating mechanism will be discussed in more detail later in the section of this chapter PPP Project Rating.
23 The Moody's rating definition can be found in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moody%27s
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4.2.3. Monolines and Wrapped Bonds
Compared to infrastructure projects using the traditional procurement methods, PPP projects are more
complex: according to European PPP Expertise Centre (2010), "PPP projects usually have a long lead
time before financial close during which the commercial terms and the financing terms are negotiated."
Unlike banks, the institutional buyers for PPP project bonds don't have inside capability to analyze the
risks associated with PPP projects in the history, and they generally don't have enough time or knowledge
to effectively monitor their investments closely, which make PPP project bonds less attractive to these
institutional buyers.
The emergence of high-rating monolines (mostly Aaa), one kind of private insurance, closes this gap:
monolines provide insurance for the bonds in exchange for a certain insurance fees; on the other hand,
monoline companies will analyze the risks associated with PPP projects and monitor the project
development on behalf of bond investors. The PPP project bonds fully insured by monolines are called
wrapped bonds. The PPP project bonds not insured by monolines are called unwrapped bonds. Moody
usually rates the wrapped bond using the higher of underlying project rating and the relevant monoline
company rating. It is worth noticing that in the UK, only two early projects were funded with unwrapped
bonds after the first PPP project was financed through the capital markets. (European PPP Expertise
Centre, 2010)
The logic behind this monoline wrapped bond model is that the financial cost of bond issues is much
lower if bonds are issued using monolines' rating, instead of their own low Baa rating in the construction
phase. Even after paying insurance fees to monolines, bond issuers can still save significant amount of
money. However, the key for the success of this model is the ability of monolines to maintain a high
rating, such as Aaa. If the ratings of monolines fall to a certain grade, this model will not work anymore.
(European PPP Expertise Centre, 2010)
Unfortunately, after the 2008 financial crisis, most monolines' ratings have fallen significantly. For
example, the rating of monoline Syncora Guarantee Ltd. fell from Aaa in June 2007 to Ca in November
2009 using Moody's rating4 . The rating decay of these monolines significantly infects the effectiveness
2 Moody's rating is listed in the List of Definition.
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of this wrapped bond model. (European PPP Expertise Centre, 2010) We will discuss these wrapped and
unwrapped bonds in more detail later.
4.3. PPP Project Rating
Currently, Moody considers PPP projects in the construction phase and in the operation phase separately.
(Moody, 2006) PPP projects in construction are typically rated by Moody in the Baa category, whereas
availability payment 25PPP projects in steady state operations are typically rated in the A category.
(Moody, 2010) As a result, if a project can complete its construction on time, we will generally see an
upgrading of the project rating.
4.3.1. Rating of PPP Projects in the Construction Phase
In a typical PPP transaction, there is usually a concession agreement (CA) between project companies and
off-takers. Here the project company refers to a new company formed by the private sector to be only
responsible for fulfilling the requirements in the concession agreement. The asset of the project company
is usually the asset the company needs to develop, for example, roads and HSR. And the project company
usually borrows money from the bond market or from banks based on the profitability of the asset, or the
potential asset.
Here the off-taker refers to the entity that promises to pay money to the project company based on certain
criteria, which are usually related to the quality and quantity of service or goods the project company
provides. This off-taker is usually the government in availability payment projects or shadow toll projects.
For example, the Portuguese government is the off-taker in the Poceirao-Caia High-Speed Rail project:
the Portuguese government will pay the project company based on availability (75%), maintenance (25%)
and demand (+-2%). There are no off-takers in real toll road projects since drivers don't promise to buy
anything in advance.
In the construction phase, there is usually a design-build agreement (DBA) between project companies
and construction companies. The DBA typically requires construction companies to be responsible for
those costs associated with construction cost overrun and construction schedule delay. (Moody, 2006)
25 The definition of availability payment is in List ofDefinition.
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PPP project bond investors are rarely willing to accept the raw construction risks, such as construction
cost overrun and construction schedule delay. Therefore in the design-build agreement, PPP project
companies usually either require the construction companies to provide a construction risk mitigation
package or assume some of the costs directly. PPP project companies may also require the parent
companies of construction companies to provide performance support.
In addition to that, project companies may also seek outside financial support, such as letter of credit from
banks, and performance support, such as performance bond from insurance companies to protect
themselves from cost and time overrun.
The typical PPP design-build structure can be summarized in Figure 4-4:
Figure 4-4 Typical PPP Design-Build Structure
Source: Moody (2006), Construction Risk in Privately-Financed Public Infrastructure (PFI / PPP / P3) Projects.
Finally, projects are rated by Moody considering raw construction risks, support from construction
companies in design-build agreements, performance support, financial support, and equity. (Moody, 2006)
The details of this rating method are summarized as follows:
* Raw construction risk: raw construction risk is the expected loss on project itself without any
outside support. The expected loss can be calculated as the product of probability of the project
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schedule delay or cost overrun and amount of costs associated with them. According to Moody's
experience, the project's complexity is the most important factor that determines the raw
construction risk. Moody divides most PPP projects into four types: Standard Buildings, Standard
Civil Infrastructure, Complex Buildings and Complex Civil Infrastructure, and assigns the base
rating based on the type. (Moody, 2006)
e Support from construction companies in the design-build agreements: there may be clauses in the
design-build agreements requiring construction companies to be responsible for completing
projects on time, absorbing the costs of schedule delay and cost overruns, etc. When calculating
the value of this support in DBA, Moody considers the ability and willingness of construction
companies to do so. (Moody, 2006)
e Performance support: performance support, usually issued by third-party insurance companies, is
designed to protect project companies against the failure of construction companies or one of its
sub-contractors in fulfilling their construction obligations. Types of performance support include
performance bonds, completion insurances, adjudication bonds, sub-contractor insurances, and so
on. However, the credit enhance value of performance support is not as much as its nominal value
because it is rarely provided on time and in full amount of the claim. (Moody, 2006)
* Financial Support: financial support, similar to performance support, typically issued by banks, is
also designed to protect project companies against the failure of construction companies or one of
its sub-contractors in fulfilling their construction obligations. The difference is that financial
support is typically provided on time and in full nominal amount. The rating of banks providing
this financial support is an extremely important factor when evaluating the effect of this financial
support. Common examples of financial support include bank letters of credit, bank guarantees
and demand deposits at regulated financial institutions. (Moody, 2006)
e Equity: because equity investors can only claim the remaining profits after paying interests, and
equity investors are in the first-loss positions, equity in nature provides credit support for the
project debt. The higher percentage of equity to debt, the stronger credit support equity can
provide. (Moody, 2006)
Therefore, important components of Moody's rating model of PPP projects in the construction phase can
be summarized in Table 4-2:
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Table 4-2 Important Components of Moody's Rating Model of PPP Projects in the Construction Phase
Components of Moody's rating
model Key considerations of these components
Probability of the project going over
w .i time/over budget, amount of budgetRaw construction risks overage/cost of schedule overage, and the
project's complexity
t .m . Related clauses in design-build agreements,
Support from construction compames m construction companies' willingness and
design-build agreements abilities to provide this support
How fast the support can be provided on
Performance support time and what percentage of full claimed
amount can be provided
Financial support Bank rating
Equity The ratio of equity to debt
Source: Moody (2006), Construction Risk in Privately-Financed Public Infrastructure (PFI / PPP / P3) Projects.
4.3.2. Rating of PPP Projects in the Operation Phase (Availability Payments)
For availability-payment PPP projects, Moody's rating is based on four considerations: the intrinsic credit
quality of the project, capital structure of PPP project companies, potential recovery on concession
termination, and off-taker's credit quality. Actually, the intrinsic credit quality of the project and the
capital structure of PPP project companies together determine the default probability; these two and the
potential recovery on concession termination together determine the expected loss of default; all of these
four factors together determine the expected default loss adjusted for off-taker's credit quality. (Moody,
2007) These four considerations are illustrated in Figure 4-5.
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Figure 4-5 Factors Used by Moody for PPP Project's Rating in the Operation Phase
The intrinsic Capital structure Potential recovery Off-taker credit
credit quality of of PPP project on concession quality
the project companies termination
The default probability
P_
The expected default loss
The expected default loss adjusted for off-taker's credit
Source: Moody (2007). Request for Comment on: Operating Risk in Privately-Financed Public Infrastructure (PFI/PPP/P3)
Projects.
These can be illustrated as follows:
* The intrinsic credit quality of the project: the intrinsic credit quality is the most important factor
Moody considers. It can be determined by the volatility of the PPP project's revenue, costs of
service delivery, and force majeure 26risk. (Moody, 2007)
- The volatility of the PPP project's revenue is determined by the project's
complexity, the standards that the government uses to measure the performance
of PPP projects, and the inflation exposure. Usually, the revenue volatility
increases when dealing with more complex projects, such as High-Speed Rails;
the revenue volatility increases when off-takers or governments set higher
performance measurement standards, which increase both the probability and
costs of revenue deduction. The higher degree that operation costs exposed to
inflation, the higher revenue volatility is. (Moody, 2007)
- Costs of service delivery: here Moody considers two factors, the predictability
and stability of operation costs, and the depth of the market. The cost risks
decrease as the predictability of operation costs become better and as more
reputable suppliers are in the market. (Moody, 2007)
26 The definition of force majeure in listed in List of Definition.
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- Force majeure risk: force majeure risk refers to the probability and costs of the
project agreement being terminated due to force majeure. In most cases, PPP
project bond issuers or PPP project companies can relieve their responsibilities
for providing the service when the force majeure happens. The key point here is
whether project companies can still get paid by off-takers, how much they get
paid and what percentage of the Issuers' operating costs can these payment
covers. (Moody, 2007)
e Capital structure of PPP project companies: Moody also considers the safety margin effect of the
project company's capital structure. As the percentage of debt increases, the safety margin
decreases and the probability of default grows. This safety margin effect is measured by Moody
using three ratios: a minimum debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), an average DSCR on a post-
tax basis, and a cash break-even ratio. DSCR is defined as the ratio of net cash flow available
divided by senior debt service. The minimum and average DSCR test the project company's
exposure to debt service costs and measures its ability to sustain lower cash flow from
unexpected events before debt service is default. A cash break-even ratio is defined as the
maximum percentage that projected operating and capital expenses can be increased when the net
cash flow is still enough to cover service debt and meet all other costs when due. This cash break-
even ratio tests the project company's exposure to the increase of operating costs. (Moody, 2007)
e Recovery on concession termination: this reflects Moody's view of the likely bond principal
recovery if the transaction is terminated early. Concession termination regime and recovery
assumptions are the two most important considerations here. (Moody, 2007)
e Off-taker's credit quality: Moody also adjusts its rating for off-taker's credit quality since this
credit quality determines whether project company can get paid timely and in full amount, and
whether it can get a termination payment when the project is terminated. (Moody, 2007) Moody's
typically maintains at least a two-notch difference between the credit quality of off-takers and the
rating of PPP projects. (Moody, 2010). Based on the current Moody's rating Al for the
Portuguese government, all PPP projects in Portugal, including the Portuguese HSR projects, at
most get A3 rating if the Portuguese government is the project off-taker and no other measures
are taken.
Important components of Moody's rating model of PPP projects in the operation phase are summarized in
Table 4-3
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Table 4-3 Important Components of Moody's Rating Model of PPP Projects in the Operation Phase
Components of Moody's rating Key considerations of these components
model Keyconsidertionsoftheecomponent
The intrinsic credit quality of the The volatility of the PPP project company's
project revenue, its costs of service delivery, andforce majeure risk
Capital structure of PPP project A minimum debt service coverage ratio
c ais r (DSCR), an average DSCR on a post-tax
companies basis, and a cash break-even ratio
Recovery on concession termination Concession termination regime and
recovery assumptions
The credit quality of the off-taker is at least
Off-taker's credit quality two notches higher than the rating of the
PPP project
Source: Moody (2007). Request for Comment on:
(PFI/PPP/P3) Projects.
Operating Risk in Privately-Financed Public Infrastructure
4.3.3. Rating of PPP Projects in the Operation Phase (with Exposure to Commercial
Revenue Risk)
Generally speaking, projects exposed to commercial revenue risk get much lower rating than projects
with predictable availability payments". Most projects with commercial revenue risk are rated Baa2 or
Baa3, while most projects with predicable availability payments are rated Baal or even Al in the
operating phase. (Moody, 2008b)
When analyzing projects exposed to commercial revenue risk (maybe full risk or maybe only partial risk),
Moody (2008b) "asks the following fundamental questions: Who bears the commercial revenue risk and
to what extent? What is the quality and predictability of the commercial revenues? What level of cushion
is incorporated in the proposed credit metrics in order to deal with market revenue risk?"
One thing that Moody pays special attentions here is the minimum revenue, the portion of the revenues
which is going to be available in the worst scenarios. Moody calculates the minimum and average debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR), and the cash break-even ratio based on this minimum revenue estimate,
27 The definition of availability payment is in List ofDefinition.
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and compares the results with certain thresholds: 1.05x for minimum DSCR, 1.lOx for average DSCR,
and 15% for cash break-even ratio. (Moody, 2008b)
Only when the calculated ratios are larger than the threshold ratios, Moody uses the rating methods of
availability payment projects to evaluate these projects with exposure to commercial revenue risks. If the
calculated ratios fall squarely below the threshold Ratios, these projects are supposed to be greatly
exposed to commercial revenue risks and the evaluation result from the rating methods of availability
payment projects can only be used to determine an upper bound. (Moody, 2008b)
Therefore, we can conclude that here the most important factor Moody considers when rating these
projects with commercial revenue risks is the minimum revenue, not the average revenue or the maximum
revenue. It would be good if we can ensure predicable minimum revenue using insurances or derivatives,
such as real options and futures.
4.3.4. Influence of Public Capital Contribution in PPP Project Rating
Here the public capital contribution means the capital provided by public sectors in the construction phase
for supporting the PPP project building. It is very interesting that Moody concludes that public capital
contributions generally have an adverse impact on senior debt credit quality in most new PPP projects.
(Moody, 2009)
For traditional government procurement projects, the public capital contribution is good for debt rating
since it may turn the original negative NPV into positive NPV by adding an initial cash inflow, and make
the project internal cash flows strong enough to be financially viable. In Moody's view, this public capital
contribution here is like "a free lunch" to the projects. This usually happens to the projects with very
positive social-economic value to the communities but without sufficient internal revenues to cover their
costs. (Moody, 2009)
Moody argues that the public capital contributions for PPP projects are different from those for the
traditional government procurement projects because these public capital contributions are just the current
value of future payments from the government to the PPP project companies, instead of "a free lunch" to
the PPP project companies. The logic is that, if the government doesn't pay the initial capital
contributions, it has to pay higher availability payments later in the operation phase for both projects with
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availability payments and with partial revenue risks. Otherwise, no private companies will be willing to
take part in these kinds of PPP projects. (Moody, 2009)
Moody also argues that the public capital contributions are worse than the future availability payments
with the same estimated NPV values because these public capital contributions are usually paid
progressively during project construction. The payment of capital contributions are typically based on the
degree of project completion. Only when the degree of project completion reaches a certain point, the
project companies can get paid. Therefore, the private capital, including the capital gathered from bond
issuance proceeds, bears all project completion risks. In this case, the public capital contributions are like
the most senior debts to the projects and are in the last loss position. (Moody, 2008c) On the other hand, if
the govermnent doesn't provide these capital contributions, the private project companies have to provide
these additional funds in advance in the form of equity, junior debt, or at most senior debts like the issued
bonds. In this case, the bond is still in the last loss position. (Moody 2009) A more detailed example is
provided below:
Example: in this example, the total funding needs are 100 million USD. In scenario A, this 100 million
USD is funded by 90 million USD debts and 10 million USD equity. In scenario B, this 100 million is
funded by 80 million public capital contributions, 10 million USD debts and 10 million USD equity. This
is illustrated in Figure 4-6.
Considering a 15 million USD loss incurred in the projects, in both scenario A and B, this 15 million
USD loss wipes out 10 million USD equity and another 5 million USD debt. However, since the total debt
is 80 million USD in scenario A and only 10 million USD in scenario B, the debt recovery rate is
85/90=94% in scenario and 5/10= 50% in scenario B. This is illustrated in Figure 4-7.
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Figure 4-6 Example Used to Illustrate the Influence of Public Capital Contributions
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Source: summarized by the author
Figure 4-7 Example Used to Illustrate the Influence of Public Capital Contributions
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Source: summarized by the author
The debt recovery rate is much higher in scenario A (without public capital contributions) than that in
scenario B (with public capital contributions), and therefore this example illustrates the negative effect of
public capital contributions on PPP project rating.
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4.3.5. Conclusion of PPP Project Rating
In the construction phase, although project companies cannot change the raw construction risk which is
determined mainly by PPP project complexity, they can enhance the PPP project rating by cooperating
with construction companies with good reputation, and adding clauses in the design-build agreements to
require construction companies to absorb the costs of both budget and time over-runs. Project companies
should also, try to find outside performance and financial support.
In the operation phase of availability-payment PPP projects, project companies can enhance their rating
by making their operation cash flow more stable and getting higher termination payments: they can
benefit from using future or real options to hedge their operation material risks, and getting a more
advantageous project termination regime toward them. In the operation phase of projects with partial
revenue risks, project companies should pay special attentions to the worst-case revenue, which is the key
consideration of Moody's rating. Project companies can benefit from using insurances, or financial
derivatives to make sure they get enough minimum revenue, even though this may sacrifice some of the
upward potentials of their revenue.
Generally speaking, governments will benefit from project companies' higher rating and lower financial
costs because these can result in lower tender price in the PPP tendering. In some cases, the lower
tendering price is the net benefit government can get without any costs. For example, governments can
benefit itself by encouraging private project companies to pick up prestigious construction companies,
seek outside performance and financial support, hedge their operation risks using derivatives, etc. In other
cases, governments have to consider the trade-off between getting a low tendering price and keeping other
benefits. For example, governments may get a lower tendering price by giving project companies more
advantageous concession termination regime toward them, where governments lose certain benefits in the
concession termination regime.
At the same time, it is interesting that the public capital contributions at the beginning are considering
negative in Moody's rating if these capital contributions are paid progressively and based on the degree of
project completion. To avoid this negative effect on rating, governments can use co-lending instead. We
will discuss this co-lending in more detail later.
Lastly, we should notice that Moody typically maintains at least a two-notch rating difference between the
credit quality of the off-taker and the rating of the PPP project. (Moody, 2010) Based on the current
Moody's rating 28Baal for the Portuguese government, all PPP projects in Portugal, including the
Portuguese HSR projects, at most get Baa3 rating if the Portuguese government is the project off-taker
and no other measures are taken.
4.4. Wrapped Bond and Unwrapped Bond
According to European PPP Expertise Centre, there is a general consensus that bond capital markets are
the best sources for PPP project financing. (European PPP Expertise Centre, 2010) Bond financing has
been most prevalent in the United Kingdom since the launch of the UK's Private Finance Initiative (PFI,
one kind of PPPs) in the 1990s. In the UK, bond financing has been very popular in large PPP project
financing (> E 200 million in capital value) for the last decade. (European PPP Expertise Centre, 2010)
Generally speaking, bonds can be divided into unwrapped and wrapped bonds. Wrapped bonds are the
bonds fully insured by monolines, and unwrapped bonds are the bonds not insured by monolines. Moody
usually rates unwrapped bonds using the underlying PPP project rating, and rates wrapped bonds using
the higher of the underlying PPP project rating and the relevant monoline rating. (Moody, 2010)
The dominant use of the wrapped bond in the UK can be illustrated by the fact that only two projects
funded by bonds were funded using unwrapped bonds since the first PPP project was financed in the
capital markets in 1997. (European PPP Expertise Centre, 2010)
4.4.1. History of Monoline Wrapped Bonds
According to the European PPP Expertise Centre, monolines and wrapped bonds started in the early
1970s in the United States in response to a series of high profile municipal bond defaults. Historically,
"the monolines' business model is to issue unconditional and irrevocable guarantees of timely payment of
principal and interest to investors while maintaining a sufficient capital base against those guarantees to
achieve Aaa ratings" (European PPP Expertise Centre, 2010) .
The rationale for this model is that the financial costs of bond issuers will be much lower if bonds are
issued using monolines' rating, instead of their own low Baa rating in the construction phase. Even after
28 Moody's rating is listed in the List of Definition.
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paying insurance fees to monolines, bond issuers can still save a significant amount of money. On the
other hand, monolines can earn fees from bond issuers to sustain their business.
However, the key factor for the success of this model is the ability of monolines to maintain a high rating,
such as Aaa. If the ratings of monolines fall to a certain grade, this model will not work out anymore.
(European PPP Expertise Centre, 2010)
4.4.2. Wrapped Bonds and Unwrapped Bonds
Compared to unwrapped bonds, wrapped bonds guaranteed by Aaa monoline companies can achieve
much lower total financial costs, overcome the rating hurdle of institutional PPP project bond investors,
close the rating gap between PPP project ratings in the construction phase and operation phase, provide
effective project control after financial close, and ease the worry of PPP project bond investors on the
transparency of PPP projects. The details can be summarized below:
" Achieve much lower total financial costs: compared to unwrapped bonds issued using the
underlying project rating, wrapped bonds can achieve much lower coupon rate because their
ratings are based on the higher of the underlying project rating and the monolines' rating. When
the monolines' rating is very high, for example, Aaa, the interest rate gap between these two
kinds of bonds will be huge. Even after paying a certain amount of fees to the monolines, PPP
project companies, or PPP project bond issuers can still achieve a significant amount of financial
cost saving. (European PPP Expertise Centre, 2010)
e Overcome the rating hurdle of institutional PPP project bond investors: typically, unlike banks,
institutional PPP project bond investors, including pension funds and insurance companies, don't
have the inside analytical capability and time to analyze each PPP projects they invest, and they
rely on the project's rating to judge whether the investment is appropriate. These institutional
bond investors avoid investing in projects with speculative rating, while most PPP projects cannot
achieve high enough rating to attract these institutional bond investors without monolines'
guarantees. The existence of monolines' guarantees provides a bridge linking these PPP project
issuers and potential institutional PPP project bond investors since wrapped bonds are rated using
the higher of the underlying projects and monoline companies, and these monoline companies are
usually rated Aaa before the financial crisis. (Moody, 2010)
* Close the rating gap between PPP project ratings in the construction phase and operation phase:
as stated in the PPP project rating, PPP projects in construction are typically rated in the Baa
116
category, whereas availability based PPP projects in the steady state of operation phases are
typically rated in the A category. Without monoline guarantees, PPP project bonds have to be
issued based on their construction phase ratings because these bonds are issued using the rating of
the underlying projects. The existence of monoline guarantees close the rating gap between PPP
project ratings in the construction phase and operation phase.
" Provide effective project control after financial close: generally speaking, PPP project creditors
or PPP project bond investors need to monitor and make decisions regarding the activities of the
PPP project companies. However, the principal PPP project bond investors, such as pension funds
and insurance companies here, don't have enough analytical capability and time to monitor every
project they invest in. The monoline business model solve these problems effectively: the
monoline companies provide the necessary project monitoring on behalf of PPP project bond
investors.
" Ease the worry of PPP project bond investors on the transparency of PPP projects: generally, it is
always time consuming, and sometimes impossible for bond investors to gain enough detailed
information of the PPP projects. These bond investors worry significantly about the credit
information provided by PPP project bond issuers and find it very difficult to do related bond
valuations. Therefore, without monoline guarantees, these bond investors will avoid investing in
PPP project bonds, resulting in the value driven down for PPP project bonds. The monoline
business model can ease the worry of PPP project bond investors on the transparency of PPP
projects because in this model PPP project bond investors just need to know the detailed
information of the monoline companies, which is much easier to access.
4.5. Bank Loan & Bond Market for PPP Projects
Bank loans and wrapped bonds seem to be the two most important kinds of financing instruments for
infrastructure projects, including HSR projects, in the past. It is helpful to take a close look at the pros and
cons of both bank loans and wrapped bonds.
Before the financial crisis, compared to bank loans, the advantages of wrapped bonds includes lower total
financial costs, longer financing term, lower refinancing risks, and less lender-borrower negotiation costs:
* Lower total financial costs: Historically, monoline wrapped bonds have proved to be highly price
competitive with bank debt. The total costs of bond financing were often much lower than that of
bank financing before the financial crisis. (Moody, 2010) There are several reasons:
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- Before the financial crisis, the monolines generally held Aaa ratings, which
typically resulted in lower financial costs for wrapped bonds compared to bank
loan financing;
- Bonds are usually issued on fixed coupon rates. Bank loans are usually on
floating rates and banks generally need to use swaps for risk hedging. This risk
hedging increases the cost of bank loans and therefore make bank loans more
expensive in PPP project financing;
- Most bond investors, such as pension funds, have long-term liabilities that need
to be matched with long-term assets while banks typically have short-term
liabilities and long-term assets. Therefore, banks may require more liquidity
premium in bank loans than that required by bond investors.
" Longer financing term: investors for bonds, such as pension funds and insurance companies, have
naturally long-term liabilities which need to be hedged by long-term assets, or long-term
investments. At the same time, banks, normally having relatively short-term liabilities, are more
willing to lend shorter. (Moody, 2010)
e Lower refinancing risks29 : since banks are generally not willing to lend for the full term of the
project agreement or concession, a refinancing risk exists in bank loan financing. This refinancing
risk is lower in bond financing since bond investors are generally willing to lend longer. (Moody,
2010)
e Less lender-borrower negotiation costs: generally speaking, contractual agreements in PPPs, used
by lenders to control the behaviors of borrowers, are the results of negotiations between lenders
and concessionaries or borrowers at the beginning. Bank loan financing is usually in the form of
syndicated loans, providing by a group of banks. In this case, concessionaries have to negotiate
with a group of banks. However, in the case of wrapped bonds, concessionaries generally only
have to negotiate with one monoline company, since this monoline company takes the first loss
position of project default and bondholders have historically ceded control of the project. (Moody,
2010)
29 In banking and finance, refinancing risk is the possibility that a borrower cannot refinance by borrowing to repay
existing debt. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Refinancing risk
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Before the 2008 financial crisis, compared to bank loans, the disadvantages of wrapped bonds include the
cost of negative carry30
Negative carry: typically, in bond financing, borrowers receive bond issue proceeds at the start of
the project's construction phase, but construction fund needs are distributed across the whole
construction phase. Therefore, bond proceeds are usually deposited in a Guaranteed Investment
Contract (GIC) and funds are drawn when needed. The reality is that the interest earned from GIC
are generally lower than bond interest payments, resulting in the negative carry of bond financing.
In the bank loan financing, funds are drawn from banks when needed in the construction phase,
so there is no negative carry in bank loan financing. Although commitment fees are charged on
undrawn balances in bank loan financing, the cost of negative carry in bond financing is generally
larger than the cost of commitment fees in bank loan financing.
Bank loans and wrapped bonds have almost the same deliverability risks:
* Traditionally, bond executions are considered to have a higher risk that funds may not be
available, or available at uncompetitive prices. However, in large PPP projects, e.g. HSR projects,
bank loan financing is usually in the form of syndicated loans. The syndication is a process
requiring a significant amount of arrangement work. On balance, syndicated bank loan and bond
financings are in similar levels of deliverability risks.
The pros and cons of both bank loans and wrapped bonds can be summarized in Table 4-4:
Table 4-4 Pros and cons of Both Bank Loans and Wrapped Bonds Can be Summnarized As follows
Bank loan Wrapped bond
Total financial costs higher lower
Financing term shorter longer
Refinancing risk higher lower
Lender-borrower negotiation cost higher lower
Cost of negative carry or commitment fees lower higher
Deliverability risk almost the same almost the same
Source: European PPP Expertise Centre (2010). Capital markets in PPP financing.
30 The carry of an asset is the return obtained from holding it (if positive), or the cost of holding it (if negative). This
definition is also in List of Definition. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carry %28investment%29
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4.6. Wrapped Bonds after the Financial Crisis
From the analysis in the section Wrapped Bonds and Unwrapped Bonds, we can see before the 2008
financial crisis, wrapped bonds had absolute advantages compared to unwrapped bonds, including
achieving much lower financial cost, overcoming rating hurdle of institutional PPP project bond investors,
closing the rating gap between PPP project ratings in the construction phase and operation phase, and so
on.
From the analysis in the section Bank Loan & Bond Marketfor PPP Projects, we can see before the
financial crisis, wrapped bonds had lower total financial costs, longer financing term, lower refinancing
cost, and less lender-borrower negotiation cost compared to bank loan financing.
Therefore, wrapped bonds were very good financial instruments in PPP project financing before the
current financial crisis. However, during the financial crisis, due to their exposure on asset-backed
securities for which the underlying assets were sub-prime or other non-standard U.S. mortgage loans, the
rating of monoline companies decreased a lot and the effectiveness of this monoline insurance wrapped
bond model was severely impaired. (European PPP Expertise Centre, 2010) The rating change of some
monoline companies can be illustrated in Table 4-5:
Table 4-5 Rating Change of Monoline Companies during the Financial Crisis
Monoline companies June 2007 November 2009
Assured Guaranty Corp. Aaa Aa3
Assurance (UK) Ltd. Aaa Aa3
Ambac Assurance Corp. Aaa CC
MBIA UK Insurance Ltd. Aaa BB+
Syncora Guarantee (UK) Ltd. Aaa Ca
FGIC UK Ltd. Aaa Withdrawn
Source: European PPP Expertise Centre (2010). Capital markets in PPP financing.
Wrapped bonds financing faces a lot of problems resulting from the downgrades of monoline companies:
e Value impairment of wrapped PPP project bonds: wrapped PPP project bonds are rated by Moody
using the higher rating of the underlying PPP project and the monoline companies. After the 2008
financial crisis, most monoline companies have been downgraded to the rating category ranging
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from triple-B to single-A, and as a result, these PPP wrapped bonds are severely downgraded.
(Moody, 2010).
* Problems resulting from the lack of transparency in some PPP project companies: in some cases,
the underlying project does not have a public rating and little information is available to investors.
In these cases, it is very difficult for institutional bond investors to value these bonds and the fund
managers of these institutions are forced to sell bonds in this situation. This further decreases the
value of these kinds of wrapped bonds. (Moody, 2010)
* Rating hurdle of institutional PPP project bond investors: traditionally, PPP project institutional
PPP project bond investors, including pension fund and insurance companies only invest in the
PPP project bonds with investment grades. Although PPP projects in construction are usually not
rated in the investment grade or just in the lowest level of investment grade, the existence of
monolines' guarantees makes the wrapped PPP project bonds attractive to these potential
institutional PPP project bond investors by enhancing the rating of the wrapped PPP project
bonds to be Aaa before the financial crisis. However, after the massive downgrades of monoline
companies, these wrapped bonds hardly attract those institutional bond investors since their
ratings usually fall below the rating hurdle of institutional PPP project bond investors.(Moody,
2010)
e Portfolio manger problem-lack of benchmark: before the 2008 financial crisis, wrapped bonds
are usually rated in the Aaa range, and the performance of these wrapped PPP project bonds can
be evaluated against the performance of other Aaa securities. These benchmarks are important for
portfolio managers since their bonuses are usually calculated based on their comparative
performance against certain standard benchmarks. Portfolio managers generally choose not to
invest in those securities without certain standard benchmarks because their performance cannot
be appropriately evaluated. After the 2008 financial crisis, wrapped bonds are largely
downgraded and the performance of wrapped bonds cannot be evaluated against other Aaa
securities. This makes portfolio managers reluctant to hold wrapped bonds since the performance
of these wrapped bond investments cannot be evaluated against certain benchmarks. (Moody,
2010)
However, monolines can still provide effective project control even after the downgrade their rating:
* Provide effective project control after financial close: traditionally, the monoline companies
provide the necessary project monitoring on behalf of PPP project bond investors before the 2008
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financial crisis because they suffer a first loss if the underlying project doesn't go well. Even after
the 2008 financial crisis, monolines still have incentives to control the project progresses and
related decision making process since they are still in the first loss position.
4.7. Development of the Portuguese Pension Fund Market
As discussed in the section Overview of Bond Financing for PPP Projects, pension funds and insurance
companies are two of the most important types of PPP project bond investors. Therefore, it is very
important to take a close look at the development of the Portuguese pension fund market.
4.7.1. Current Portuguese Pension Fund and Insurance Market
According to the statistics of the Portuguese Insurance and Pension Funds Supervisory Authority (ISP),
the percentage of pension funds assets (PFA) in GDP increased from 10.6% in 2004 to 12.9% in 2005. On
the other hand, the percentage of insurance assets (IA) in GDP increased from 20.6% to 24.7% over the
same period. The combination of both pension fund assets and insurance assets accounted for around 38%
of GDP by the end of 2005. The ratio of pension fund assets divided by insurance assets remained stable
since 2004, ranging from 50% to 52%. (Jos6 Pavio Nunes, 2007) More details are provided in Figure 4-8
below. By comparison, in 2005 pension fund assets account for 0%, 3.9%, 5.8%, 9.1%, 18.8%, 58% and
66.2% of GDP in Greece, Germany, France, Spain, Australia, and the United Kingdom respectively. The
Portugal's pension fund asset percentage is almost the medium of the percentages of OECD 31countries.
31 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
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Figure 4-8 Pension Fund Market in Portugal
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Source: Jose Pavio Nunes (2007). Pension fund in Portugal.
4.7.2. Social Security System Reform
Currently, ordinary state pensions in Portugal are financed through a redistribution system (pay-as-you-
go3 ).The rationale for this system is that the pension payments for current aged people come from the
taxes or contributions of current workers, and the pension payments for tomorrow's aged people come
from the taxes or contributions of tomorrow's workers. This redistribution system will face a lot of
problems when the aged dependence index33 increased rapidly, or in other words, when the percentage of
aged people in the whole population increased rapidly, because the taxes or contribution burden of
workers will become heavier and heavier. It is estimated that the aged dependence index will have
32 Definition of Pay as you go: In an unfunded defined benefit pension, no assets are set aside and the benefits are
paid for by the employer or other pension sponsor as and when they are paid. Pension arrangements provided by the
state in most countries in the world are unfunded, with benefits paid directly from current workers' contributions and
taxes. This method of financing is known as Pay-as-you-go (PAYGO or PAYG). Source:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pension#cite note-7
3 The Aged Dependence Index is defined as the ratio Population 65 + / Population 15-64
123
increased from around 25% in 2005 to around 60% in 2050. (Jos6 Pavio Nunes, 2007) Therefore, this
redistribution system is unsustainable in Portugal if no changes occur.
Portugal has realized this financial problems and has begun its Social Security System reform. Portugal
would like to create a new system combining the current redistribution scheme and the capitalization
scheme34 together. This means that the government would like to put greater emphasis on the scheme in
which every working person should contribute to the financing of their own pensions by creating
capitalized financial reserves. (Jos6 Pavio Nunes, 2007) Based on the analysis of the upper trend of the
percentage of aged people in Portugal, the transition from the redistribution system to capitalization
system is expected to continue.
The change from the redistribution system to the capitalization system is definitely positive for the
Portuguese pension fund market because this will significantly increase the total pension fund assets. The
increase of the total pension fund assets will result in a more liquid capital market and create more
demands for the assets pension fund would like to invest, for example, Aaa assets. On the other hand, if
the retirement age of Portugal increases from 65 to 70, the ratio of aged people divided by working people
will increase, and the transition progress from the redistribution system to the capitalization system will
slow down.
4.7.3. Investments of Portuguese Pension Funds
Around 2006, Portuguese pension funds invest 58% of their total money in assets with an Aaa rating, and
around 91% of their total money in assets with a rating superior to A is around 91%. (Jos6 Pavio Nunes,
2007) This shows that a high asset rating is essential for attracting Portuguese pension fund investments.
4.7.4. Conclusion of Portuguese Pension Fund Market
Although the current pension fund and insurance market size of Portugal is medium in OECD countries,
this market is expected to grow significantly in the future because the current redistribution pension
system is expected to gradually change to recapitalization system due to the pressure of the increase in the
percentage of aged people in Portugal. This change is definitely a good opportunity for pension funds in
3 In the capitalization scheme, every working person should also contribute to the financing of their own pension by
creating financial reserves that are capitalized.
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Portugal because it increases the total amount of pension fund assets, and it is also a good opportunity for
Portuguese HSR building if it can achieve a high and attractive project rating to pension funds.
4.8. Institutional Structure Implication
From the analysis in the sections PPP Project Rating, Wrapped Bond and Unwrapped Bond, Bank Loan
& Bond Market for PPP Projects, and Wrapped Bonds after the Financial Crisis, we can conclude that
compared to unwrapped bonds, wrapped bonds before the financial crisis could achieve much lower
financial cost, overcome rating hurdle of institutional PPP project bond investors, close the rating gap
between PPP project ratings in the construction phase and operation phase, provide effective project
control after financial close, and ease the worry of PPP project bond investors on the transparency of PPP
projects.
Compared with bank loans, wrapped bonds before the financial crisis could achieve lower total financial
costs, longer financing term, lower refinancing cost, and less lender-borrower negotiation cost.
However, during the financial crisis, due to the exposure on asset-backed securities for which the
underlying assets were the sub-prime or other non-standard United Stated mortgage loans, the rating of
monoline companies decreased a lot and the effectiveness of this monoline insurance wrapped bond
model was severely impaired.
Therefore, we think it will bring a huge amount of benefits if the Portuguese government can develop a
debt guarantee program at a national level, the function of which is just like monoline guarantees, and
form a corresponding new institution to support this program (the new institution is the Portuguese
Infrastructure Bank, and details will be given in Section 4.8.4). This program will help significantly lower
the financial cost of Portuguese High-Speed Rail building if wrapped bond financing is used.
In addition, this debt guarantee program at a national level may bring in higher than expected benefits
because the total Portuguese pension fund asset will probably increase and infrastructure bonds, including
the potential HSR project bonds, will face more demands if these bonds can achieve high enough rating:
Portugal is highly like to continue its Social Security System reform and gradually change its current
redistribution pension system to recapitalization system due to the pressure of the increase of aged people
in Portugal, which will result in the increases of pension fund assets.
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This institution used to support the debt guarantee program at a national level should be able to collect a
guaranteed fee at a market price and have financially sustainable development: this financially sustainable
development is totally possible since firstly the traditional monoline companies were profitable before the
financial crisis; secondly the downgrade of monoline companies in the financial crisis was not due to their
exposure to asset-backed securities for which the underlying assets were infrastructure bonds, but the
exposure to asset-backed securities for which the underlying assets were the sub-prime United Stated
mortgage loans.
To better understand what kinds of institutions are appropriate, we take a close look at related financially
sustainable institutions which provide guarantees, including the European Investment Bank (EIB), and the
proposed United Stated Infrastructure Bank.
4.8.1. European Investment Bank
"Established under the treaty of Rome in 1957 and created in 1958, the European Investment Bank (EIB)
is the European Union (EU)'s long-term lending institution. As a policy-driven Bank, the EIB supports
EU priority objectives, notably European integration and social cohesion, through its financing
operations." (EIB, 201 1f)
The business model of the EIB is that it finances viable capital projects matched up with the EU
objectives and borrow low on the capital markets to finance these projects using its Aaa rating. The total
capital of the EIB in the end of 2009 was 232 billion Euros, of which 11.6 billion Euros were actually
paid-in. In other words, the ratio of total capital divided by public capital was close to 20. (EIB, 2011 g)
In the EU, the EIB would like to lend to six kinds of projects: Cohesion and Convergence; Support for
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), Environmental Sustainability, Implementation of the
Innovation 2010 Initiative (i2i), Development of Trans-European Networks of transport and energy
(TENs), Sustainable, competitive and secure energy. (EIB, 2011 a)
The financial products EIB provides include loans, technical assistance, guarantees, venture capital, and
microfinance. (EIB, 201 1b) The loans include individual loans provided directly to projects with capital
cost larger than 25 million Euros and being in line with the EU objectives, and intermediated loans
provided to banks and financial institutions to help them to provide finance to small and medium-sized
enterprises. (EIB, 201 1c) The guarantee can be either a standard guarantee or debt service guarantee
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similar to that offered by monoline insurers. For TEN-T projects, including the Portuguese HSR projects,
the Loan Guarantee Instrument for TEN Transport (LGTT) can be very helpful, which is designed to
guarantee revenue risks during a limited period following construction of TENs projects, notably under a
PPP structure. (EIB, 201 1d)
The most important corporate policy of the EIB is its transparency policy. (EIB, 2011 a) The EIB group
"stresses good governance, including a high level of transparency and accountability for itself and its
counterparts, while recognizing the need to respect confidentiality where appropriate and ensuring trust.
The EIB considers that as a bank and a public institution, openness on how it makes decisions, works and
implements EU policies, strengthens its credibility and its accountability to citizens. Transparency also
contributes to increasing the efficiency and sustainability of the Bank's operations, reducing the risks of
corruption, and enhancing staff relations with external stakeholders."
4.8.2. The US Infrastructure Bank (Proposed)
The creation of the US Infrastructure Bank was recently proposed by Senator Christopher J. Dodd and
Senator Chuck Hagel in 2007 in their Dodd-Hagel bill (S.1926 and HR.3401). The bank was proposed to
be established using a $60 billion long-term bond issue (up to 50 years) and pay back these bonds using
the potential benefits of the bank's infrastructure investments in the future. The bank was estimated to be
self-financing in the end. (Kenneth Orski, 2008)
The US Infrastructure Bank is supposed to promote the building of infrastructure projects--primarily
roads, mass transits and High-Speed Trains-in line with public interest, including economic growth,
environmental sustainability, regional integration, poverty alleviation, etc. by using its toolbox of loans,
insurance policies and guarantees to stimulate the use of public private partnerships. (Michael Likosky,
2010) This US Infrastructure Bank is supposed to achieve the best use of federal resources since it will
evaluate projects on a project-by-project, and dollar-by-dollar basis. (Everett Ehrlich & Felix G. Rohatyn,
2008)
The business model of the US Infrastructure Bank was discussed in details in HR. 2521. According to the
summary of HR. 2521, the revised bill " Authorizes the Board to: (1) issue public benefit bonds and
provide direct subsidies to infrastructure projects; (2) borrow on the global capital market and lend to
entities and commercial banks for funding infrastructure projects; and (3) purchase, pool, and sell
infrastructure-related loans and securities (including guarantees) on such market. Requires the Board to
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establish criteria for determining project eligibility for financial assistance under this Act." (GovTrack.US,
2011)
The most important financial related concept of the US Infrastructure Bank is leverage. Chairman Dodd
explained to the hearing in 2007"this bank would establish a unique and powerful public-private
partnership. Using limited Federal resources, it would leverage the significant resources and innovation of
the private sector. It would tap the private sector's financial and intellectual power to meet our nation's
largest and most critical structural needs." Senator Hagel went on to explain to the hearing: "The
Infrastructure Bank-a public entity similar in nature to the Municipal Assistance Corporation- would have
the ability to leverage private capital to supplement current levels of public spending. A public entity that
can focus private sector investment onto public infrastructure could help provide the necessary investment
for 21st century infrastructure in America." (Michael Likosky, 2010)
In 2008, President Obama suggested that the Bank would borrow US$60 billion of federal funding to
invest in infrastructure over 10 years, while leveraging "up to $500 billion" of private investment.
Everett Ehrlich and Felix G. Rohatyn (2008) also argued "even using a conservative ratio of borrowed
funds to capital of three to one (meaning each dollar of federal activity attracts three added dollars of
private borrowing), this could produce almost a quarter trillion of investment on a $60 billion annual bond
issue."
4.8.3. Comparison of European Investment Bank and the Proposed US Infrastructure
Bank
After comparing the cases of the EIB and the proposed US Infrastructure Bank, we can conclude that
these two banks both provide loans and guarantees to support the development of infrastructure projects
in line with public interest. HSR projects, included in "TEN-T for EIB and HSR trains for the proposed
US Infrastructure Bank", are important investment targets for both of them.
Both EIB and the proposed US Infrastructure Bank are, or are supposed to be, financially sustainable. The
basic business models of these two banks are also almost the same: they borrow low in the global capital
market and provide infrastructure-related loans and securities to entities and commercial banks for
funding infrastructure projects, except for the facts that the proposed US Infrastructure Bank also
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purchase, and pool these infrastructure-related loans and securities (including guarantees) in this capital
market, and issue public benefit bonds and provide direct subsidies to infrastructure projects.
Leverage is the most important financial concept for both the EIB and the proposed US Infrastructure
Bank: in the EIB, the ratio of total capital divided by public capital was close to 20 in 2009; in the
proposed US Infrastructure Bank, the proposed ratio of total capital divided by public capital is 500
billion USD/60 billion USD, or close to 9.
Although we don't know whether the proposed US Infrastructure Bank can succeed in the future since it
has not been created, we do know the key factor for the success of the EIB is its Aaa rating: because of its
Aaa rating, it can borrow at a very low interest rate and is able to be financially sustainable. However,
although not explicitly listed in documents, someone can argue that the EIB's achievement of Aaa rating
is due to the implicit guarantees provided by the EU.
4.8.4. Conclusion of Institutional Structure Implication
As previously discussed in Institutional Structure Implication, the Portuguese government can benefit
significantly by developing a debt guarantee program at a national level, the function of which should be
similar to the function of monoline companies. This program will significantly lower the financial cost of
Portuguese High-Speed Rail building if wrapped bond financing is used this way. To support this
program, the Portuguese government should form a corresponding new institution (the proposed new
institution is the Portuguese Infrastructure Bank, and details will be given soon in this section). After
taking a close look at both the EIB and the proposed US Infrastructure Bank, we can conclude:
" These two banks are both created to support the development of infrastructure projects in line
with public interest and they are both interested in HSR projects;
" They achieve or are supposed to achieve a high financial leverage and make full use of private
capital;
e They both provide guarantees to the building of infrastructure projects: the EIB provides both the
regular guarantees and monoline guarantees, and it is still not clear whether the proposed US
Infrastructure Bank will provide these monoline guarantees;
e The business models of these two banks are almost the same: they borrow low in the global
capital market and provide infrastructure-related loans and securities to entities and commercial
banks for funding infrastructure projects;
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* The EIB has achieved financial sustainability mostly because it can maintain its Aaa rating and
invest mostly in financially viable projects.
It is beneficial for the Portuguese government to establish a national infrastructure bank to support the
development of Portuguese infrastructure, including its HSR developments. This bank should have a high
rating like EIB, e.g. Aaa, and be able to borrow low in the global capital markets. If the Portuguese
government can achieve a high rating, such as Aaa, in the future, this Portuguese infrastructure bank can
benefit from receiving guarantees from the Portuguese government or becoming a subsidiary of the
government. However, if the Portuguese government cannot achieve a high rating in the future, for
example, if the government can only get rated Baal as it did in April, 2011, this national infrastructure
bank should be private and should not be just a subsidiary of the Portuguese government. Otherwise, this
national infrastructure bank will meet a rating ceiling, which is the rating of the Portuguese government.
In the second case, the Portuguese government needs to allocate a significant amount of capital and few
debts to the national infrastructure bank to help it achieve a much lower debt to capital ratio than the one
of the Portuguese government. At the same time, the Portuguese government should have absolute control
over the Portuguese infrastructure bank by holding more than 51 percentage of the total equity. In either
of these two cases, it would definitely be helpful if the Portuguese Infrastructure Bank can get some
financial support, including guarantees, fund injection and so on, from the EIB or from the EU.
The Portuguese infrastructure bank should provide loans or guarantees to projects in line with public
interest. At the same time, it should also pay special attentions to financial viability when selecting
investment projects, in order to make its business financially sustainable. Compared to the EIB and the
proposed US Infrastructure Bank, the Portuguese infrastructure bank should focus more on the monoline
guarantee business since it is the most promising, and cheapest financing method both before the financial
crisis and in the future, and it can bring most benefits to the infrastructure development in Portugal. The
fees should be set at market prices and the infrastructure bank should be able to generate profits based on
it. In addition, the Portuguese infrastructure bank should treat transparency very seriously since it has
been proved to be a very key factor for the success of this infrastructure bank.
In the end, we should point out that none of these conclusions works without the economy of Portugal
getting healthy.
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4.9. Other Innovative Financing Methods: Stock IPO, Co-lending, etc.
4.9.1. Stock IPO
According to the experience of China, Germany, Taiwan, Japan and Portugal discussed in Chapter 3,
Difference between Financing HSR and Other Transportation Projects, whether stock IPO is feasible for
HSR project financing depends heavily on the project's profitability. Generally speaking, stock IPO is
infeasible for HSR project financing because HSR projects are generally not profitable. The only
exception is Japan, in which some HSR projects are very profitable.
For Portugal, stock IPO can be used to gather money for HSR projects probably only when the
government is willing to give tax incentives, just as Taiwan did.
In Taiwan, the tax incentives were stated as: "For those entities/people who hold the stocks of domestic
major transportation projects or significant infrastructures for more than two years, these entities/people
can claim 20% of their investments as deductibles from taxable income, starting from year 2." (I-Tsung
Tsai, 2007)
4.9.2. Co-lending
If the Portuguese government would like to use the unwrapped bond financing, the underlying project
rating matters a lot.
As discussed early, the public capital contributions at the beginning are considering negative in Moody's
rating if these capital contributions are paid progressively and based on the degree of project completion.
To avoid the negative rating effect of public capital contribution at the beginning, Portuguese government
can consider using co-lending instead of public capital contribution.
These kinds of governmental co-lending agencies have already existed in the world, for example, the HM
Treasury's The Infrastructure Financing Unit (TIFU) in the UK. According to Moody (2009), "if this
public sector co-lending is provided for the long-term, with no expectation of replacement, and with the
co-lending ranking equal with conventional private sector debt, we may even view such co-lending as a
credit positive on the grounds that the public sector off-taker may be less willing to allow private sector
lenders to reach a default if that inevitably causes a simultaneous default on the public sector's co-lending
asset."
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Therefore, we can see if the Portuguese government is willing to provide this co-lending for the long-term,
with no expectation of the replacement and with co-lending ranking equal with conventional private
sector debt, it can enhance its HSR project rating.
4.10. Conclusion
Compared to unwrapped bonds, bank loans, and stock IPO, wrapped bonds guaranteed by high rating
monolines are the most promising way to finance the Portuguese HSR projects in the future because of its
low total financial costs, long financing term and low refinancing cost. However, the effectiveness of the
wrapped bond model has been limited by the 2008 financial crisis because most monolines have been
downgraded a lot since then.
To recover the benefits of wrapped bonds and to better use them to finance the building of Portuguese
HSR projects in the future, the Portuguese government needs to develop a national debt guarantee
program, the function of which should be similar to the function of monoline companies. To support this
program, the Portuguese government needs to establish a high rating national infrastructure bank. The
Portuguese infrastructure bank should provide loans or guarantees to infrastructure projects in line with
public interest just as EIB and Obama's Bank do, but it should focus more on the monoline guarantee
businesses because wrapped bond financing is the most effective way to finance the Portuguese HSR
projects in the future. In this end, we need to point out again that this conclusion only works when the
economy of Portugal has become much better and can really afford to build a new HSR project.
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5. Megaregions and HSR Financing
5.1. Overview
In Chapter 4, Innovative Financing Methods, we conclude that the wrapped bond is a very promising way
to finance the Portuguese HSR projects in the future since it has much lower total financial costs than
unwrapped bonds and bank loans when this wrapped bond can be rated Aaa. We recommended that the
Portuguese government should establish a debt guarantee program at the national level to support the
revival of wrapped bonds after the 2008 financial crisis has passed. Institutionally, we think a national
infrastructure bank is an appropriate institution to provide this nation-wide debt guarantee program.
However, the use of innovative financing methods cannot diminish the importance of a "good project",
or financially viable project: innovative financing methods are used to decrease financial costs required
by investors because of their unfamiliarity with projects, but these methods cannot change the intrinsic
financial value of the projects; if the projects cannot generate enough operating revenues or operating
cash flows in the future, no innovative financing methods, including wrapped bonds, can work. A good
project, or a financially viable project, is the foundation for using any innovative financing methods. This
relationship can be illustrated in Figure 5-1:
Figure 5-1 Relationship between Innovative Financing Methods and Financially Viable Projects
Source: sketched by the author
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Inno cing
The Portuguese HSR projects are all important megaregion projects: for example, the Lisbon-Oporto HSR
line links the two largest metropolitan areas in Portugal, Lisbon and Porto. In this chapter, we will take a
close look at the megaregion characteristics of the Portuguese HSR projects, indentify potential
megaregion revenues based on hoped economic growth, and provide recommendations for the Portuguese
HSR financing based on these new identified revenues.
This chapter can be divided into four sections: in the first section, we introduce the concept of
megaregions and briefly discuss the relationship between megaregions and the internal transportation
infrastructures; in the second part, we summarize the theories of HSR's contribution for the formation of
megaregions; in the third section, we discuss the economic influence of HSR on megaregions; in the
fourth section, we discuss the potential megaregion revenues that we can use to build HSR.
5.2. Megaregions
5.2.1. Definition for Megaregions
Generally speaking, megaregions are regions with large agglomeration of economic activities. There are
many terminologies expressing the same meaning with megaregions: all megalopolises, metropolitan
areas, and function region are similar to megaregions.
Blum, Haynes, Karlsson (1997) defines the function region as "a geographical area that shares a common
labor market and a common market for household and business services".
Regional Plan Association (2006) defines megaregions as "agglomerations of metropolitan regions with
integrated labor markets, infrastructure, and land use systems".
Ross (2009) defines megaregions as "network of metropolitan centers and their surrounding areas. They
are spatially and functionally linked through environmental, economic, and infrastructure interactions."
For consistency, we will just use the term megaregions in the following discussion.
The formation of megaregions is based on the Modem City Theory: "No city is an island, not
economically, not environmentally, not demographically, not culturally and certainly not politically. A
thriving city both draws from and contributes to a thriving region." (Ross, 2009)
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Eduardo Lopez Moreno, the co-author of the UN report, World's Biggest Cities Merging Into
Megaregions, said "Research shows that the world's largest 40 megaregions cover only a tiny fraction of
the habitable surface of our planet and are home to fewer than 18% of the world's population [but]
account for 66% of all economic activity and about 85% of technological and scientific innovation."
(John Vidal, 2010)
The largest current megaregions in the world are the Hong Kong-Shenzhen-Guangzhou regions in China,
the population of which is about 120 million. (John Vidal, 2010) In the US, approximately 70% of the
population will reside in or close to the country's eight or ten megaregions. (Ross, 2009) In Portugal, the
population of the urbanized area of Lisbon is about 3 million (Demographia, 2011), and the population of
the Porto metropolitan area is about 1.1 million (Demographia, 2011), if megaregions can be formed in
the Lisbon-Porto areas, the megaregions will have a population of at least 4.1 million.
5.2.2. Megaregion Governance and Planning
Ross (2009) considers megaregions, not cities, to be the most appropriate unit of social organization and
economic coordination. She thinks that megaregions may be more effective than cities to absorb the
economic shock waves of economic crises, and allocate limited resources to meet the social and economic
challenges. She also thinks megaregions are the best unit to capture the economies of scale effect
associated with the building of large infrastructure projects. (Ross, 2009) Ross and Woo (2011) also
argues that megaregions play an important role in globalization by providing "focal points for global
connections to existing and emerging markets of opportunities". Therefore, the importance of
megaregions requires us to take a close look at megaregion governance and planning.
According to Innes, Booher, and Vittorio (2010), due to the lack of integrated megaregion governance,
"formal government decisions are made at different scales, typically without consultation with those who
will be affected and usually without coordination, much less an effort to achieve joint gain." This lack of
coordination between formal governments resulting that "megaregions (are) unable to build synergies
among diverse components, adapt to changing conditions in a productive way, or address region-wide
issues."
At the same time, Contant (2009) also argues that planning carried by local governments will meet
problems when facing the challenges of globalization, uneven distribution of wealth, global climate
change, limited natural resource, etc. This is because that these issues are all at least at the regional scale
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while local governments act to maximize the local benefits only. Local governments have incentives to
promote activities that increase local wealth even when these activities can result in external
diseconomies, because the funding of local governments is typically only related to local property values
and the wealth of local citizens. (Ross, 2009) Although no individual scale of planning can fully address
the challenges mentioned above, Regional Plan Association (2006) argued that "planning at the scale of
megaregions may provide useful approaches to enhance future economic competitiveness, sustainability,
and quality of life."
Therefore, the literature shows that megaregion governance and planning is more effective in addressing
the challenges we face in the 21" century, including global climate change, limited natural resources and
so on. The megaregion governance and planning helps to utilize both energy and land resources more
effectively and efficiently, because it internalizes the external diseconomies of local planning and reaches
closer to the global optimum.
However, it is infeasible to achieve megaregion governance and planning by forming a formal
megaregion government, "given the limited success thus far of metropolitan governments". (Innes,
Booher, and Vittorio, 2010) To address this issue, based on the research results of complexity science,
Innes, Booher, and Vittorio (2010) proposes "the use of collaborative network governance in megaregions
in the current set of governing institutions, which interfere with collaboration, boundary spanning, and
inclusion of diverse players." More specifically, their idea is to form systems of governance in
megaregions including "not only governments and public agencies, but also profit and nonprofit entities,
civic organizations and representatives of a larger public", and to build linkages between these different
fragmented systems. Based on the adaptive complex system theory, because these complex systems are
diversified, interactive, and able to select, these complex systems can "select effective strategies and those
with low-value outcomes." (Innes, Booher, and Vittorio, 2010)
5.2.3. Megaregion and Transportation Project Investments
Transportation investments are extremely important for megaregions and the whole nation. Meyer (2007)
argues: "The transportation connections within megaregions will need particular attention in that these
connections not only support the economic activities of the megaregions themselves, but also serve as
gateways to the rest of the nation." Ross and Woo (2011) argues "sustainable, livable megaregions
require intra- and inter-urban access and mobility coordinated with public transportation." On the other
hand, the megaregions concept should be considered seriously in transportation investments. Ross (2009)
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states "extending transportation and infrastructure planning to the level of the megaregions could deliver
significant economic, social, and mobility benefits."
In addition, according to Ross and Woo (2011), "to relieve traffic congestion in major corridors in
megaregions, mobility systems should be based on alternative modes of transportation and combinations
of different modes and technologies." To maximize the benefits of the whole megaregions, they suggest
that the US government builds more sustainable infrastructure and transportation system in megaregions,
for example, the High-Speed Rail system, which can "improve mobility, environmental conditions, and
regional economic growth and connectivity and ensure the integration of transit in long-range and
regional policies".
We can conclude that the transportation investments in megaregions help with the regional economic
development significantly. And HSR is a sustainable mode that people should prefer when considering
megaregion development. We will take a close look at HSR's contributions to the economy of
megaregions in the following sections HSR and Megaregion Formation, and HSR 's Economic Influence
on Megaregions.
5.3. HSR and Megaregion formation
5.3.1. Overview of HSR and Megaregion Formation
The HSR's contributions to the formation of megaregions have been discussed significantly by many
authors.
According to Blum, Karlsson and Haynes (1997) "HSR links together many cities and, hence, creates a
new type of region or corridor with a high interregional accessibility... cities that are linked together into
a band of cities by means of a High-Speed Train connection are transformed to an extended functional
region or in other words an integrated corridor economy."
According to Hall (2009), "railway systems have achieved an extraordinary renaissance in the form of
High-Speed Trains.... (HSR) shrink geographical space, and thus tie not only half of Britain, but also
much of Europe, into a single polycentric Megalopolis."
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According to Vickerman (1997), "High-Speed Rail improves both the competitiveness and cohesion
dimensions by, in effect, shrinking the size of geographical space" by increasing accessibility. However,
"it is clear that the biggest gains in accessibility accrue to the major access points to the network."
According to Melibaeva, Sussman, and Dunn (2010), "HSR contributes to further centralization and
concentration of most economic activity in already developed areas."
In summary, HSR decreases the temporal distances and increase the accessibility between cities, "shrinks
the size of geographical space", and therefore may contribute to the formation of megaregions. However,
we should also notice that the gains from HSR investments are not distributed evenly across the whole
megaregions, with the major access points, and the already developed areas usually being the biggest
winners.
According to Blum, Haynes, and Karlsson (1997), the contributions of HSR to the formation of
megaregions can be in two cases: in the first case, megaregions are only formed between the two principal
end cities "when a point to point link is dominant" and "each train is a potential substitute for an air
connection between two cities"; in the second case, megaregions are formed by binding cities along the
HSR lines when "the train system links together many cities and CBD's and, hence, creates a new type of
region with a high intra-regional accessibility." (Blum, Haynes, and Karlsson, 1997)
In addition, to measure HSR's contributions to the formation of megaregions, Melibaeva, Sussman, and
Dunn (2010) propose the use of "daily accessibility indicators" since "HSR allows reaching more
population and more places at a reduced travel time relative to other modes of transportation". After HSR
investments, they expect to see "significant increases in one-day round trips between a pair or group of
cities, high levels of newly generated induced demand overall, induced demand for business trips,
increase in the number of daily commuters, and decrease in overnight hotel stays."
5.3.2. The Japanese Shinkansen and the Formation of Megaregions
The Shinkansen is the High-Speed Rail network in Japan. Important Shinkansen lines include Tokaido
Shinkansen, Sanyo Shinkansen, Joetsu Shinkansen, Tohoku Shinkansen, Hokuriku Shinkansen,
Yamagata Shinkansen, Akita Shinkansen, Hokuriku Shinkansen and so on. The map of the Japanese
Shinkansen network is shown in Figure 5-2.
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Figure 5-2 Map of the Japanese Shinkansen Network in 2010
Source: Wikitravel (2011). Retrieved Feb, 2011 from http://wikitravel.org/en/Image:Shinkansen map 20101204 en.png
The Tokaido line, opened in 1964, is the first Shinkansen line linking Tokyo and Osaka, was operated by
JR Central. (Sand, 1993) Nowadays, the Tokaido line is the busiest HSR line in the world, with 151
million passengers transported by it per year (March 2008). (Melibaeva, Sussman, and Dunn, 2010)
The Tokaido line links 17 stations, including Tokyo, Shinagawa, Shin-Yokohama, Nagoya, Kyoto, Shin-
Osaka and so on. There are three types of trains running on this HSR line, Nozomi, Hikari, and Kodama.
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The Nozomi, the fastest one, shortens the temporal distance between Tokyo and Kyoto to be just 2 hours
30 minutes; it takes people 3 hours 10 minutes to travel from Tokyo to Kyoto using Hikari; and it takes
people approximately 4 hours to travel the same distance using Kodama, the slowest one. (Wildpedia,
2011 a)
According to Melibaeva, Sussman, and Dunn (2010), "relative to other modes, the HSR's (the Tokaido
HSR's) reach has expanded the commute zone to the cities that are over 200 km (124 miles) away from
Tokyo." This can be further shown in Figure 5-3: the major cities along the Tokyo-Osaka corridor are
brought closer by the Japanese Shinkansen. The formation of megaregions can be partly proved by "the
increase in intra-organizational business trips in the services sector and decrease of the overnight stays".
Additional evidence supporting the formation of Tokyo-Osaka megaregions are the "concept of formation
of Extra Huge Economic Zones (EHEZ)" brought forward by Japan's Chubu Economic Federation.
(Melibaeva, Sussman, and Dunn, 2010)
Figure 5-3 Time Space Chart from/to Tokyo by Mode
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According to Blum, Haynes, and Karlsson (1997), the Tokyo-Osaka megaregions are only formed
between the two principal end cities, Tokyo and Osaka, not with others. Furthermore, this means cities
along the corridor of HSR line may experience a loss of economic activities.
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5.3.3. The French TGV and the Formation of Megaregions
The French TGV, the HSR network in France, is basically radical with its center being in Paris. The
French TGVs include the Paris-Lyon TGV, the TGV Atlantic line (Paris-Le Marts/Tours), the Paris Lille
TGV, and so on. The map of the French TGV network is illustrated in Figure 5-4.
Figure 5-4 Map of the French TGV Network in 2010
Source: About France.com, Retrieved Feb, 2011 from http://about-france.com/france-rail-travel.htm
The Paris-Lyon HSR, launched in 1981, is the first TGV line in France. This Paris-Lyon HSR shortens
the temporal distance between Paris-Lyon to be two hours (the physical distance between these two cities
is 425km).
According to Melibaeva, Sussman, and Dunn (2010), the Paris-Lyon TGV brought the two largest urban
centers in France, Paris and Lyon, closer to each other, as shown in Figure 5-5. "Total business travel on
the corridor increased 56%, and those made for sale/purchase of services by 112%." "The number of
overnight stays by TGV passengers fell after the introduction of HSR from 74 to 46%". The increase of
business travel, especially those made for the sale/purchase of services, provides strong evidence for the
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increase of induced travel. Combining this increase of induced travel and the decrease of overnight stay,
we can conclude that the Paris-Lyon TGV shrinks the geographic distance between Paris and Lyon, and
this HSR line helps with the formation of the Paris-Lyon megaregions. (Melibaeva, Sussman, and Dunn,
2010)
Figure 5-5 Time Space Chart from/to Paris by Mode
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However, it should also be noted that intermediate cities along the HSR line, Le Creusot and Macon, have
not experienced the gigantic changes of users' behaviors like Paris and Lyon due to the low frequencies
of HSR trains in these cities (8 vs. 30 trains/day in Paris). (Melibaeva, Sussman, and Dunn, 2010) This
means that the Paris-Lyon megaregions are only formed between the two principal end cities, Paris and
Lyon, not with others. Furthermore, this Paris-Lyon HSR case shows that cities along the corridor of HSR
line may experience a loss of economic activities.
5.3.4. The German ICE and the Formation of Megaregions
The German ICE trains are operated in a maximum speed of 300 km/h (186 mph) and connect major
German cities at hourly intervals. The major ICE lines includes the Frankfurt-Hamburg ICE line, the
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Frankfurt-Munchen (Munich) ICE line, the Hamburg-Munchen ICE line, the Berlin- Frankfurt ICE line,
the Frankfurt- K6ln ICE line, the Frankfurt-Amsterdam ICE line, the Frankfurt-Brussels ICE line, the
Berlin-Hamburg ICE line, the Hamburg-Copenhagen ICE line, and so on. (EuRail, 2011) The map of the
German ICE network in 2010 is illustrated in Figure 5-6.
Figure 5-6 Map of the German ICE Network in 2010
Source: Wikipedia.2011. Intercity-Express. Retrieved Feb 20th, 2011 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intercity-
Express#Germany
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The Frankfurt- K6in ICE line is the first new-built (contrasted with upgraded) dedicated ICE line linking
the cities of Frankfurt am Main and K61n, with a total distance of 177km (110 miles). This ICE line has
shortened the temporal distance between these two cities from 2 hours 15 min to just over an hour.
(Sasaki, Ohashi, and Nado, 1997)
According to Melibaeva, Sussman, and Dunn (2010), the deployment of the Frankfurt- K61n ICE makes
Montabaur and Limburg, the intermediate cities along this ICE line, more closely connected to the
traditional employment cities, such as Frankfurt, K61n, and Wiesbaden, as illustrated in Figure 5-7. "The
ICE line has moved the cities closer in space-time thus integrating them into a large megaregion or
megalopolis." (Melibaeva, Sussman, and Dunn, 2010). Therefore, in the Frankfurt- K61n ICE case,
megaregions are formed by binding cities along the ICE lines.
Figure 5-7 Time Space Chart from/to Frankfurt by Mode
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5.3.5. The Lisbon-Porto HSR and the Potential Formation of Lisbon-Porto Megaregions
According to RAVE, the Portuguese government plans to build the Lisbon-Porto HSR in 2015, a 297 km
HSR line linking the cities Lisbon, Leiria, Coimbra, Aveiro, and Porto. (RAVE, 2008) This HSR line will
shorten the temporal distance from Lisbon to Porto to only 75 min. The map of this Lisbon-Porto HSR is
illustrated in Figure 5-8.
Lisbon and Porto have already been connected by well-developed conventional rails and intercity roads
nowadays. The journey time between these two cities is 2 hours 34 min on conventional rail, and 3 hours
24 min by intercity roads. (RAVE, 2008)
Figure 5-8 The Lisbon-Porto HSR in Portugal
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Source: RAVE.2008. The Portuguese High-Speed Rail Project: General Overview and Status of the Project. RAVE's
presentation. Lisbon, Portugal. September, 2009.
According to Melibaeva, Sussman, and Dunn (2010), as illustrated in Figure 5-9, allowing the Lisbon-
Porto corridor to become "a zone of one-day activity", the Lisbon-Porto HSR may contribute to the
formation of megaregions. There are four possibilities for the formation of megaregions: firstly, the
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megaregions may be formed "between two main end cities (Lisbon- Porto)"; secondly, these megaregions
may be formed "at one of either ends of the HSR routes or both simultaneously (Lisbon-Oeste- Leiria and
Porto-Aveiro-Coimbra)"; thirdly, hybrid megaregions may be formed by combining the cases one and
two mentioned above; The last possibility is that no megaregions will be formed because the Lisbon-
Porto corridor has already had well-developed conventional rail services, with the incremental time-
saving benefits of building HSR being small. (Melibaeva, Sussman, and Dunn, 2010)
Figure 5-9 Time Space Chart from/to Lisbon by Mode
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5.4. HSR's Economic Influence on Megaregions
5.4.1. Overview of HSR's Economic Influence on Megaregions
According to the analysis in the section HSR and Megaregion Formation, by decreasing the temporal
distance and increasing the accessibility between cities, HSR contributes to the formation of megaregions.
And the formation of megaregions will integrate both the labor and consumer markets, provide
opportunities for larger agglomeration of economic activities, and raise the concerns for unbalanced
growth with the megaregions.
According to Pol (2003), HSR "may affect the regional economy in two ways: it may act as a catalyst or
it may have a facilitating effect." The catalyst effect typically happens in the cities or regions with low
economic growth, or at a phase of economic transition. These cities or regions "need a strong impulse to
direct the local economy" and the connection to HSR network provides this necessary impulse. "In
particular, actors in these cities are expected to carry out additional investments in response to the HST-
connection in order to improve their economic potential." Good examples of cities with the catalyst effect
are Montabaur and Limburg in the Frankfurt- K6n megaregions.
The facilitating effect typically happens in the cities or regions with "a relatively high economic potential,
and frequently the first to be connected to the HST-network". These cities or regions "need to ensure that
their accessibility keeps pace with their economic growth" and the connection to HSR network provides
this necessary accessibility. These cities or regions are also expected to have additional investments in
response to the connection to HSR networks. But Pol (2003) thinks these cities should focus more on the
social equity issue. (Pol, 2003) A good example of cities with the facilitating effect is Paris and Lyon in
the Paris-Lyon megaregions.
According to Pol (2003), the megaregion developments in response to the connection to HSR networks
are supposed to focus on specific development areas. Schntz (1998) classifies these development areas
into "primary, secondary and tertiary development zones" based on their accessibility to and from HSR
stations. The details of these development zones are illustrated in Table 5-1.
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Table 5-1 Development Zones in Response to the Connection to HSR Networks
Primary development Secondary development Tertiary development
zone zone zone
Indirect, <15 minutes, via Indirect, >15 minutes, via
Accessibility to and Direct, 5-10 minutes, complementary complementary transport
from the HST- on foot or by a transport modes (incl. modes (incl. travel and
station transport mode travel and change time) change time)
Secondary location for
high-grade functions.
Location for high-grade Specialized functions Variety of functions
(inter)national related to specific depending on specific
Location potential functions location (cluster) location factors
Depending on specific
Building density Very high High situation
Development
dynamism Very high High Modest
Source: Schiitz (1998)
According to Schitz (1998), in the primary development zone, "high-grade office and residential
functions can be established and where relatively high increases in land and real estate values are
expected." In the second development zone, the increase in population density and real estate values will
be much lower than that in the primary zone. The tertiary development zone is not able to show any direct
development effect due to the connection to the HSR network, although it can benefit a bit from better
accessibility.
As for the development effect of HSR on the whole region, HSR can promote the regional economic
development, especially in certain industries, based on the case studies of Japan, France, and Germany,
conducted by Sands (1993).
5.4.2. The Japanese Shinkansen's Economic Influence on Megaregions
The Shinkansen significantly promote the economic development in megaregions: "Regions served by the
Shinkansen generally have higher population and employment growth rates than those without direct
Shinkansen service." (Sands, 1993) According to Amano and Nakagawa (1990), the average annual
growth rates of employments are 1.8 percent and 1.3 percent in cities with Shinkansen stations and their
neighboring cities without Shinkansen stations. (Sands, 1993)
The promotion effect is more significant in some industries, such as "information exchange industries":
according to Sands (1993), the employment growth rates of information exchange industries are 22% and
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7% in cities with both Shinkansen and expressway and cities with expressway only. The details of the
employment growth of information exchange industries are illustrated in Table 5-2.
Table 5-2 The Employment Growth Rates of Information Exchange Industries (1981-1985)
Shinkansen & Expressway Expressway Only
(%) (%)
Business Service (total) 42 12
Information, Investigation, Advertising
Services 125 63
R&D and Higher Education 27 21
Political Institutes 20 11
Other 57 28
Banking Services 27 28
Real Estate Agencies 21 3
Total 22 7
Source: Sands (1993)
In addition, this promotion effect is also very significant in hotel and food sectors. According to Hirota
(1984), the food and hotel sectors along the Sanyo Shinkansen had also experienced high growth in the
1970s: in Hakata, the terminal of the Sanyo line, the total number of hotels and rooms increased from 20
and 2,060 in 1972 to 40 and 5,320 in 1974 respectively, the year before the Sanyo Line reached there. In
Okayama, midway on the Sanyo line, the total number of hotel guests grew from 170,000 in 1971 to
236,000 in 1975, the year when the Sanyo line reached there.
Furthermore, according to Sands (1993), Nakaraura and Ueda (1989) found that land value of the
commercial areas grew 67 percent after the connection to the Shinkansen network. However, this
argument was doubted and considered too large by Sands.
5.4.3. The French TGV's Economic Influence on Megaregions
The analysis in the section HSR and Megaregion Fonnation shows that: the French TGV contributes
significantly to the increase of the total business travel on the Paris-Lyon corridor, especially those made
for sale/purchase of services. (Melibaeva, Sussman, and Dunn, 2010) However, the benefits of economic
development due to the building of the Paris-Lyon TGV are not distributed equally between Paris and
Lyon: Paris has attained most of the economic development benefits because of the spatial concentration
of population there. Lyon also gains some economic benefits, mainly "in the form of an increase in
economic cooperation and exchanges with Paris".
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According to Sands (1993), three year after the launch of the TGV Atlantic (Paris-Le Mans), real estate
values and transactions in several communities with stations had experienced significant growth. In
Nantes, the connection to the TGV network "has spurred a major redevelopment project near the station
as well as helped to produce a 20 percent rent premium on space in the redevelopment area." (Sands,
1993)
5.4.4. The German ICE's Economic Influence on Megaregions
One year since the building of the Hanover-Wdrzburg ICE and the Kassei-Wilhelmsh6he station, the
business of office, retail, and hotel sectors around the Kassei-Wilhelmshbhe station had experience
significant growth, with the rent for retail space increasing by 20 percent. In addition, a large part of land
bordering the station was developed to "serve information/service sector firms requiring access to the
ICE".
5.4.5. Conclusion of HSR's Economic Influence on Megaregions
HSR's economic impact is most significant on the adjacent area of the HSR station, especially in the
primary development zone, defined as areas that can be accessed within 5 or 10 minutes on foot or by a
transport mode. (Schdtz, 1998) on this area, we expect the increase of real estate and land values, and the
prosperity of service industry, such as "information exchange industries", retail and hotel industries. The
"information exchange industries" include information, investigation, advertising services; R&D and
higher education; political institutes; banking services; and real estate business.
It is hard to find literature modeling and quantifying the comprehensive regional impacts of HSR.
Although only Sands (1993)'s study provides quantitative evidence that regions served by the Shinkansen
generally have experienced higher population and employment growth rates than those without direct
Shinkansen service, we do believe that HSR can influence the regional economic beyond the adjacent
area of HSR stations and further research can explicitly illustrate this effect.
5.5. Megaregion revenues and HSR financing
5.5.1. Introduction to Megaregion Revenues and HSR Financing
Although HSR can bring positive economic impacts on megaregions, especially on the adjacent area of
the HSR station, it is really expensive to build HSR. Based on the analysis in Chapter 1, Introduction,
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HSR is more capital intensive than other transportation projects in both unit cost (the cost per lane km)
and total cost. The average unit cost of HSR is about almost twice as much as the average unit cost of toll
roads, and the total construction costs of HSR projects usually exceed 1 billion Euros, or 1.5 billion Euros,
primarily due to the long distance nature of HSR projects.
According to the principle of "beneficiary pays", it is justifiable to capture the additional, or at least part
of the additional economic benefits of HSR development in megaregions, and use them to finance HSR
development. We will focus on mechanisms that capture value generated by the direct economic impacts
of HSR development since these direct impacts have been well understood and accepted. We will also
briefly discuss mechanisms that capture value generated by the indirect economic impacts of HSR
development if these indirect impacts are clearly determined.
Actually, public transportation investments can significantly increase the land and real estate value near
public transportation stations just as HSR do. The potential mechanism used for capturing the value
generated by the direct economic impacts of HSR development is called value capture. This value capture
mechanism has already been widely used to finance public transportation in the world. For example,
Versement Transport, one kind of value capture mechanisms, covered approximately 40% of the total
transportation expenditure in France in 2000. We will discuss more detailed examples in each individual
value capture mechanisms later.
5.5.2. Value Capture Mechanisms Based on HSR's Direct Economic Influence
Value capture, as one type of public financing methods, captures the increase of private land or property
values generated by a new public investment typically through special taxes or fees, and use the revenue
to pay for that public investment or other public projects. The rationale for value capture is that
increments in land or property values are wholly or partly attributed to public investments, such as HSR
and public transportation investments, instead of private investments. It is justifiable to use taxes, fees, or
other fiscal methods to indirectly to capture these value increments and use them to finance the public
investments.
The value capture mechanisms based on HSR's direct economic influences can be divided into four
groups: property related charges (including land charges), land development charges, employer charges,
and direct developments. Tax increment financing, business improvement districts (BID), business rate
levy, and land value tax are all property related charges; Development impact tax is a land development
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charge; Versement Transport is an employer charge; Land lease, and direct development are both direct
developments. In addition, if further research can model and quantify the comprehensive regional impacts
of HSR, we can further use part of consumption taxes and income taxes to finance the HSR investments.
We will discuss these mechanisms in more detail in Section 5.5.11.
5.5.3. Tax Increment Financing
Tax increment financing, or TIF, earmarks the increase in property tax revenues in certain districts,
named TIF districts, resulting from a public investment, and use this revenue to finance that public
investment or other public projects. Tax increment financing is a property related charge and can be used
to cover both the capital costs and operation costs of public investments, e.g., HSR investments.
(Martinez, 2010)
Requiring no primary legislation, the tax increment in TIF is the increase of previous property tax revenue,
which can be calculated by multiplying the incremental property value with old tax rate. The incremental
property value is the difference between the property value after public investments, e.g. HSR building,
and the property value at a base year. (Martinez, 2010)
Therefore, the advantage of TIF is that there is no need to increase the current property tax rate or
introduce new tax. Effectively capturing the HSR's economic benefits-the increase of land and real
estate value around HSR stations, this tax is a reasonable way for the Portuguese HSR financing. These
taxes can be levied to finance Portuguese HSRs no matter whether new HSR stations are built. However,
at the same time, since the TIF is based on the incremental property value in the TIF district, the taxable
value, or the value of tax base is low and unstable, and there is no guarantee for the financial stability35
for this policy.
TIF has been widely used in the United States. For example, California, which introduced tax increment
financing in 1952, has more than four hundred TIF districts now with aggregate revenue of over $10
billion per year. (Chiang, 2009) The city of Chicago, in Cook County, Illinois, "runs 131 districts
(approximately 30% of the Chicago city area) with tax receipts totaling upwards of $500 million for
2006". The map of north side TIF districts is illustrated in Figure 5-10. (Cook County Clerk's Office.
2007) Currently, the largest TIF project in the USA is the Mesa del Sol development project in
35 Financial stability here is referred as the ability of the policy to generate stable and enough revenue for HSR
development.
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Albuquerque, New Mexico, worth 500 million USD. "The proposed development (of the Mesa del Sol
project) would be built upon a 'green field' that presently generates little tax revenue and any increase in
tax revenue would be diverted into a tax increment financing fund." (Wikipedia, 2011b) This project is
highly controversial because some people argue that the increase in tax revenue is not only due to the
building of the Mesa del Sol project and too much money is diverted into the tax increment financing
fund.
Figure 5-10 TIF in the North Side of the Chicago City
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Source: City of Chicago. 2011. North Side TIEF District Map. Retrieved March, 2011 from
http://www.citvofchicaco.org/citv/en/depts/dcd/supp info/tif/north side tif districtmap.html
In addition, according to Transport for London (2003), through a scheme similar to TIF, local authorities
of London have gathered more than 10 billion USD over the past five years.
TIF mainly faces two criticisms: the first one is that TIF districts may not actually serve their resident
populations; the second one is that the increase in real estate value may be due to factors other than the
direct public investments financed by the TIF, such as the inflationary increase, increase of public service
and so on. According to Quigley (2007), the TIF districts would still attain about 40% of the increased
value of properties even without the building of the transportation projects. (Quigley, 2007)
5.5.4. Business Improvement District (BID)/Special Assessment (SA)
Business improvement districts (BID)36 is a defined area within which an additional tax or fee is raised to
fund public infrastructure projects within the district's boundaries. Similar to the additional tax or fee in
the Business improvement district, Special assessment is the charge levied in a defined geographic area
known as a Special Assessment District (SAD). Business improvement district tax and special
assessment are both property related charges and can be used to cover both the capital costs and operation
costs of public investments, e.g., HSR investments. (Martfnez, 2010)
The establishment of BIDs and SADs typically needs legislation on local or municipality level, although
sometimes on state level. There are typically three steps for creating BIDs: firstly, a certain number of
businesses should propose to the local government to create the BID; secondly, the local government
should make sure that most of the businesses in the local areas welcome the BID; finally, the local
government legislates for BIDs. Prior to the enactment of legislation, local governments typically need to
seek authority grants from state legislatures. The exceptions are Texas and Missouri in the USA: state
legislations are required for creating BIDs there. (Wikipedia, 2011 c) It should also be noted that special
assessments are not ad valorem taxes37 : the most important principal of SA is proportionality. The tax
burden is spread across all properties within the SADs or BIDs in proportion with the direct benefit the
property received from the public improvement. (Governor's Office of Planning and Research (California),
36 The scale of Business Development District is generally smaller than local, or municipal scale.
3 The definition of the ad valorem tax (Latin for according to value) is in List of Definition. Source: Wikipedia.
2011. Special assessment tax. Retrieved March, 2011 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special assessment tax
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1997) Therefore, the vacant land or property in the SIDs and BIDs will be taxed the same with those well
developed land or property in the same spot, providing incentives for further development in the SADs
and BIDs.
Compared with tax increment financing, the proportionality characteristic of business improvement
district taxes and special assessments makes them more equitable considering the principal of
"beneficiary pays". In addition, the tax base for business improvement district tax and special assessment
is the "benefit". This benefit typically means "a particular and distinct benefit over and above general
benefits conferred on real property located in the district or the public at large." The "benefit" of a vacant
land is the same as the "benefit" of those well developed land or property in the same spot, although the
increase in market value of this vacant land may be less than the "benefit". (Governor's Office of
Planning and Research (California), 1997).
Effectively capturing the HSR's economic benefits of the land and real estate value increase around HSR
stations, these business improvement district taxes and special assessments are reasonable methods for
Portuguese HSR financing. These taxes can be levied to finance the Portuguese HSR projects whatever
new HSR stations are built. However, similar to tax increment financing, these taxes have a narrow tax
base and can only generate limited amount of revenue. When these taxes are used to fund public
transportation projects, they can generate from 9% to 50% of the capital costs of the projects. (Martinez,
2010)
Currently, BID taxes and special assessments have all been widely used in the world: BIDs have been
established in the United Kingdom, Germany, New Zealand, South Africa, and so on; and special
assessment is also very popular in the United States. In the United Kingdom, the concept of BIDs was
introduced by The Local Government Act 2003. (UK Legislation, 2011) Up to October 2007, there were
36 proposed or operational BIDs across Greater London. (Wikipedia, 2011 c). According to British BIDs
(2011), "the average size of a BID is 300-400 hereditaments, with some of the smallest having fewer than
50 hereditaments and the largest at 2,500. Annual income is typically E200,000-f600,000 but can be less
than E50,000 per annum or over E2 million."
In San Diego in the United States, the BID program was introduced back to 1970 with the creation of the
Downtown Improvement Area, California's first metropolitan downtown district. Since then, eighteen
separate business improvement districts have been created and more than 11,000 businesses are included
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in these districts, generating more than $1 million revenue annually. (The City of San Diego, 2011) The
map of the business improvement districts in San Diego is illustrated in Figure 5-11.
In Los Angeles in the United States, special assessments are levied by the Southern California Rapid
Transit District, now the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Authority, to fund the building of new
transit system. The special assessment district for a new rail line is typically within 400 to 800 m of the
rail stations. (Doherty, 2004)
Figure 5-11 Business Improvement District in San Diego
City of San Diego
Business Improvement Districts
Source: The City of San Diego. 2011. Business Improvement Districts. Retrieved March, 2011 from
http://www.sandiego.gov/economic-development/business-assistance/small-business/bids.shtml
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5.5.5. Business Rate Levy
According to Martinez (2010), business rate levy is similar to the business improvement district tax and
special assessment. The only two differences between them are: firstly business rate levy is tax on local
level instead of the level of business improvement district; secondly this business rate levy focuses more
on non-residential properties. According to Martinez (2010), this business rate levy has been used to help
finance London Crossrail.
This business rate levy can effectively capture the Portuguese HSR's economic benefits of the increase of
land and real estate value around HSR stations. Since this tax has wider tax base than tax increment
financing and special assessment, it has better financial stability. However, at the same time, since this tax
is levied on local level instead of just near HSR station, this tax may capture more than reasonable
benefits.
5.5.6. Land Value Tax
Land value tax (or site valuation tax) is "a levy on the unimproved value of land. It is an ad valorem tax
on land that disregards the value of buildings, personal property and other improvements." (Wikipedia,
2011 d) According to Lari, Levinson et al (2009), this land value tax is the most general type of value
capture policy in the world used for the provision for general public goods, including transportation
networks. (Lari, Levinson et al, 2009) Moreover, this land value tax can be levied in different
jurisdictions but is generally levied on the state level instead of the local level. For example, this tax is
levied in almost all states in Australia as state taxes, and is also levied in the state of Pennsylvania in the
US.
The land value tax is different from other property taxes because its tax base is only the land value while
the tax bases of others are the whole property value, including lands, buildings and improvement of the
sites. (Wikipedia, 201 ld) However, a pure land value tax based only on the unimproved value of land is
seldom seen in practice. Instead, some countries around the world, such as Canada, Australia, and so on,
have implemented a split-rate system, with land and buildings taxed in different rates. (Martinez, 2010)
In theory, one advantage of land value tax is that it only transforms supplier surplus into tax revenue and
does not create deadweight loss the way other property taxes do because the completely inelasticity of
land supply. This can be further illustrated by Figure 5-12:
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Figure 5-12 Theory of Land Value Tax
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Source: sketched by the author
As illustrated in Figure 5-12, before the tax is levied, the equilibrium price is P1 and the equilibrium
quantity is Qi; after the tax is levied (no matter whom are levied, consumers or suppliers), the effective
price for suppliers changes to P2, the effective price for consumers remains P1, and the equilibrium
quantity is still Q1. Since the equilibrium quantity does not decrease, no deadweight loss is created. The
impact of tax here is just to transform part of the supplier surplus into tax revenues.
According to Lari, Levinson et al (2009), the land value tax provides incentives for the land owners to
improve their property and is an efficient way to prevent urban sprawl because the tax rate on land is
typically much higher than that on buildings. For example, the tax rate on land is five times larger than
that on improvements in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in the United States. This land value tax policy has
reduced the number of vacant buildings in downtown Harrisburg from approximately 4,200 in 1982 to
fewer than 500 now. (Wikipedia, 2011 d)
This land value tax can also effectively capture the Portuguese HSR's economic benefits of the increase
of the land and real estate value around HSR stations, and it can be used to recover both capital and
operation costs. Actually, this land value tax captures the change of real estate value from many sources
beside a specific transportation project, and therefore it reduces the need for further value capture. (Lari,
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Levinson et al, 2009) In addition, since this tax has wider tax base than tax increment financing and
special assessment, it has better financial stability.
However, at the same time, since this tax is levied on state level instead of just near HSR station, it is
unfair to use all the tax revenue to finance Portuguese HSR only. Moreover, if Portugal does not have this
land value tax now, a primary legislation is needed for the application of this land value tax to finance
Portuguese HSR projects. And the levy of this land value tax may require regular valuation.
Australia is a good example of countries applying this land value tax policy. According to Defense
Housing Australia (2011), "land tax is imposed in all states and territories, except the Northern Territory."
The map of Australia is illustrated in Figure 5-13.
Figure 5-13 Map of Australia
Source: Defense Housing Australia. 2011. Land tax. Retrieved March, 2011 from
http://www.invest.dha.gov.au/dha/home/info/landtax.sok
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The state of New South Wales in Australia levies a state land value tax. However this state land value tax
is only levied on "value over a certain threshold" with "farmland and a person's principal place of
residence" get exemption. In addition, revenue from property taxes represents 4.5% of total taxation in
Australia. (Wikipedia, 2011 d)
5.5.7. Development Impact Tax
According to Lari, Levinson et al (2009), development impact fees are "one-time charges collected by
local governments from developers for the purpose of financing new infrastructure and services
associated with new development." Therefore, from the definition, we can see these fees are levied on
local level.
According to Lari, Levinson et al (2009), development impact taxes can be calculated using two methods.
The first one is the demand-driven fee calculation, which is based on the estimated demand impact of new
developments on transportation network. This method takes into account "the number of new trips
generated, the average trip length, and the cost per trip based on the cost to improve the transportation
system." The second one is the improvement-based fee calculation, in which "the average cost of the trips
generated by the development is determined by dividing the road (transportation system) improvements
budget of a local jurisdiction by the trip generation rate for a proposed land use." (Lari, Levinson et al,
2009)
These development impact fees can effectively capture the Portuguese HSR's economic benefits of the
increase of land and real estate value around HSR stations, the boom of retail and accommodation
industries, and the boom of "information exchange" industries, because all these economic benefits
provide incentives for developers to develop new real estates near Portuguese HSR stations. In addition,
these development impact fees can be used to recover both capital and operation costs. (Martinez, 2010)
Since the development impact fees are only levied on new developments, they can only be used to finance
Portuguese HSRs when new HSR stations are built.
These development impact fees are typically only levied on new developments so they are greatly
exposed to the demand risks of new commercial and housing spaces: the revenues are highly volatile and
unstable. Therefore, to use these fees as a source of Portuguese HSR financing, we need strong and
convincing evidences that HSR can actually generate strong economic benefits in megaregions, especially
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on the adjacent area of HSR stations. Otherwise, these development impact fees will not have financial
stability.
According to Lari, Levinson et al (2009), these impact fees are widely used in the US, especially in fast
growing areas such as California, Florida, and Texas. According to Altshuler, Gomez-Ibanez et al. (1993),
the percentage of jurisdictions using this type of tax mechanism had increased from less than 10% prior to
1960 to about 60% by the mid-1980s in the US.
5.5.8. Employer Tax (Versement Transport)
According to Martinez (2010), employer taxes are "taxes charging the productivity enhancements derived
from increased accessibility, and allowing each firm to have larger catchment's areas of qualified
employees." The most successful example of employer taxes in the EU or even in the world is the
Versement Transport in France: this tax covered approximately 40% of the total transportation
expenditure in France in 2000. (Hass-Klau, 2006)
This Versement Transport was originally introduced in the Ile-de-France 3 8in 1971, and "extended to local
authorities or large organizations (transport regions) that provide public transport for more than 300,000
inhabitants in 1973." (Martinez, 2010) Since 2000, the year the restriction was further relaxed, local
authorities or large organizations with more than 10,000 inhabitants are entitled to levy this tax and use
the revenue to finance public transport development. (Hass-Klau, 2006)
According to French laws, both public and private employers hiring more than nine employees and
locating within a region managed by transport authorities may be asked to pay from 0.55% to 2.2% of its
total payroll as the Versement Transport. As for Ile-de-France, the tax rates are 2.2%, 1.6%, and 1.3% in
central areas, inner ring, and outer ring respectively; as for provincial cities with more than 100,000
inhabitants, the tax rates are 1.75% and 1.0% for areas with fixed track system and without fixed track
system; as for provincial cities with less than 100,000 inhabitants, the tax rate is 0.55%. (Hass-Klau, 2006)
The Versement Transport contributed significantly to the building of metros in Lille, Lyon and Marseille.
And this Versement Transport helped increase the public transport investments in France: public transport
38Ile-de-France is the wealthiest and most populated of the twenty-six administrative regions of France, composed
mostly of the Paris metropolitan area. It is one of France's administrative regions. Source: Wikipedia. 2011. Ile-de-
France (region). Retrieved March, 2011 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%8Ele-de-France_%28region%29
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investments increased from only one third of road investments to almost the same as road investments
from 1970 to 1980, in the major cities of France. In Paris, the Versement Transport raised approximately
945 million Euros, and covered 20% of the RATP1 and SNCF2 operational budget in 1988. (Martinez,
2010)
According to the France's experience, this employer tax can provide significant amount of revenue with
good financial stability. This employer tax can effectively capture the HSR's economic benefits of
booming retail, accommodation, and "information exchange" industries around HSR stations, and it is a
reasonable mechanism for the Portuguese HSR financing. This employer tax can be levied to finance the
Portuguese HSR projects no matter whether new HSR stations are built, but it should generate more
revenues when HSR stations are just the existing railway stations because businesses have already
clustered near the existing railway stations. However, to use these taxes as a source of the Portuguese
HSR financing, a primary legislation is required and public acceptance is a key issue here. Moreover, this
employer tax may in some sense discourage the business developments around HSR stations if the tax
rate is too high.
5.5.9. Land Lease
Land lease is "the most powerful tool used to intervene on the land and housing markets." In land leases,
"the government possesses the right to own, and private developers lease from the government the right to
develop, use, transfer, inherit, and benefit from land." In land leases, the government can determine the
type of development rights it grants and the length of grants here. (Martinez, 2010)
The prerequisite for this land lease policy is that the government still owns the land. Otherwise, the
government may have to repurchase the lands back from private owners before the public investments. In
Portugal, since most developed lands are owned by Portuguese people, this financing mechanism seems
only to be feasible for financing HSRs when new HSR stations are built.
The advantages of leasing land close to HSR stations includes: firstly it can effectively internalize the
increase value of land and real estate due to the building of HSR; secondly it complies perfectly with the
principal of "beneficiary pays", and in our definition, it is an equitable financing method for the whole
society. However, similar to the development impact tax, this land lease policy is also significantly
exposed to the demand risks of new commercial and housing spaces, making corresponding revenues
volatile and unstable. To use the land lease as a source of Portuguese HSR financing, we need strong and
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convincing evidence that Portuguese HSR can actually generate strong economic benefits near HSR
station.
One appropriate example for the application of this land lease policy is Hong Kong. Hong Kong use a
"Rail+Property" approach to finance its public transportation system: the government leases lands and
provides long-term land development rights to MTR, the transit agency in Hong Kong; and in return, the
government only needs to pay part of the construction costs. (The Transport Politic, 2010)
For the South Island metro Line project in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong government approves MTR land
development rights to a site located at the former Wong Chuk Hang estate. In return, the transit agency
only requires the government to contribute less than half of the construction costs. Up to now, along the
urban rail lines, the MTR has funded dozens of new housing projects with 300 to 7,000 apartments each.
(The Transport Politic, 2010) On the other hand, we should also notice that Hong Kong is a very dense
city with more than 90% of journeys made by public transportation when we see the success of land lease
in Hong Kong.
5.5.10. Direct Development
This direct development policy is similar to the land lease policy. The only difference is that in this direct
development, lands of HSR stations and some areas close to HSR stations, associated with their
development rights, are given directly to HSR developers. If PPP is used as the procurement method,
these HSR developers are the private sector in PPP. In the Portugal case, because PPP is highly likely to
be used in the Portuguese HSR projects in the future, these land ownerships and direct development rights
can be added to the bidding package in the bidding process. The direct development policy provides
incentives for the private sector to develop better HSR lines, and provide better HSR services, because
better HSR services can help boost businesses in HSR stations and areas close to HSR stations. In return,
prosperous businesses in HSR stations and areas close to HSR stations can help increase the attractiveness
of HSR compared to other transportation modes, further increasing HSR fare revenues.
Similar to the land lease policy, the prerequisite for this direct development is also that the government
still owns the lands. In Portugal, since most of developed lands are owned by Portuguese people, this
financing mechanism is only feasible when new HSR stations are built.
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Similar to land lease, the advantages of the direct development includes: firstly, it can effectively
internalize economic benefits of Portuguese HSR building, such as the increase value of land and real
estate, prosperity of retail, accommodation, and information exchange industries; secondly, it provide
incentives for the private sector in PPP to better develop HSR lines, HSR stations and lands close to HSR
stations; thirdly it complies perfectly with the principal of "beneficiary pays", or the social equity
principal. However, this direct development policy is also greatly exposed to the demand risks of new
commercial and housing spaces, making the corresponding revenues volatile. In PPP, these demand risks
are born by the private sector. The success of this direct development financing method depends
significantly on the direct economic benefits that Portuguese HSR can actually generate near HSR
stations. If the real economic benefits are too low to cover even the direct development costs (excluding
the original cost of building HSR lines and HSR stations), the private sector will reject this financing
mechanism.
The most appropriate example that can be used to illustrate this direct development policy is Japan. The
East Japan Railway Company (JR East) was given the rights to developed space in some HSR stations
and some properties close to HSR stations after the privatization of the Japanese National Railways (JNR).
JR East's non-transportation income 39consists of income from station space utilization, shopping centers,
office buildings, and other services (including transportation advertising businesses, hotel businesses,
etc.). Details of the components of JR East's operating revenue are illustrated in Table 5-3
Table 5-3 Components of JR East's Operating Revenue
Operating revenue 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Transportation 70.8% 70.4% 70.2% 70.7% 70.2% 69.6% 68.7% 68.7% 67.9% 68.3%
Station space utilization 13.7% 14.5% 14.4% 14.4% 14.6% 14.8% 15.1% 14.9% 15.4% 15.0%
Shopping centers & office
buildings 6.5% 6.5% 6.6% 6.9% 7.2% 7.3% 7.4% 7.6% 8.3% 8.8%
Other services 9.0% 8.6% 8.8% 8.0% 8.0% 8.2% 8.8% 8.7% 8.4% 7.8%
Non-Transportation 29.2% 29.6% 29.8% 29.3% 29.8% 30.4% 31.3% 31.3% 32.1% 31.7%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: East Japan Railway Company. 2010. Annual Financial Report of 2010.
39Here transportation income means income generated from normal transportation activities, such as fare revenues.
Non-transportation income means income generated from economic activities other than normal transportation
activities.
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Figure 5-14 Components of JR East's Non-Transportation Operating Revenue
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Source: East Japan Railway Company. 2010. Annual Financial Report of 2010.
Figure 5-15 Transportation VS. Non-Transportation Operating Revenue
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From Table 5-3, Figure 5-14, and Figure 5-15, we can see this non-transportation revenue accounts for
appropriately 30% of the total operating revenue for JR East every year, and it is an important revenue
source for JR East. Within this non-transportation revenue, station space utilization revenue accounts for
the largest part, about 15% of the total operating revenue. But shopping center & office building revenue
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keeps increasing as a percentage of the total operating revenue in the past ten years, even during the 2008
financial crisis.
In railway stations, including HSR stations, JR East operates a wide variety of businesses, including retail
outlets and restaurants that provide customers with convenient and comfortable services. The passenger
volume is the key factor JR East considers when developing this station space. According to JR East
(2010b), JR East is now considering the further development of non-transportation services since many
railway stations it owns have high passenger volumes: "91 railway stations are used by more than
100,000 passengers a day, including 36 railway stations used by more than 200,000 passengers a day as
of March 2010."
JR East develops "ecute" commercial spaces" inside the railway station, including HSR stations. The
business in these "ecute" commercial spaces includes: deli, confectionary, variety shops, eating and
drinking establishments, services, etc. (JR East, 2004) Now JR East is in its "Station Renaissance
Program" and is renewing aging commercial shopping areas in the stations in order to make them more
attractive. (JR East, 201 1b)
In addition, JR East develops shopping centers in the railway stations, and develops and leases office
buildings in highly convenient locations that have direct access to its railway stations. By March, 2010,
the number of shopping centers and office buildings operated by JR East had grown to 133 and 20
respectively. JR East believes the building of shopping centers can attract more people to use its
transportation services, and the railways station can also help the business of shopping centers prosper.
(JR East, 201 1b)
Transportation advertising businesses, including those in both stations and trains, are another important
source of revenue for JR East. To better deal with the revenue decline due to the 2008 financial crisis, JR
East "intends to heighten the value of advertising media for advertisers through further digitization and
network incorporation", for example, J-AD Vision Exploits Large-Capacity Wireless Service. (JR East,
201 1b) Hotel services are the last component of the non-transportation businesses in JR East. JR East
40 "ecute" is a nickname JR East picks for New Spaces for Ticketed Passengers ("Ekinaka"). Source:
http://www.jreast.co.jp/e/press/20040501/index.html
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operates hotels in the metropolitan areas and near the terminal of major regional railway stations. (JR East,
2011b)
Therefore, we can conclude that the non-transportation businesses that JR East operates make full use of
the direct economic impacts of HSR on megaregions: JR East's non-transportation businesses include
station space utilization, shopping centers, office buildings, transportation advertising businesses, hotel
businesses, etc.; whereas the direct economic impacts of HSR on megaregions includes increasing land
and real estate value, and booming retail, accommodation, and "information exchange" industries around
HSR stations.
The Japanese experience provides valuable lessons for Portugal in using this direct development method
to finance its HSR building: the businesses developed in this direct development should be in line with
the direct economic benefits generated by HSR building. The development of retail shops and hotels can
capture the economic benefits of booming retail and accommodation industry. The development of office
building can capture the economic benefits of increasing land and real estate value, and it can also capture
the benefits of booming information, investigation, and banking service industries, part of "information
exchange" industries, because businesses of these industries generally locate in office buildings.
Therefore, retail shops, hotels, and office buildings should be the most appropriate businesses in direct
development.
5.5.11. Consumption Tax/Income Tax
A consumption tax is "a tax on spending on goods and services. The tax base of such a tax is the money
spent on consumption." The consumption taxes are usually indirect taxes41, but can also be direct taxes.
For example, value added taxes and sale taxes are both indirect taxes; while expenditure tax is an indirect
tax. (Wikipedia, 2011 e) An income tax is a tax levied on the income of individuals or businesses
(corporations or other legal entities)." (Wikipedia, 201 lh)
However, the prerequisite for using consumption tax or income tax as a value capture means to finance
Portuguese HSR buildings is the positive comprehensive regional impact of HSR building. Only if further
research can model and quantify the comprehensive regional impacts of HSR, consumption taxes, or
41 The definition of direct tax and indirect tax is in List of Definition.
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income taxes, or the increase of consumption taxes and income taxes can be used as appropriate value
capture mechanisms for HSR financing.
If HSR is able to bring positive comprehensive economic benefits to megaregions that is not yet proved,
these consumption tax and income tax are appropriate methods to capture these benefits because both
consumption tax and income tax are directly related to the economic condition of megaregions: as the
economy of megaregions becomes better, people will have higher income and usually consume more. In
addition, these consumption tax and income tax should have good financial stability because of its wide
tax base.
5.5.12. Portugal's Current Tax System Related to Value Capture
Currently, Portugal has some exactions and negotiated fees between municipalities and companies, in the
case of which, companies are obliged to pay to build the infrastructure if they want to locate in a low
accessible location. But Portugal doesn't have any other value capture mechanisms. (Martinez, personal
communication, 2011)
In Portugal, the most relevant taxes related to value capture mechanisms mentioned above are annual
property tax (Imposto Municipal Sobre Im6veis, IMI), and property purchase tax (Imposto Municipal,
IMT). As for IMI, property owners are required to pay a certain amount of taxes to the government if they
own the property. The tax is calculated as the product of IMI tax rate and real estate value. The IMI tax
rate can vary from municipalities to municipalities, but within lower and upper bounds set by the national
government of Portugal. (Santos, personal communication, 2011) The real estate value is calculated based
on the average cost of construction; areas, location and type of building; the intrinsic characteristics of
buildings; and the surrounding urban facilities and infrastructures. (Real estate value = VC * A * CA *
CL * QC * CV, where CV = base value of the buildings built, A = total gross floor area plus the area over
the area of deployment; CA = coefficient of allocation, CL = coefficient of location, QC= coefficient of
quality and comfort, CV = coefficient of obsolescence). (SIGIMI, 2011)
In addition, property buyers are required to pay IMT. The IMT tax is calculated by the product of IMT tax
rate and the sale price. Permanent residents and non-permanent residents are taxed differently here. The
IMI tax rates are listed in Table 5-4, and Table 5-5 below:
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Table 5-4 IMI Tax Rate for Permanent Residences
Permanent Residence
Purchase Price (Euros) Marginal tax rate
Up to£690 418 0
690418 -6123 682 2
6123 682- 6168 638 5
6168 638 -6281030 7
£281 030-6561960 8
Over £561 960 Single flat rate of 6%
Source: ExpatsPortugal (2011)
Table 5-5 IMI Tax Rate for Non-Permanent Residences
Non-permanent Residence
Purchase Price (Euros) Margin tax rate
Up to E90 418 1
690 418 -£123682 2
£123 682 -6168 638 5
£168 638 -£281030 7
£281 030 -6538978 8
Over £538 978 Single flat rate of 6%
Source: ExpatsPortugal (2011)
In addition, people purchasing their main residences, not the second or holiday homes, are able to apply
for IMI exemption: people are able to get 8 year IMI exemption when they purchase property worth less
than 157,500 Euros; they are able to get from 6 to 7 year IMI exemption when they purchase property
worth between 157,500 and 236,000 Euros.
The current property tax system in Portugal makes tax increment financing highly applicable, because
there is no need for the change of tax rate and primary legislation. The Portuguese government just needs
to dedicate this incremental tax revenue resulting from the building of HSR to finance the HSR building.
Only small legislation changes are needed and no public acceptance issues will be incurred.
5.5.13. Value Capture for the Portuguese HSR Building
It is important to take a close look at characteristics of different value capturing methods before we
provide suggestions for Portuguese HSR financing. These characteristics are summarized in Table 5-6
and Table 5-7.
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Table 5-6 Characteristics of Different Value Capture Mechanisms (I)
Funding methods Type Target Scale Related economic benefits Peisato
Tax Increment Property in TIF district Increase of real estate price near HSR No
Financing TIF district station
Business Property in
Development Property tax BIDs and BIDs and SADs Increase of real estate price near HSR No
District/Special SADs station
Assessment
Business rate levy Property tax Property Local level Increase of real estate price near HSR No
station
Land value tax Property tax Land Mostly state level Increase of real estate price near HSR Yes
station
Increase of real estate and land value;
Development Development New Local level Prosperity of retail, accommodation NAimpact tax tax development and information exchange industries
near HSR stations
Region managed Increase of real estate and land value;
Versement by transportation Prosperity of retail, accommodation
Transport Employer tax Employer authority, e.g., and information exchange industries
HSR authority near HSR stations
HSR stations and Increase of real estate and land value;
Land lease Direct New areas close to Prosperity of retail, accommodation Nodevelopment development HSR stations and information exchange industries
near HSR stations
. sIncrease of real estate and land value;
Direct Direct New HSR stations and Prosperity of retail, accommodation
development development development e c and information exchange industries
near HSR stations
Consumption tax/ Consumption Retail HSR's indirect economic influence on
income tax business megaregionsincome tax tax _____________________ ____
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Table 5-7 Characteristics of Different Value Capture Mechanisms (H)
Property Ad valorem
type (if tax (if
Funding property property Current HSR station Financial Social Feasibility
methods tax) ax) application requirement Stability Equity4 2  4
Tax United States,
Increment All United Kingdom, Both new and Medium/
Financing property Yes etc. old low High High
Business
Development United States,
District/Speci United Kingdom,
al All Germany, New Both new and High/
Assessment property No Zealand, etc. old Medium High medium
Mostly
non-
Business rate residential Both new and Medium/
levy property No United Kingdom old Medium Medium low
Land value Canada, Australia, Both new and Medium/
tax Land only Yes United States, etc. old High low Low
Development Medium/ Medium!
impact tax NA NA United States, etc. Only new low low High
Both new and
Versement old, but prefer
Transport NA NA France old High High Low
Medium/
Land lease NA NA Hong Kong, etc. Only new low High High
Direct Medium/
development NA NA Japan, etc. Only new low High High
Consumption
tax/ income Both new and Medium/ Medium!
tax NA NA All the world old High low low
Source: summarized by the author
From Table 5-6 and Table 5-7, we
aspects: some have good financial
can see no value
stability, but bad
capture mechanism is superior to the others in all
social equity, e.g. land value tax; some has good
social equity, but bad financial stability, e.g. tax increment financing; some has good financial stability
and good social equity, but requires primary legislation and may have huge public acceptance problems,
e.g. Versement Transport. Different value capture mechanisms may be chosen when different evaluation
criteria are used. The only global constraint is whether new HSR stations will be built: if new HSR
stations will not be built, development impact tax, land lease and direct development will all be infeasible.
42 Here social equity is defined as benefit equity, which describes the allocation of benefits across people. In this
definition, beneficiary pay is the fairest way for HSR financing.
43 Feasibility evaluates value capture mechanisms based on their political and administrative feasibility.
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5.6. Conclusion
Due to the high speed characteristic, HSR decreases the temporal distance, increases the accessibility
between cities, and therefore may contributes to the formation of megaregions. HSR's economic impact is
most significant on the adjacent area of HSR stations: the increase of real estate or land value, and the
prosperity of service industry, such as "information exchange industries", retail and accommodation
industries are expected to see on this area.
We can use value capture mechanisms to capture these economic benefits resulting from the building of
the Portuguese HSR projects, and use these revenues to finance the Portuguese HSR building. After
analyzing all related value capture mechanisms, we find no mechanism is superior to all others in all
aspects and no perfect one can be found. The decision-making authorities should consider the trade-off
between different criteria.
If we consider social equity ("beneficiary pays") as the most important criterion, tax increment financing,
business development district/special assessment, Versement Transport, land lease, and direct
development may be chosen assuming new HSR stations will be built. In addition, based on the analysis
of Portugal's current tax system related to value capture, we can see tax increment financing is highly
applicable because only small changes are needed and no public acceptance issues will be incurred.
However, all tax increment financing, business development district/special assessment, land lease and
direct development may not be able to generate enough revenue or may only generate volatile revenue. In
other words, they don't have good financial stability. Versement Transport may meet the public
acceptance problems when enacting primary legislation in spite of its good social equity and financial
stability.
If we consider financial stability as the most important criteria, land value tax, Versement Transport,
income tax and consumption tax may be chosen. However, levied mostly on state level, land value tax
does not agree with our social equity ("beneficiary pays") criterion well, and may encounter public
acceptance problems because it requires primary legislation; consumption tax or income tax is only
justifiable when further research can prove the positive comprehensive economic impacts of HSR on
megaregions, and it also has this social equity problems; Versement Transport require primary legislation
and may be objected by the public.
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6. Conclusion and Suggestions for HSR Financing in Portugal
Portugal's economy is in a very difficult period right now. Portugal's sovereign debt rating has been
downgraded significantly recently. For example, on April 5t, 2011, Portugal's sovereign debt rating was
further downgraded by Moody's Investors Service to Baal, three steps from junk status. (Ross-Thomas
and Meier, 2011) on April 6 , 2011, Portugal asked the European Union (EU) and International Monetary
Fund (IMF) for financial bailout. And on May 3rd, 2011, the European Commission, the International
Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank issued the Memorandum of Understanding on Specific
Economic Policy Conditionality for Portugal to require Portugal to endure years of unprecedented
austerity, government expenditure cut and taxes rise. Based on the analysis in Chapter 1, Introduction,
requirements in the MOU make it open to question for Portugal to build new HSR lines in the near future.
Therefore we assume that Portugal will build other HSR lines only when the economy of Portugal has
significantly recovered and when the bailout has been over. At that time, the conclusion of this thesis will
come into play.
This thesis has examined the crowding out effect of HSR investments on other transportation projects,
and compared HSR financing with the financing of other transportation projects. To make HSR
investments more financially viable, this thesis has also indentified innovative financing methods that can
be used to lower the financial costs of HSR investments, and explored appropriate value capture
mechanisms that can be used to capture the economic benefits of HSR on megaregions and finance the
building of the Portuguese HSR projects.
6.1. Summary of Findings and Recommendations
This thesis begins by raising the concern that although HSR may increase capacity of transportation
infrastructure, provide an environment friendly transportation alternative, and promote regional economic
development, HSR is more capital intensive than other transportation projects and may crowd out the
investments on other transportation projects.
Chapter 2 Crowding Out Effect of HSR Investment examines this crowding out effect and concludes that
crowding out effect of HSR investments exists in the world: the building of HSR can make the funds of
other transportation projects less available. The crowding out effect is generally significant in the
countries in the initial stage of the formation of their HSR system, e.g. China; this effect is generally
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insignificant in the countries with mature HSR system, e.g. Germany and Japan. We believe Portugal is
also in the initial stage of the HSR system formation just as China does, and Portugal needs to pay
attention to this crowding out effect when building new HSR projects in the future.
Chapter 3 Difference between Financing HSR and Other Transportation Projects compares HSR
financing with the financing of other transportation projects in China, Germany, Taiwan, Portugal, and
Japan. This chapter concludes that HSR projects are relatively harder to attract private capital for and rely
more on the government's funding capabilities compared to road, airport, and seaport projects. The
current Portuguese HSR financing mechanism relies heavily on EU funds and EIB loans, and this reliance
makes the Portuguese HSR development more vulnerable to EU and EIB policy change. We need to
explore more HSR funding opportunities for Portugal in the future. After studying the experience of
China and Taiwan, we believe some unexplored opportunities may exist in bond capital markets.
Chapter 4 Innovative Financing Methods identifies innovative financing methods that can be used to
lower the financial costs of HSR investments. This chapter concludes that wrapped bond financing is the
most promising way to finance the Portuguese HSR projects in the future because of its low financial
costs, long financing terms and so on. But this wrapped bond model has become significantly infected
since the 2008 financial crisis because of the downgrade of monoline companies, and it is beneficial for
the Portuguese government to establish a national debt guarantee program to help with the revival of the
monoline wrapped bond model.
To support this national debt guarantee program, it is beneficial for the Portuguese government to
establish a national infrastructure bank. The Portuguese infrastructure bank should provide loans or
guarantees to infrastructure projects in line with public interests just as the EIB and the proposed Obama's
Bank do, but it should focus more on the monoline guarantee business than the EIB and the proposed
Obama's Bank do considering the fact that the wrapped bond financing is the most promising way to
finance the Portuguese HSR projects in the future.
The Portuguese infrastructure bank should maintain a high rating like the EIB, e.g. Aaa, and be able to
borrow at low financial costs in the global capital markets. If the Portuguese government can achieve a
high rating, such as Aaa, in the future, this Portuguese infrastructure bank can benefit from receiving
guarantees from the Portuguese government or becoming a subsidiary of the government. However, if the
Portuguese government cannot achieve a high rating in the future, for example, if the government can
only get rated Baal as it did in April, 2011, this national infrastructure bank should be private and should
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not be just a subsidiary of the Portuguese government. Otherwise, this national infrastructure bank will
meet a rating ceiling, which is the rating of the Portuguese government. In the second case, the
Portuguese government needs to allocate a significant amount of capital and few debts to the national
infrastructure bank to help it achieve a much lower debt to capital ratio than the one of the Portuguese
government. At the same time, the Portuguese government should have absolute control over the
Portuguese infrastructure bank by holding more than 51 percentage of the total equity.
Chapter 5 Megaregions and HSR Financing examines the economic influence of HSR on megaregions,
and captures part of these economic benefits to finance the building of Portuguese HSR projects using
value capture mechanisms. This chapter concludes that HSR can bring significant economic benefits to
the adjacent area of the HSR stations: HSR significantly increases the real estate or land value, and
promotes the business of service industry, such as "information exchange industries", retail and
accommodation industries, near HSR stations. However, it is hard to find literature modeling and
quantifying the comprehensive regional impacts of HSR.
We can use value capture mechanisms to capture these economic benefits in megaregions resulting from
the building of Portuguese HSRs, and use these revenues to help finance the Portuguese HSR
construction. These value capture mechanisms include Tax Increment Financing, Business Development
District/Special Assessment, Business rate levy, Land value tax, Development impact tax, Versement
Transport, Land lease, Direct development, and Consumption tax/ income tax. The details of these value
capture mechanisms are illustrated in Table 5-6, and Table 5-7.
Considering all financial stability, social equity, and feasibility, we find no value capture mechanisms can
be superior to the others. Some value capture mechanisms have good financial stability, but bad social
equity, e.g. land value tax; some has good social equity, but bad financial stability, e.g. tax increment
financing; some has good financial stability and good social equity, but bad feasibility, e.g. Versement
Transport. The only feasibility constraint is whether new HSR stations will be built: if new HSR stations
are not built, development impact tax, land lease and direct development will all be infeasible.
The decision-making authorities of Portugal should consider the trade-off between different criteria, and
choose the most appropriate ones to finance Portuguese HSR. For example, if we consider social equity
("beneficiary pays") as the most important criterion, tax increment financing, business development
district/special assessment, Versement Transport, land lease, and direct development may be chosen
assuming new HSR stations will be built. If we consider financial stability as the most important criterion,
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land value tax, Versement Transport, consumption tax/income tax may be chosen assuming new HSR
stations will be built. If we consider feasibility as the most important criterion, tax increment financing,
business development district/special assessment, direct development, Land lease, and development
impact tax may be chosen.
Finally, it is necessary to combine wrapped bond financing and value capture mechanisms together to
address the timing issue of megaregion cash flows when financing Portuguese HSR projects: most value
capture mechanisms only provides megaregion revenues when HSR enters its operating phase, and
wrapped bond financing can effectively transform these future megaregion revenues into current
construction funds in low financial costs. The combination is perfectly feasible in Portugal on condition
that PPP is the most likely procurement method for Portuguese HSR projects in the future: in the tender
invitation document issued before the bidding phase starts, the Portuguese government needs to clearly
state that additional megaregion revenues are dedicated revenues for HSR projects just like HSR fare
revenues, wrapped bond financing is highly recommended and the Portuguese infrastructure bank will
provide monoline guarantee to support the use of wrapped bonds if necessary. This statement will
significantly reduce the capital the Portuguese government needs to contribute from the public budget at
the beginning, effectively counter the negative crowding out effect of HSR investments on other
transportation projects in Portugal, reduce the reliance of Portugal on EU funds and EIB loans, and reduce
the vulnerability of Portuguese HSR financing to EU and EIB policy change.
6.2. Future Work
This thesis has introduced various value capture mechanisms to capture the economic benefits of HSR
building in megaregions, and use financial stability, social equity, and feasibility as criteria to measure
these value capture mechanisms. However, due to the variance of the construction costs between different
HSR projects, the variance of the economic condition of megaregions in which the HSR projects are built,
and the variance of the economic benefits that HSR can bring to megaregions, this thesis cannot reach a
more detailed conclusion about the revenue scale of each value capture mechanisms than rating high,
medium, or low in the financial stability criterion. Further research is needed to estimate the revenue scale
of these value capture mechanisms before the start of building new HSR projects in the future. These
researches may include:
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" A detailed investigation of the economic conditions of megaregions in which new HSR projects
are built, especially the economic conditions of the urban adjacent areas of HSR stations,
including GDP, average income, real estate price, land price, population density, and so on.
* A quantitative cost estimation of new Portuguese HSR projects.
* A detailed benefit-cost analysis (BCA) of new Portuguese HSR projects to make sure that these
HSR projects can be built only when they are able to bring justifiable social benefits. This BCA
should be done using other transportation modes as comparables, such as conventional rail
projects, road projects, and so on.
* A detailed quantitative study of the economic benefits that Portuguese HSR can bring to
megaregions, such as, the percentage increase in land and real estate price around HSR stations,
the revenue increase of retail and acconunodation businesses around HSR station, the revenue
increase of information exchange industries, the comprehensive regional impacts of HSR, and so
on.
* Estimation of tax rate based on public's acceptance of a new value capture tax and a new value
capture tax district.
" Estimation of revenues each value capture mechanisms can provide for financing HSR based on
the analysis of this thesis and the four further researches mentioned above.
6.3. A Closing Word
This thesis adds value by systematically studying the financial impacts and financing methods for HSR
building in Portugal based on the assumption that Portugal will build other HSR lines only when the
economy of Portugal has significantly recovered. This thesis has many contents, including crowding out
effect of HSR investments, difference between financing HSR and other transportation projects,
innovative methods of financing HSR, and megaregion and HSR. It require substantial amount of time
and patience to finish reading this thesis, and here we would like to express our sincere thanks to all
readers for your patience and attention. We hope you find our result of value.
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Appendix A: Current Events of Relevance
This thesis is writing when many big HSR-related events happen around the world, for example the
economic bailout in Portugal, the rejection of HSR in Florida, and so on. To make this thesis especially
timely, this Appendix A discusses all these late-breaking events and their relevance to the arguments in
this thesis.
Portugal
Economic Bailout of Portugal by the European Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF)
This issue has been discussed in detail in Chapter 1, Introduction.
The Snap General Selection in Portugal and Its Influence
Currently, there are two primary political parties in Portugal: the Socialist party represented by the
caretaker Prime Minister Jose Socrates, and the main opposition Social Democratic Party (PSD). There
will be a snap general election on June 5t, 2011.
However, no matter which parties get elected, Portugal will experience an unprecedented austerity just as
the bailout agreement required in the near future. According to Khalip (2011), in the Socialist party's
manifesto, Socrates expressed his opinion that "Portugal had to put its finances in order by cutting the
budget deficit and stabilizing its debt load." He said "We will conduct a demanding budget consolidation
programme, intervening more on the side of spending cuts, but without compromising the foundations of
the social state."
On the other hand, according to Kowsmann (2011), Portugal's main opposition party "has vowed to take
measures to cut public spending, including sharply shrinking the size of the government, which it claims
go well beyond those being imposed by the European Union and the International Monetary Fund under a
EUR78 billion bailout agreement." The leader of the PSD, Pedro Passos Coelho, said: "This is a plan that
takes tough, brave and ambitious measures with the goal to address the dramatic situation that the country
is in, we have a goal and vision for Portugal that go beyond the economic targets set under the bailout."
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Source: 1) Khalip, Andrei. 2011. Socrates Election Plan Echoes Portugal Bailout Terms. Reuters Website, April,
27th. Retrieved May, 2011 from http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/27/portugal-socialists-
idUSLDE73Q2DB20110427
2) Kowsmann, Patricia. 2011. Portugal Opposition Vows to Go Beyond EU Bailout Measures. Wall Street Journal
Website, May 9th, 2011. Retrieved May, 2011 from http://online.wsj .com/article/BT-CO-20110509-706583.html
China
China Slows Down Its HSR Speed (April 15m, 2011)
According to Spegele (2011), China will begin to operate its HSR trains at lower speed due to safety
concern and energy consideration. Sheng Guangzu, head of China's Ministry of Railways, said "High-
Speed Trains will begin operating at a maximum 300 kilometers an hour from July 1, compared with
previous speeds of around 350 kilometers an hour."
The slowing down of China's HSR is due to the safety concern and energy consideration. According to
Spegele (2011), an executive at a non-Chinese High-Speed Train manufacturer said "running trains above
speeds of 330 kilometers an hour poses safety concerns and higher costs. At that speed threshold, wheels
slip so much that you need bigger motors and significantly more electricity to operate. There is also so
much wear on the tracks that costs for daily inspections, maintenance and repairs go up sharply. That's
why in Europe, Japan and Korea no operators run trains above 320 kilometers an hour."
In addition, energy can be saved significantly when slowing down the speed of HSR: trains operating at
350 kilometers per hour needs to consume 100% more energy than those operating at 200 kilometers per
hour.
Source: Spegele, Brian. 2011. China Puts Brakes on High-Speed Trains. Wall Street Journal Website, April 15th,
2011. Retrieved April 2011 from
http://online.wsj.conarticle/SB10001424052748703983104576262330447308782.html
Japan
Japanese Shinkansen Back on Track (April 29"', 2011)
The Shinkansen, the bullet train connecting Tokyo and Tohoku region, operated by JR East, was fully
open for business again on April 29, 2011. According to Cooper and Matsuda (2011), JR East reopened
service from Tokyo to Fukushima, "where the disasters triggered the world's worst nuclear accident since
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1986", in early April, 2011 and extended it to Sendai on April 25". On April 29h, 2011, the final leg was
open and this would allow passengers to "ride all 714km between Tokyo and Shin-Aomori, and access
the Akita bullet-train line."
The reopening of the Japanese Shinkansen may create a symbolic effect for both the Japanese people and
other countries. On April 29f, 2011, when the Shinkansen connecting Tokyo and Tohoku region became
fully operational again, Takeaki Matsumoto, the Japan's minister for foreign affairs, talked to The New
York Times that "The Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami are the worst natural disasters Japan has
encountered since the end of the Second World War. However, Japan will not simply rebuild what used to
be, but aim for an innovative reconstruction that focuses on the future by fully mobilizing its signature
strength: a society with high levels of technology, safety and security." The reopening of the Japanese
Shinkansen is one of the examples that Takeaki mentioned to support his view that Japan was courageous
and was open for business again. (Matsumoto, 2011)
Source: 1) Cooper, Chris and Matsuda, Kiyotaka. 2011. Japanese Bullet-Train Back on Track. Independent Online,
April 29th, 2011. Retrieved April, 2011 from http://www.iol.co.za/business/companies/japanese-bullet-train-back-
on-track-1.1062369
2) Matsumoto, Takeaki. 2011. Japan Is Open for Business. The New York Times, April 29th, 2011. Retrieved April,
2011 from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/30/opinion/30iht-edmatsumoto30.html
The United States
Ohio's Governor Rejects High-Speed Rail Line
According to Higgs (2011), in the end of 2010, the Ohio's Governor John Kasich rejected the 400 million
USD federal fund for a 258 mile HSR project to connect Cincinnati, Cleveland and Columbus. Kasich
"rejected the idea as too expensive for Ohio (it would require an annual $17 million subsidy) and unlikely
to draw ridership to pay those expenses."
This Ohio case shows that the operating costs of HSR can be so significant that the government may not
even be able to afford these.
Source: Higgs, Robert. 2011. Gov. John Kasich Successful In Halting $400 Million, High-Speed Rail Project:
Politifact Ohio. Cleveland Website, January, 2011. Retrieved May, 2011 from
http://www.cleveland.con/open/index.ssf/2011/01/kasich successful-in-halting_4.html
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Florida's Governor Rejects High-Speed Rail Line
On February 16, 2011, Florida Governor Rick Scott (R) announced to give up the state's High-Speed
Rail project linking Tampa with Orlando because this HSR project had to be fund mostly by the state
government eventually even though the federal government provided 2.4 billion USD at the beginning.
(William, 2011)
Mr. Scott's announcement is a little more than a week after Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. "called for
spending $53 billion on passenger trains and High-Speed Rail projects over the next six years as part of
the administration's goal of making High-Speed Rail accessible to 80 percent of Americans within 25
years." (William, 2011)
At a news conference in Tallahassee on Wednesday, Mr. Scott said that "cost overruns related to the
Tampa-to-Orlando line could leave Florida taxpayers stuck with a $3 billion tab. Further, he said that if
the state deemed the project too costly after having started construction, it would be required to return the
$2.4 billion to the federal government." In addition, Mr.Scott also believed that revenue estimates are too
optimistic, and state taxpayers may need to provide subsidies to keep the HSR line running. (William,
2011)
Source: Williams,Timothy. 2011. Florida's Governor Rejects High-Speed Rail Line, Fearing Cost to Taxpayers. The
New York Times Website, February 16th, 2011. Retrieved April, 2011 from
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/us/17rail.html
California May Run the HSR Trains through the Bay Area on Two Tracks Instead of Four (May
2 ad, 2011)
According to Rosenberg (2011), due to the budget constraint in California, the state may "spend most of
the $1.5 billion to electrify the two Caltrain tracks between San Francisco and San Jose, putting on hold
its plan to spend four times as much to wipe out the historic rail line and build four new tracks along the
corridor." This is a major shift that could start the project earlier, decrease the cost from 6.1 billion to 1.5
billion but also decrease the speed of the HSR trains.
Although the California may turn to the two tracks now, Jeff Barker, deputy director for the California
High-Speed Rail Authority, insisted that "the two-track plan is only a start", and "we will finally need a
four-track system by 2035."
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This California case shows that although the method of building new dedicated High-Speed Rail lines and
use new trains can result in better service and higher speed that the method of upgrading existing
conventional railway lines, people may not be able to afford the expensive costs of building new
dedicated HSR lines and turn to other options.
Source: Rosenberg, Mike. 2011. High-Speed Rail: Two-Track Alternative Picks Up Steam in the Bay
Area. MercuryNews Website, May 1st, 2011. Retrieved May 2nd, 2011 from
http://www.mercurynews.com/peninsula/ci 17970647?nclick check=1
Wisconsin Wanted Part of Rejected Fund Back (May 11, 2011)
According to BizTimes (2011), in December, 2010, Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker rejected "the 810
million USD that the federal government had allocated last year to establish a Milwaukee-to-Madison
High-Speed Rail line." And in May, 2011, Wisconsin got nothing from the new 2 billion USD funding
allocations for High-Speed Rail projects throughout the country announced on May 9f, 2011, although
the state "applied for $150 million in High-Speed Rail funding for upgrades to the Milwaukee to Chicago
Hiawatha Amtrak rail line."
According to BizTimes (2011), Walker said "he rejected the federal funding for the Milwaukee-to-
Madison line because the state could not afford the operating costs. Those annual costs were estimated at
$7.5 million, but a federal reimbursement formula could have reduced it to as low as $750,000 per year."
In addition, Walker said "he supported funding to upgrade the Hiawatha line because he preferred to
improve an established and successful rail line rather than attempt to establish a new line to a smaller
market (Madison). The Hiawatha Service had 783,060 riders in fiscal 2010, up 6.1 percent from fiscal
2009. The previous ridership record for the Hiawatha was in 2008, when it served 749,000 riders."
This Wisconsin case also shows that the operating costs of HSR very significant and governments may
not be willing to build HSR even when they don't need to pay the construction costs.
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